Language impairment and colour categories by Davidoff, Jules B. & Luzzatti, Claudio
	








  
!
∀∀
#∃#


∀
%
#&



∋




  
!
())∗

∀∀
#∃#


∀





(+,)−.
∃∃
−/−0−/∗
1
)2−)0∗(∗3
45
∋
#


6
∋
∃∋77∃∀87∗2)97
	
 
 # 
 ∃∃ 
  
 # 
 6& 
  
# 
  
 
 ,. 
 

∃
6&
∃&∀



∃∃&
∀
%
#&


∃&

∃

&





∃∃


6&
:;
∃&∀
<

∃


#&
∃∃&


#

∃&

6
∃∃


∀



∃&∀
#
∃






∃

&




!


∃#


=


>∃ 
 #

<8
#&
6
∃6
<
 
∃ 
<

 
 
∃&∀

7
∃∋77∃0∀∀#8
!
#


∋
60∃?∀8
1. Introduction
This target article considers how a perceptually grounded
categorical repertoire can become sufficiently shared among
the members of a population to allow successful communi-
cation. For example, how do colour categories like “red” or
“purple” become sufficiently shared so that one agent from
the population can use the word “red” to get another agent
to pick out a red object from a set of coloured objects in a
scene?
Our goal is entirely practical. We want to find out how to
design artificial embodied agents (robots) that are able to
do this task. Although the artificial agents might end up
with a quite different categorical repertoire compared to
the repertoires of human beings, it is intriguing and chal-
lenging to investigate under what circumstances the artifi-
cial agents would arrive at humanlike solutions, as this would
enable communication with humans. Because the agents
will be considered to be autonomous and distributed, we
cannot assume telepathy or central control. Because the
real-world environments in which they will find themselves
will be assumed to be open-ended and unknown at design-
time (perhaps the agents are to be sent to a distant planet),
we cannot program into the agents a specific repertoire of
categories because that would make them unable to adapt
to new or unknown circumstances. Moreover, it is known to
be very difficult, if not impossible, to ground categories in
sensory-motor patterns by hand (Harnad 1990), so some
form of learning or evolution will be unavoidable.
It seems a good idea to take as much inspiration as pos-
sible from categorisation and naming by humans because
that is the only natural system achieving shared perceptu-
ally grounded categorisation and communication based on
a rich open-ended repertoire of categories. Moreover, if we
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can generate categorical repertoires that are similar to those
of humans, then communication between humans and ar-
tificial agents will be more feasible. The question of how a
population might coordinate its perceptually grounded cat-
egories and negotiate a shared set of linguistic conventions
to express them is relevant to the computational modeling
of the origins of language and meaning, which is receiving
increased attention lately (Briscoe 2002; Cangelosi & Parisi
2001) and which has important applications in man-machine
interaction.
With respect to human beings, it is generally acknowl-
edged that human physical embodiment plays a significant
role. But it is also clear that this does not yet constrain suf-
ficiently the set of possible categories an agent might utilise
to cope with the world. Three approaches have been sug-
gested to aid the coordination of categories over and above
the constraints given by embodiment:
Approach 1: Nativism. All humans are born with the
same perceptually grounded categories, as part of their
“mentalese.” So when children learn a language, their cat-
egorical repertoire is already shared with that of caregivers
and they only have to learn the names of these categories.
No influence of language on category formation is deemed
to be necessary. Assuming innate perceptual categories im-
plies that the neural mechanisms performing categorization
must be genetically determined and the relevant genes
must have developed through evolution by natural selec-
tion. This position is historically associated with rationalism
(Fodor 1983) and is often found explicitly or implicitly in
evolutionary psychology (Durham 1991; Pinker & Bloom
1990; Shepard 1994). Adopting this position for the design
of artificial agents means that we must simulate genetic
evolution (Fogel 1999; Goldberg 1989; Holland 1975; Koza
1992). Agents could be given a genome that determines
(through some developmental process) how they categorise
the world. We could then use success in communication as
the selection pressure acting in artificial evolution, and, af-
ter some period of time, agents should have zoomed in on
a shared set of perceptually grounded categories adequate
for communication. If the environment changes or imposes
new challenges, genetic evolution could still help the pop-
ulation to adapt.
Approach 2: Empiricism. All human beings share the
same learning mechanisms, so given sufficiently similar en-
vironmental stimuli and a similar sensory-motor apparatus
they will arrive at the same perceptually grounded cate-
gories reflecting the statistical structure of the real world.
Hence the acquisition of language is again a matter of learn-
ing labels for already-known shared categories and there is
no influence of language on category formation. This view
is common among “empiricist psychologists” (Elman et al.
1996) and researchers in inductive symbolic machine learn-
ing (Quinlan 1993) or connectionism (Rumelhart & McClel-
land 1986). If we adopt this approach, the agents will need
to have some inductive learning mechanism with which
they can derive the perceptually grounded categories rele-
vant in their environment, but it is not necessary to intro-
duce a genetic basis for the categories and hence the ge-
netic structure of the agents can be much simpler. Each
agent now needs neural networks, or functionally equiva-
lent clustering algorithms, to perform statistical learning, as
well as networks that learn the association between names
and categories. To guarantee continued adaptation to an
open environment, agents would need to regularly update
their repertoires by performing induction on new, incom-
ing stimuli.
Approach 3: Culturalism. Although human sensory
systems, learning mechanisms, and environments are
shared, there might still be sufficiently important degrees
of freedom left so that categories are not yet sufficiently
shared within a population to support communication. Cul-
turalism therefore argues that language communication (or
other forms of social interaction where perceptual cate-
gories play a role) is required to further coordinate percep-
tual categorisation by providing feedback on how others
conceptualise the world. So language now plays an addi-
tional causal role in conceptual development (e.g., Bower-
man & Levinson 2001; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow 2003;
Gumperz & Levinson 1996).
This cultural hypothesis is favoured by those advocating
a “cultural psychology” (Tomasello 1999) and those viewing
language and its underlying conceptual framework as a
complex adaptive system that is constantly coordinated by
its users (Steels 1997). If this approach is adopted for the
artificial agents, it requires that they are given not only the
mechanisms to invent or adopt categories and ways to cre-
ate and adopt associations between names and categories
but also ways to align these choices with other agents based
on feedback in communication. The categories are now in-
fluenced by multiple factors: embodiment constraints, the
history of interactions and the adaptation after each inter-
action, and the collective consensus arrived at through ne-
gotiation.
There seems no clear consensus in the cognitive science
literature on which approach is most appropriate. We find
researchers strongly arguing on the basis of children’s early
word learning that language acquisition and concept acqui-
sition go hand in hand (Bowerman & Levinson 2001), take
a long time (Bornstein 1985; Teller 1998), and require a
strong form of cultural learning (Tomasello 1999), whereas
others have argued that perceptually grounded concepts
are either innate (Shepard 1994) or acquired prior to and
independently of language (Harnad 1990) without direct
linguistic or categorical feedback (Bloom 2000). So the en-
gineer is not given a clear choice of what would be the best
blueprint for implementing category formation and naming
by embodied communicating agents.
1.1. A case study for colour
Colour has become a prototypical case study to investigate
issues of category sharing in humans because of the relative
ease with which it is possible to gather data (compared to,
e.g., olfactory or gustatory experience) and because colour
is well understood as a physical phenomenon (Wyszecki &
Stiles 1982/2000). Colour is of course also one of the pri-
mary modes, although surely not the only one, in which ar-
tificial robotic agents interact with the world, given the
highly advanced state of digital camera technology.
Knowledge about the neurophysiology, the psychophys-
ics, and the molecular genetics of colour vision has been in-
creasing steadily (for an introduction, see Gegenfurtner &
Sharpe 1999). In recent years, it has become clear that
colour perception is perhaps more variable within normal
subjects than previously thought (e.g., see Bimler et al.
2004). Results from molecular genetics show that there are
several allelic variants of opsin genes, and that 15 to 20% of
Caucasian females have the genetic potential to be tetra-
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chromatic instead of trichromatic (Mollon et al. 2003; Neitz
et al. 1993; Sharpe et al. 1999; Winderickx et al. 1992).
The impact of the variation of the neural substrate on
colour perception, colour categorisation, and colour nam-
ing is still being investigated. But it is a reason from an en-
gineering viewpoint that indicates it is a good idea to take a
closer look at how humans arrive at shared categories. Fab-
rication processes of complex artifacts like robots or cam-
eras are such that there will always be individual differ-
ences, particularly if some form of calibration is involved.
So if Nature has found a solution to enable shared cate-
gorisation in communication, even if the perceptual appa-
ratus is not exactly the same, then that is very relevant for
communicating robots as well. Psychologists and neurobi-
ologists have been collecting large amounts of data that
could help our understanding of how human beings arrive
at shared perceptually grounded categories for communi-
cation. Data supporting a genetic coding of colour cate-
gories are sought by studying the colour categorisation 
behaviour of new-born children (Bornstein et al. 1976; Ger-
hardstein et al. 1999). Data supporting the presence of
learning are sought in colour tests with prelanguage chil-
dren (Bornstein 1975; Bornstein et al. 1976; Davies &
Franklin 2002) and in experiments where individuals from
one culture learn the colour categories of another culture
(Roberson et al. 2000; Rosch-Heider & Olivier 1972).
Anthropologists have also tried to collect empirical data
about whether all human beings in the world, whatever
their language or culture, use exactly the same colour cate-
gories (universalism) or whether there are significant dif-
ferences (relativism). If colour categorisation is universal,
then this is of course a very strong indication that either it
must be genetically determined due to constraints on phys-
iology ( just as each of us has ten fingers) or innate cate-
gorisation, or that there is enough statistical structure in the
real world so that neural systems performing clustering can
easily pick it out, as empiricists have been suggesting. In
that case, it should be straightforward to use these univer-
sal categories as the basis of robotic implementations as
well.
The anthropological research has been conducted using
colour naming tests and memory tests (Berlin & Kay 1969;
Davidoff et al. 1999; Kay et al. 2003; MacLaury 1997;
Rosch-Heider & Olivier 1972), as first introduced by
Lenneberg and Roberts (1956). The studies provided the
following results: (i) The naming experiments, requiring in-
formants to point to the best example for one of the “basic”
colour words in their language, consistently showed that
subjects are not only capable of doing this but that there is
also a large consensus in a language community about what
the focal point is for a particular word, even though there is
less of a consensus about the boundaries of its colour region
(Berlin & Kay 1969). (ii) The memory experiments, which
require informants to pick out a colour sample seen earlier,
show that samples which are closer to focal points are bet-
ter remembered than those closer to the boundaries
(Rosch-Heider 1971; 1972).
Based on data of naming experiments and memory ex-
periments, Berlin and Kay (1969) have argued strongly that
the focal points of colour categories are shared by all lan-
guages and cultures of the world. Recent analysis by Kay
and Regier (2003) of data gathered during the World Color
Survey (Kay et al. 2003) confirm that there are crosslin-
guistic tendencies in colour naming in different languages.
Named colour categories of languages across the world ap-
pear to cluster at points that tend to be described by En-
glish colour names. But Davidoff et al. (1999), Roberson et
al. (2000), and Davidoff (2001) have presented evidence
through the same sort of memory and naming tests that the
focal points of English and the language of the Berinmo (a
Papua New Guinea tribe) are substantially different and
that Rosch-Heider’s data have been misinterpreted. So, de-
spite the abundance of data, no consensus has emerged in
the universalism versus relativism debate; on the contrary,
colour categorisation seems one of the most controversial
areas of cognitive science (e.g., Lucy 1997; Sampson 1997;
Saunders & van Brakel 1997).
It is therefore not surprising that no consensus has been
reached on how the perceptually grounded categories un-
derlying language communication become shared. The na-
tivist view on colour has been strongly defended by, among
others, Berlin and Kay (1969), Kay et al. (1991), Shepard
(1992), Pinker (1994), and Kay and Maffi (1999), based on
the identification of universal trends in colour categorisa-
tion. Language plays no role in this. As Pinker (1994) put 
it: “The way we see colors determines how we learn words
for them, not vice versa” (p. 63). Other researchers have
strongly defended an empiricist position by trying to find
correlations between specific environments and the colour
categories of certain communities (Van Wijk 1959) or by 
investigating how clustering algorithms can pick out the sta-
tistical distributions in natural colour samples (Yendrik-
hovskij 2001b). The culturalist view on colour categorisa-
tion and colour naming has its own defendants; see, for
example, Lucy and Shweder (1979), Gellatly (1995), Davies
and Corbett (1997), Davies (1998), Dedrick (1998), and
Jameson and Alvarado (2003), among others.
1.2. Objectives
The present article does not take a stance on whether a na-
tivist, empiricist, or culturalist approach is the most appro-
priate one for interpreting the human data. It focuses on
the pragmatic goal of finding the best way to design au-
tonomous embodied agents and leaves it up to future de-
bate what this implies for human categorisation and nam-
ing.
Our position is that multiple sources of constraints act on
perceptually grounded colour categories, and (at least in
the case of artificial agents) all of them play a role:
1. Constraints from embodiment. Although there are
more variations in the human visual sensory apparatus than
is usually believed (see the references given in sect. 1.1,
para. 2), there are of course still a large number of similar-
ities in terms of what part of the spectrum human retinal
receptors are sensitive to, what perceptual colour appear-
ance model is used, what low-level signal processing takes
place (e.g., to calibrate perception to context), and so forth.
Moreover, there are also constraints from the kinds of
neural processes that are used for categorization itself and
they show up in human categorisation behaviour – for ex-
ample, through the importance of focal points. Nobody
doubts that these constraints help to shape the possible
repertoire of perceptually grounded colour categories, and
it has recently become possible to incorporate many of
these constraints into artificial vision systems. We will do so
in all the experiments reported in this paper.
2. Constraints coming from the world. Although there is
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significant variation in the environments in which human
beings find themselves (compare growing up at the North
Pole versus in the rainforest), there are obviously consider-
able similarities. Biological organisms must be adapted to
the environment to reach viable performance, and this is
also true for categorisation. This adaptation implies that the
statistical structure of the environment has to be a second
force shaping the possible categorical repertoire. We can
achieve this for artificial agents by giving them stimuli that
are taken from real-world scenes. Of course, if they have to
be adapted to another environment (such as Mars) they
have to be given stimuli from that environment.
3. Constraints coming from culture. We want to exam-
ine the hypothesis that embodiment and statistical regular-
ity of the environment are not enough to achieve sufficient
sharing for communication and that cultural constraints
also play a role. Cultural constraints are collective decisions
made by a population. For example, one community may
decide to drive on the left side of the road, another one may
decide to drive on the right side. Speakers of English have
agreed to call a particular hue “blue” but they could just as
well have called it “plor.” Cultural choice is also available
with respect to the perceptually grounded categories that
are used in conventionalised communication. Instead of
making a categorical distinction between blue and green, a
population may decide to combine these into a single cate-
gory, as indeed many cultures have done. All of which im-
plies that cultural constraints should be a third force, shap-
ing the perceptually grounded categorical repertoire used
for communication.
The first source of constraints is preferred by nativists,
and in some extreme versions of nativism it is argued that
these constraints are enough to explain the (universally)
shared human colour categories underlying language. But
this can only be when not only physiological constraints
(such as those due to the retinal receptors) but also the
colour categories themselves are genetically determined –
in other words, the neural microcircuits performing colour
categorisation are directly laid down under genetic control.
The second source of constraints is preferred by empiri-
cists. They accept of course that there are constraints from
embodiment, but these constraints still leave many degrees
of freedom so that the categories still need to be shaped for
the most part by the environment. Moreover, the empiri-
cists do not believe that additional cultural constraints are
necessary. The third source of constraints is considered to
be crucial by culturalists, even though they do not deny that
embodiment and structure in the environment may also
play roles. Their position has been the most controversial,
perhaps because it is less obvious by what kind of process
cultural constraints could play a role. There is a chicken-
and-egg problem: to name a colour category it seems that
this category must already exist and be shared, so how can
naming influence the shaping of the category?
In order to tease apart the contributions from each
source of constraints we have constructed a series of theo-
retical models and compared their behaviour. Besides the
utility for designing artificial autonomous agents, we be-
lieve that this effort is also valuable for those exploring hu-
man (colour) categorisation and naming. Theoretical mod-
els make a particular view explicit, thereby making it easier
to structure the debate for or against a certain position.
Theoretical models bring out the hidden assumptions of an
approach, particularly with respect to the cognitive mecha-
nisms that are required and the information they need.
Moreover, they help to assess the plausibility of certain as-
sumptions – for example, with respect to the time needed
to acquire categories or propagate word-meaning pairs in a
population. Finally, theoretical models may suggest new ex-
periments for empirical data collection.
Theoretical investigations of the sort undertaken in this
article are very common in many sciences but still surpris-
ingly controversial for psychologists. For example, there is
now a large body of game theoretic models that have revo-
lutionized economics. These models are theoretical in the
sense that they examine the consequences of certain as-
sumptions about the structure of interactions between
agents or the strategies they follow; they may show, for 
example, the presence or absence of a Nash equilibrium
(Gibbons 1992). Usually it is not possible to collect the nec-
essary empirical data to make the model predictions em-
pirically grounded; nevertheless, a lot can be learned about
the possibility of certain outcomes or their plausibility.
These models might help us to infer the effects of certain
consumer behaviours on specific business models, without
evidence of whether consumers actually exhibit these be-
haviours. Similar theoretical approaches are now wide-
spread in biology, where, for example, it has been shown
that certain observed phenomena, like cycles in predator-
prey populations, are due to the mathematical properties of
the underlying dynamical system and not to the specific bi-
ological instantiation (May 1986).
The approach in this target article is in the same line and
uses the same methodological tools. The verbal interactions
between the agents are modeled as multiagent decision
problems, called discrimination games (to categorise the
world) and language games (to communicate with others
using these categories), and our main goal is to understand
what properties follow from the dynamical system implied
by the structure of the interactions and the strategies of the
agents.
1.3. Overview
Because nobody doubts that embodiment constrains per-
ceptually grounded categories, we have first of all at-
tempted to integrate as well as possible the constraints com-
ing from the physics of light interacting with objects in the
real world and the constraints coming from the perceptual
apparatus itself, as captured in widely accepted colour ap-
pearance models such as the CIE L*a*b* space. In each of
our models we use the same neural networks for categori-
sation (radial basis function networks). These networks cap-
ture the prototypical nature of colour categorisation, as
demonstrated by the naming and memory experiments,
and are widely believed to be realistic models of the be-
haviour of biological neural networks. All of our models in-
corporate the same embodiment constraints.
1. To explore position 1 (nativism) we introduce a model
of genetic evolution capable of evolving “genes” for focal
colours and show how these genes can become shared in a
population. Notice that this represents the extreme nativist
position, arguing that not only embodiment but also the
perceptually grounded categories themselves are innate.
2. To explore position 2 (empiricism) we introduce
agents using an inductive learning algorithm in the form of
a neural network capable of acquiring colour categories,
and we examine whether colour categories become shared
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among individual learners when the physiological and en-
vironmental constraints are identical.
3. To explore position 3 (culturalism) we strongly couple
category formation to the situated use of colour categories
in verbal communication and investigate whether this en-
ables a population to reach a shared categorical repertoire.
We not only examine for each of these models whether a
shared repertoire of categories emerges but also whether a
lexicon expressing these categories can arise in the popula-
tion, and whether categorical sharing is sufficient for suc-
cessful communication. This allows us to confront the
chicken-and-egg problem alluded to earlier: How can a
self-organising lexicon influence an emergent adaptive cat-
egorical repertoire and vice versa?
The semiotic dynamics generated in the interaction be-
tween perception, categorisation, and naming is too com-
plex (in a mathematical sense) to be solved analytically, so
we examine its properties through computer simulations,
starting from real-world physical colour data captured by a
multispectral camera. The use of computer simulations for
examining the behaviour of complex systems is common in
all the sciences of complexity, including nonlinear physics
(Nicolis & Prigogine 1989) and artificial life (Langton
1995). It is characteristic for the “methodology of the arti-
ficial” (Steels 2001b) and has been pioneered for colour
cognition research by Lammens (1994), who proposed the
first concrete computational models exploring colour cate-
gorisation and naming. In order to make the simulations
feasible, cultural constraints are exercised exclusively
through language, even though language is clearly not the
only factor that embodies such constraints. Note that the
use of computer simulations does not imply any stance on
whether the brain is a computer (we believe it is not), just
as the use of computer simulations to make predictive
models of the weather does not imply that the weather is
seen as a computer.
In the first batch of experiments (sects. 3 and 4), the pre-
sented colour stimuli have no realistic statistical distribu-
tion, precisely because we want to examine whether a pop-
ulation can coordinate its colour categorisation and colour
naming even if there is no chromatic distribution in the
data. This forces the question of whether coordination is
possible, purely based on a structural coupling between cat-
egorisation and naming processes. The main conclusion is
that this is indeed possible and hence that it is at least plau-
sible that language plays a role in coordinating the percep-
tually grounded categories. Our main contribution here is
to solve the chicken-and-egg problem by introducing a two-
way causality between naming and category formation.
Next, in section 5, we consider what happens when there
is a statistical distribution in the samples. This helps us ex-
amine whether colour stimuli taken from real-world scenes
are sufficiently constraining so that no coupling between
categorisation and naming is required to explain how a pop-
ulation can coordinate its repertoire of perceptually
grounded categories (either through genetic evolution or
statistical learning). The main conclusion here is that even
if the statistical structure of the world constrains the cate-
gories that arise in the agents, it is not so obvious that the
statistical structure of the environment alone can explain
the sharing of perceptually grounded categories. This con-
firms that three interacting forces are at work: embodi-
ment, an environment with statistical structure, and cul-
tural negotiation.
Some conclusions and suggestions for further research
conclude the paper.
2. Components for categorisation and naming
This section introduces the basic components needed for
making computational models of colour categorisation and
colour naming: agents, environments, and tasks.
2.1. Agents
We define an abstract object called an agent. A set of agents
is called a population. We use small populations in this tar-
get article (typically 10 agents) because we know from other
work that the mechanisms being used in our models scale
up to populations of thousands of agents (Steels et al. 2002).
All agents have the same architecture for perception, cate-
gorisation, and naming but each has unique associated in-
formation structures, representing its repertoire of cate-
gories and its lexicon. The agent’s architecture is intended
to model what we know today about human colour percep-
tion, categorisation, and naming. Agents cannot use infor-
mation structures of other agents so they have no telepathic
access to the categories or lexicons used by other agents.
Neither do agents have a global view of what words are used
by others; they have only local information coming from the
interactions in which they were involved themselves. There
is no central authority specifying how the agents should
conceptualise reality or speak. Agents only interact by ex-
changing words and by nonverbal gestural feedback (point-
ing). The agent population is an example of a distributed
multiagent system (Ferber 1998), commonly used in artifi-
cial-life simulations.
Next we define verbal interactions between agents. An
interaction has a communicative goal – namely, the speaker
draws the attention of the hearer to an object in the envi-
ronment. After each interaction, agents adapt their internal
states to become more successful in the future. So the
framework of evolutionary game theory, which has been
used to model genetic and cultural evolution in biology
(Maynard Smith 1982), applies and we therefore call the in-
teractions language games. The notion of a language game
resonates with the philosophical work of Wittgenstein
(1953) who emphasised the situated contextual nature of
word meaning. Indeed, the agents in our simulations are
grounded, in the sense that their symbols are coupled to the
environment through a sensory apparatus (Harnad 1990),
they are embodied, because the apparatus and subsequent
processing reflects human physiology (Kaiser & Boynton
1996), they are situated, because the games are embedded
in the context of communicative acts in a shared real-world
setting (Suchman 1987), and they are cultural, because the
agents are part of a population with recurrent interactions
between the members (Sperber 1996).
Genetic evolution is modelled by introducing change in
the population. At regular times, some of the agents are re-
placed by offspring (mutated versions of themselves) de-
pending on their success in colour categorisation and colour
naming. This is in the spirit of research in genetic algo-
rithms and evolutionary computing (Fogel 1999; Goldberg
1989; Holland 1975; Koza 1992).
Individualistic learning is modelled by a process in which
the categorical repertoires and lexicons of the agents
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change in interaction with the environment but without in-
teractions among the agents. This is in the spirit of connec-
tionist learning (Elman et al. 1996). Cultural learning is
modelled by using a similar connectionist learning algo-
rithm, but now with cultural constraints, exercised through
language, playing an additional role (Steels 2001a).
2.2. The environment
The environment consists of 1,269 matte-finished Munsell
colour chips (Munsell 1976), familiar from anthropological
experiments. We use the spectral energy distribution E(l)
reflected by physical chips as measured by a spectrometer
from 380 to 800 nm in 1-nm steps (Parkkinen et al. 1989).
The simulations do not use monochrome colour samples or
random values in RGB or another colour space; instead,
they start from realistic colour data. In each game, the
agents are presented with a number of samples randomly
drawn from the total set. This set constitutes the context of
the game. One of the samples is chosen as the topic. Choice
of topic and context reflect the ecological conditions of the
environment.
The environmental complexity is experimentally con-
trolled by changing the total number of colour samples and
the similarity between the samples. The ecological com-
plexity is controlled by varying the properties of the context:
the average number of samples in a context and the (short-
est) distance from the topic to the other samples in the 
context. For example, fine shades of orange may constitute
the difference between edible and nonedible mushrooms.
Mushroom eaters will therefore need to acquire the ability
to distinguish these fine shades of orange. If the distinction
is much clearer (e.g., because all edible mushrooms are or-
ange and all nonedible ones are white), the agents’ colour
distinctions can be less fine-grained, even though the same
diversity of orange shades might still occur in the environ-
ment. In general, when there are more samples and they
are closer together, finer categorical distinctions are needed
and the lexicon can be expected to contain more colour
words. This dependency between environmental and eco-
logical complexity on the one hand and cognitive complex-
ity on the other is a property of the proposed models and is
discussed by Belpaeme (2001).
2.3. Agent architecture
2.3.1. Perception. All agents are assumed to have exactly
the same perceptual process. Perception starts from a spec-
tral energy distribution S(l) and is converted into tristimu-
lus values in CIE L*a*b*, which is considered to be a rea-
sonable model of human lightness perception (L*), and the
opponent channels red-green (a*) and yellow-blue (b*).
This colour coding handles certain aspects of the colour
constancy problem as well (Fairchild 1998, p. 219).
The spectral energy distributions are converted to XYZ
coordinates using the following equations:
X  kS(l) x¯(l) dl
Y  kS(l) y¯(l) dl
Z  kS(l) z¯(l) dl. (1)
x¯(l), y¯(l), and z¯(l) are the 1931 2 CIE colour matching
functions, describing how an average observer reacts to
chromatic stimuli.1 The CIE L*a*b* colour coding is com-
puted directly from these CIE XYZ values using standard
formulas (Wyszecki & Stiles 1982/2000, p. 166).
Obviously the realism of this model can be improved. For
example, Lammens (1994) started from the neural re-
sponse functions proposed by De Valois and De Valois
(1975) and De Valois et al. (1966) and showed how tristim-
ulus values in another colour space can be derived. This
space, though carefully constructed and founded on neu-
rophysiological data, is not as suited for colour categorisa-
tion as is the CIE L*a*b* space (Lammens 1994, p. 142).
So for categorising colour perception, CIE L*a*b* remains
a good choice.2
2.3.2. Categorisation. Categorisation is based on the gen-
erally accepted notion that colours have prototypes and a
region surrounding each prototype (Rosch 1978) with fuzzy
boundaries (Kay & McDaniel 1978). Categorisation can
therefore be modelled with adaptive networks, a modifica-
tion of radial basis function networks (Medgassy 1961),
which are widely assumed to have a high biological plausi-
bility (Hassoun 1995). Input to the network is a tristimulus
x in CIE L*a*b* space.
An adaptive network consists of locally reactive units.
These units have a peak response at a central value m and
an exponential decay around this central value. The re-
gional extent around m is determined by a normalised
Gaussian function, of which the width3 is defined by param-
eter s, thus giving rise to the magnet effect typically found
in categorical perception (Harnad 1990). The behaviour of
each unit j is defined as follows:
(2)
Rather than a single decision unit, as in the work of Lam-
mens (1994), an adaptive network is used for each colour
category.4 Each network contains weighted locally reactive
units, so that colour regions do not have to be symmetrical
– as is the case with only a single decision unit. Each unit
in the network reacts to an incoming stimulus x, as in equa-
tion (2). The reaction of an adaptive network for category k
with J locally reactive units has the following form, familiar
from perceptron-like feed-forward networks (Minsky & Pa-
pert 1969), where wj is a weight factor with a range between
0 and 1:
yk(x)  wjzj(x). (3)
Each colour category has its own adaptive network and all
networks consider the input in parallel. The “best match-
ing” colour category b for a given tristimulus value x is de-
termined by a winner-take-all process based on the output
of each categorical network:
c  C : yb(x)  yc(x). (4)
The various components of the adaptive networks are
summarised in Figure 1. Physiological evidence for locally
reactive units in the domain of vision have been found in
the macaque monkey visual cortex (Komatsu et al. 1992)
and these neurons have been modeled by Lehky and Sej-
nowksi (1999).
2.3.3. Naming. Naming is modelled with an associative
memory network L. One word form can be associated with
several categories (because the agent must be able to main-
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tain multiple hypotheses about the meaning of a word) and
one category with several word forms (because the agent
must be able to maintain multiple hypotheses about which
word to use for a specific meaning). Given a set C of n cat-
egories and a set F of mword forms, this network consists of
n  m relations, each having a strength s  [0.0, 1.0], so that
L  C  F  [0.0, 1.0]. Words are randomly selected from
a finite alphabet of syllables. The strength of the association
between a category and a word can be varied, as explained
later. When a word form f is needed for a category c, there
is a winner-take-all competition and the word form with the
highest strength wins. Conversely, to find the category given
a word form f, there is again a competition. The category c
with the highest strength is taken as the winner.
2.4. Tasks
We will explore two types of interactions. The first requires
an individual agent to discriminate a sample (called the
topic) from a set of other samples. This means that the
agent must not only categorise all the samples in the con-
text but must also find a categorisation of the topic that is
unique for the topic and does not apply to any other sam-
ple in the context. We call this a discrimination game (Steels
1996a). The second interaction is between two agents in a
shared context playing the roles of speaker and hearer. The
speaker chooses the topic, categorises it using a discrimi-
nation game, and names the categorisation. The hearer
must identify the topic based on the category name. We call
this a guessing game because the hearer has to guess the ob-
ject intended by the speaker through verbal means. We
have been using the guessing game in a wide variety of ex-
periments investigating the origins of language (Steels &
Kaplan 1999; Steels et al. 2002), including experiments on
autonomous mobile robots (Steels 2001a; Steels & Kaplan
2002; Vogt 2003).
2.4.1. The discrimination game. The discrimination game
has been chosen so as to introduce the ecological dimen-
sion into the models. As already mentioned, suppose that
various types of mushrooms have similar form and shape
and are distinguishable only by their colour, and further
suppose that only one type of mushroom is edible. Given a
specific situation with a number of mushrooms on the table,
the agent must play a discrimination game in which the
topic is the edible mushroom and the other objects in the
context are the nonedible mushrooms. So ecology is con-
cretised through which objects form a context, and which
ones are topics that need to be distinguished. Similar ex-
amples could be given for distinguishing predators or prey
based on colour marks, distinguishing members of the
group from outsiders using the colour of clothes, and so
forth. In later simulations, contexts are chosen randomly
and any sample in the context can be the topic, so there is
no strong distinction between environmental constraints
(which stimuli are present in the environment) and ecology
(which stimuli are functionally significant to the agent).
The discrimination game is defined more precisely as fol-
lows. An agent has a possibly empty set of categories C. A
random context O  {o1, . . . , oN} is created and presented
to the agent. It contains N colour stimuli oi of which one is
the topic ot. These colour stimuli take the form of spectral
distributions of energy against wavelength. The topic has to
be discriminated from the rest of the context. The game
proceeds as follows:
1. Context O  {o1, . . . , oN} and the topic ot  O are
presented to the agent.
2. The agent perceives each object oi and produces a
sensory representation for each object: Soi  {s1
oi, . . . ,
sN
oi}. The sensory representation is the CIE L*a*b* value
computed from the spectral distribution, as discussed ear-
lier.
3. For all N sensory representations, the “best” category
cso  C is found, according to
cSo
 arg max(yc(So)), (5)
C
where yc is the output of the adaptive network belonging to
category c, and So is the sensory input for an object o.
4. The topic ot can be discriminated from the context
when there exists a category whose network has the highest
output for the topic but not for any other sample in the con-
text:
count({cSo1 ,..., cSoN}, cSot)  1. (6)
2.4.2. The guessing game. The guessing game has been
chosen because it is the most basic language game one can
imagine. It is a game of reference where the speaker wants
to get something from the listener and identifies it through
language, as opposed to gestures. Language presupposes a
categorisation of reality because words name categories and
not individual objects. The ecological relevance of guessing
games is obvious. For example, two people sit at a table on
which there are various fruits of the same form and shape
but with different colours. The speaker wants a particular
type of fruit (the topic) and says, for example, “Could you
give me the red one,” whereupon the hearer has to apply
the category that is the meaning of “red” to the objects in
the context and identify the desired fruit. The meaning of
“red” is the category that discriminates the topic from the
other objects in this context. So the guessing game implies
a discrimination game.
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Figure 1. Categorisation is performed by an adaptive network
consisting of locally reactive units fully connected to a summing
output unit. Each such network corresponds to one colour cate-
gory. 
The guessing game is more precisely defined as an inter-
action between two agents, one acting as the speaker and
the other as the hearer. The agents have an associative
memory relating colour categories with colour names. Each
association has an associated strength. The game consists of
the following steps.
1. A context O  {o1, . . . , oN} is presented to both the
speaker and the hearer. Only the speaker is aware of the
topic ot  O.
2. The speaker tries to discriminate the topic from the
context by playing a discrimination game. If a discriminat-
ing category cs is found, the game continues; otherwise the
game fails.
3. The speaker looks up the word forms associated with
cs. If no word forms are found, the speaker creates a new
random word form f by combining syllables from a previ-
ously given repertoire and stores an association between f
and cs. On the other hand, if there are word forms associ-
ated with cs, the one with the highest strength s is selected.
The speaker conveys word form f to the hearer.
4. The hearer looks up f in its lexicon. If f is unknown to
the hearer, the game fails and the speaker reveals the topic
ot to the hearer by pointing to it. The hearer then tries dis-
criminating the topic ot from the context. If a discriminat-
ing category is found, the word form f is associated with it;
if no discriminating category is found, a new category is cre-
ated to represent the topic and f is associated with it.
5. If the hearer does have the word form f in its lexicon,
the hearer looks up the associated category ch and identi-
fies the topic by selecting the stimulus in the context with
the highest activation for this category ch. The hearer then
points to this sample.
6. The speaker observes to which sample the hearer is
pointing and if this is the one that the speaker had chosen
as the topic, the game is successful. If not, the speaker iden-
tifies the topic and the hearer adapts its categorical network
and its lexicon as in equation (4) to become better in future
games.
When agents only engage in discrimination games, the
formation of colour categories is influenced by physiologi-
cal, environmental, and ecological constraints only. When
agents perform a discrimination game and a guessing game,
a cultural dimension is brought in (through language).
Guessing games are therefore an effective way to study the
potential causal relation between language and category ac-
quisition. Another reason for using the guessing game is
that the colour-chip-naming experiments widely used in an-
thropological research (Berlin & Kay 1969; Lantz & Stef-
flre 1964; Lenneberg & Roberts 1956; Kay et al. 1991;
1997; MacLaury 1997; Rosch-Heider 1972) are equivalent
to guessing games. So, if needed, the results of our simula-
tions can be compared with anthropological data obtained
with human subjects. One difference is that the context in
most anthropological studies usually consists of all the
Munsell chips and the topic is the best representative or
prototype of a colour name. It would be desirable for an-
thropological experiments to be made more realistic by ask-
ing subjects to name topics within ecologically valid con-
texts (see also Jameson & Alvarado 2003). Presenting all the
Munsell chips at once is obviously an unusual problem set-
ting for human subjects; it is no wonder that some report
difficulties doing it.
We now discuss a series of computer simulations explor-
ing different ways in which colour categories and colour
names can be acquired. The first series (described in sect.
3) assumes that there is no causal role of language in con-
cept formation, so agents only play discrimination games.
In section 4, guessing games are used to explore the inter-
action between conceptualisation and language. As men-
tioned earlier, no statistical structure is present in the data,
in order to find out whether coordination of categories
takes place even in the absence of such a structure. In sec-
tion 5, we examine colour samples drawn from real-world
data where a clear chromatic structure is present.
3. Learning without language
We saw earlier that there could be two approaches to the
problem of how concepts are acquired: either they are
learned or they are innately present, the latter implying that
they have evolved through genetic evolution. The two pos-
sibilities are explored in sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
The discrimination context is the same for both experi-
ments and consists of four stimuli chosen from a total of
1,269 Munsell chips. In the learning case, the agents adapt
their categorical networks during their lifetime in the spirit
of connectionist learning systems (Churchland & Sejnowski
1992). In the genetic evolution case, the agents have a fixed
network and change takes place only when there is a new
generation whose “colour genes” have undergone some
mutation, in the spirit of genetic algorithms (Holland 1975).
But first we need some measures to follow the progress and
adequacy of concept formation (for more details on these
measures see Belpaeme 2002).
3.1. Measures
To play a discrimination game i the agent A is given a con-
text that consists of a set of (randomly chosen) colour sam-
ples. One sample from this context (also randomly chosen)
is the topic. The agent then exercises its categorisation net-
work. There are two possible outcomes: (i) If the colour
sample is uniquely categorised, then agent A is capable of
discriminating the topic from the other colour samples, and
the discriminative success for game i is dsAi  1. (ii) If no
unique category is found for the topic, the discrimination
game has failed; dsAi  0.
The discriminative success of the agent for a specific en-
vironment ideally reaches 100%. In this case we say that the
agent has acquired an adequate repertoire of colour cate-
gories for that environment. The cumulative discriminative
success at game j for a series of n games is defined as
(7)
The average success of a population of m agents at game j
is defined as
(8)
The category variance cv between the categorical reper-
toires of the different agents is measured by computing the
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cumulated distance between the categories of the agents of
a population P  {A1, . . . , An}, as in
(9)
where D(Ai,Aj) is a distance measure between the category
sets of two agents.5
3.2. Individualistic learning
We now present a model of individualistic learning. The up-
date rule used by an agent after playing a game is a function
of the success of the play.
When successful: The weights wi of each locally reac-
tive unit i of the discriminating category network are in-
creased according to the following rule:
wi  wi  bzi(Soi) (10)
where zi(Soi) is the output of unit i for the topic Soi, and b is
the learning rate.6
When not successful: The discrimination game sce-
nario can fail in two ways. First, the agent has no categories
yet (C  ∅); in this case the agent creates a new category
centred on the topic. Second, no discriminating category
can be found because the category found for the topic is
also applicable to the other objects. When the discrimina-
tive success of the agent is lower than a predefined thresh-
old (set at 95%), a new category is created. Otherwise, the
best matching category network is adapted by adding a new
locally reactive unit to its network.
Adding a new category is done by creating a category
with only one locally reactive unit centred on the sensory
representation of the topic (m  Sot ). Adapting a category
is similarly done by just adding a new locally reactive unit
sensitive to the topic.
After playing a discrimination game, the weights of all the
locally reactive units of all categories of the agent are de-
creased by a small factor. The weight decay, a learning rule
standard in the literature (Krogh & Hertz 1995; Rumelhart
& McClelland 1986), is defined as
wj  awj , (11)
where a	 1 is a nonnegative value. This takes care of a slow
“forgetting” of unused categories and thus of the reshaping
of categories to remain adapted to changes to the environ-
ment or the ecology.
The following graphs show the outcome of simulations
exploring this model. Agents play successive discrimination
games with random sets of samples from the environment
and randomly chosen topics within each set. In a first illus-
trative experiment (Fig. 2), a population of 10 agents plays
a series of 1,000 discrimination games. The context of a
game contains four colour stimuli chosen randomly from
the complete set of more than 1,269 Munsell chips, of
which one stimulus has to be discriminated from the other
three. The chips are at a minimum Euclidean distance of
50 from each other in L*a*b*-space. Agents take random
turns playing a game. Two agents are randomly selected
from the population to play one discrimination game. The
x-axis maps to consecutive games. The left y-axis of Figure
2 shows the average success rate in the discrimination game
with the learning rules used here. We see clearly that dis-
criminative success increases to almost 100%, proving that
the agents are capable of developing a repertoire of colour
categories adequate for the given environment.7 The right
y-axis plots the size of the categorical repertoire. It sta-
bilises when the agents have become successful in discrim-
ination. It is undeniable that a repertoire forms which is ad-
equate for the given environment and ecology. When the
environment or the ecology is more complex, agents take
longer and the number of categories increases, but the
same trend is seen.
A mapping of the extent and focal points of the different
colour categories for two agents onto the Munsell array is
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 4 shows that agents endowed with adaptive net-
works are capable of coping with changes to the environ-
ment. The agents start now with a context of four stimuli
randomly chosen from a total of seven stimuli. The stimuli
are equal to the Munsell chips8 corresponding to red, yel-
low, green, blue, purple, black, and white. The categorical
repertoires stabilise and after 50 games four more stimuli
are added as potential choices.9 We see at first a dip in dis-
crimination success. Then the agents quickly adapt to the
more complex situation by expanding their colour reper-
toires. Note that the population does not change during the
course of the simulation and agents do not interact with
each other. The observed behaviour is entirely based on in-
dividualistic learning.
Clearly the proposed mechanisms solve the acquisition
problem, but what about the sharing problem? Figure 5
compares the repertoire of the different agents for the same
run as in Figure 2, using the category variance metric cv de-
fined earlier. Although the agents are all capable of dis-
crimination, they use different repertoires. And although
the repertoires tend to become more similar as the simula-
tion progresses, the similarity is not absolute (if all cate-
gories were similar, the category variance would be zero).
This demonstrates that the constraints that are at work,
namely the physiological constraints (perception and cog-
nitive architecture) and the environmental and ecological
constraints, are not enough to drive the agents to the same
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Figure 2. Average discriminative success DS and average num-
ber of categories (dotted line) of 10 agents playing discrimination
games.
solution space. Different solutions are possible for the same
task in the same environment. More sophisticated physio-
logical models will probably not alter that fact. Indeed, the
results hint why it has not been possible to explain basic
colour categories based on physiological constraints alone
(e.g., Gellatly 1995; Jameson & D’Andrade 1997; Saunders
& van Brakel 1997). If different populations exposed to dif-
ferent environmental stimuli and ecological challenges
were to be compared, the repertoires of the agents in the
population would be even more different.
Table 1 shows the interpopulation category variance cv
,
a metric used to show how well categories compare across
populations. It is the average of the category variance com-
puted between all agents of two different populations P and
P
. The number of agents in the populations P and P
 are n
and m, respectively, which are assumed to be equal for all
populations being compared:
(12)
Table 1 shows that the category sets of agents within and
across populations are quite dissimilar (an intuitive grasp
can be obtained by comparing the values in this table with
other category variance tables in the following sections). If
the categories of agents are similar between two popula-
tions, cv
 decreases. Populations where all individuals have
identical categories have cv
  0.
We conclude that:
1. Individualistic learning leads to the development of
an adequate repertoire of colour categories.
2. There is a certain percentage of sharing of colour cat-
egories within a population, which can be attributed to
shared physiological, environmental, and ecological con-
straints, but there is no 100% coherence.
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Figure 4. Average discriminative success DS and average num-
ber of categories (dotted line) for a population of 10 agents that
learn colour categories. In the first 50 games the context is cho-
sen from a simple stimuli set; after 50 games the set of stimuli is
extended to increase complexity. The graph shows how the agents
cope to reach again a discriminative success of 100%.
Figure 5. The category variance of a population of 10 agents
playing discrimination games (for the same simulation as reported
in Fig. 2). The graph shows how the categories of all agents start
to resemble each other due to ecological pressure, but do not be-
come equal.
Figure 3. The maximum (white circle) and the extent (colour coding) of the categories of two agents after playing 1,000 discrimination
games. The chart consists of saturated Munsell chips, following Berlin and Kay (1969). Observe how categories are distributed across
the Munsell chart, and how both agents end up with different categories.
3. The colour categories are not shared across popula-
tions.
3.3. Genetic evolution
This section turns to the properties of genetic evolution. We
examine a variation of the previous model which includes
different generations of agents. Each agent has a set of
“colour genes” that directly encode its categorical networks,
so we shortcut the problem of modelling gene expression.
The networks do not change during the lifetime of the
agent. Agents play exactly the same discrimination game as
before. They have a cumulative score, reflecting their suc-
cess in the game, as defined earlier. This score is used to de-
termine the fitness of the agent. The m fittest agents (where
m is equal to 50% in the present simulation) are retained in
the next generation and the others are discarded. A single
mutated copy is made of each remaining agent so that the
size of the population always remains constant. Mutations,
which happen with a probability inversely proportional to
discriminatory success, can take four forms with equal prob-
ability:
1. A new category network is added with a single locally
reactive unit whose centre is at a random point in the
L*a*b* space.
2. A randomly chosen category network is expanded by
adding a new locally reactive unit whose centre m is at a
random deviation from the centroid c of the category. The
centroid c of the category is computed as in equation (13).
The centre of the added locally reactive unit is randomly
chosen from a normal distribution with mean c and stan-
dard deviation s.
(13)
3. A randomly chosen existing category network is re-
stricted by removing one randomly chosen locally reactive
unit. If no unit is left, the category network itself is re-
moved.
4. An existing, randomly chosen category network is re-
moved.
Only one mutation is allowed for each copy. Note that the
mutation operator does not use any intelligence about what
might be good changes to the categorical repertoire, as in-
deed it should be.
Figure 6 shows the behaviour of this model using the
same environmental stimuli as in the learning case dis-
cussed earlier (a context consists of four stimuli chosen
from a total of 1,269 Munsell chips). The x-axis plots the dif-
ferent generations of agents. The y-axis displays the success
rate after n generations. This success rate is based on the
outcome of 50 discrimination games. We see that after sev-
eral generations a population of agents is reached which
have adequate categorical repertoires for the given envi-
ronment. When this environment is made more complex
(in a similar way as in Fig. 4), genetic evolution generates
more colour categories, and after a number of generations
there is again an adequate repertoire (Fig. 7). Figure 8
shows the focus and extent of the categories of two agents
plotted on the two-dimensional Munsell colour chart.
These results show that our model of genetic evolution is
also capable of evolving agents that have adequate reper-
toires of colour categories. There is of course a profound
difference between the learning and genetic scenarios. In
the learning scenario, agents start their life with no colour
categories, develop an adequate repertoire within their life-
time, and adapt to environmental changes (caused, e.g., by
the availability of new dyes) also within their lifetime. In the
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Table 1. Interpopulation category variance cv
 of five popula-
tions for which the categories have been learned under identical
experimental settings, except for the initial random seed
cv
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
A1 9.29
A2 10.14 9.38
A3 10.62 10.51 9.62
A4 10.84 11.25 10.94 9.22
A5 10.89 11.14 10.31 11.21 9.83
Figure 6. Average discriminative success DS and average num-
ber of categories (dotted line) for a population of 10 agents for
which the colour categories are evolving in a genetic fashion.
Figure 7. Average discriminative success DS and average num-
ber of genetically evolved categories (dotted line) for a population
of 10 agents. In the first 50 games the context is chosen from a
simple stimuli set; after 50 games the set of stimuli is extended to
increase complexity. 
genetic scenario, successive generations of agents are
needed before a generation arises that has an adequate
repertoire. So genetic evolution is much slower than learn-
ing, which is of course a well-known fact. This is borne out
by the simulation results shown in Figure 7, which uses the
same data as the learning case in Figure 4. Rather than
adapting after two dozen more games, the agents need
about 20 generations (which would amount to at least 400
years of evolution if such a mechanism were applied to an
equally small population of 10 humans, counting a modest
20 years per generation). On the other hand, once genetic
evolution has established a repertoire, agents do not have
to learn anything because they are born with a ready-to-use
categorical repertoire.
Figure 9 displays the category variance between the cat-
egorical repertoires of the agents in the case of genetic evo-
lution. We see clearly that genetic evolution not only solves
the acquisition problem but also the sharing problem. The
population evolves towards the same categorical repertoire
for all the agents. This is in strong contrast with the learn-
ing scenario where the final repertoires were never identi-
cal. The cause of this sharing lies in the nature of genetic
evolution. The colour genes coding the categorical net-
works of more successful agents propagate in the popula-
tion and so after some time these “genes” completely dom-
inate. Which colour categories come out depends on
environmental, ecological, and physiological constraints,
but there are multiple solutions. Genetic evolution ran-
domly selects one solution that then spreads to the rest of
the population. This is clearly seen by doing another simu-
lation with exactly the same parameters (for the environ-
ment, genetic mutation rates, etc.) but starting from an-
other random seed. Due to the randomness inherent in the
genetic search process, the two repertoires are very differ-
ent. This is shown in Table 2, which shows that the varia-
tion within a population is almost nonexistent (	0.40) but
across populations the variation is considerable. With dif-
ferent ecological and environmental constraints the varia-
tion would be even more dramatic.
We conclude that:
1. Genetic evolution leads to the development of an ad-
equate repertoire of colour categories.
2. The colour categories are completely shared among
the individuals within a population.
3. The colour categories are not shared across popula-
tions.
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Figure 8. The maximum (white circle) and the extent (colour coding) of the categories of two agents with genetically evolved cate-
gories. Because of the dynamics of the evolutionary process, most categories of both agents are identical.
Figure 9. The category variance of a population of 20 agents af-
ter evolving for more than 50 generations (under the same condi-
tions as in Fig. 6). It can be seen that there is hardly any variation
between the categories of the agents.
Table 2. Interpopulation category variance of 5 populations for
which the categories have been evolved using the discriminative
success as fitness measure
cv
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
A1 0.40
A2 4.91 0.40
A3 3.98 5.75 0.05
A4 3.67 4.54 4.64 0.20
A5 5.60 6.26 6.10 5.55 0.27
4. Learning with language
The previous section compared individualistic learning
with genetic evolution. Both are capable of explaining how
categories may be acquired by individuals, but only genetic
evolution can also explain how colour concepts could be-
come shared. In the next series of experiments, we study
the impact of language (and therefore of culture) on the for-
mation of colour categories by letting the agents play guess-
ing games and discrimination games as part of a guessing
game. Again we are interested in modelling both cases:
learning (sect. 4.2) and genetic evolution (sect. 4.3). First
we need some additional measures to follow the progress in
the experiment.
4.1. Measures
There are three possible outcomes of a guessing game: (i)
The topic pointed at by the hearer is equal to the topic cho-
sen by the speaker; therefore, the game i is a success for
both agents A: communicative success csAi  1. (ii) The
topic pointed at by the hearer is not equal to the topic cho-
sen by the speaker; the game i is a failure for both agents A:
csAi  0. (iii) The game got stuck somewhere halfway, ei-
ther because the speaker or the hearer did not have a dis-
criminating category, or because the speaker did not have a
word for the category or the hearer did not know the word.
In this case the game is also a failure for both agents A: csAi
 0.
The cumulative communicative success CSAj of an agent
A at game j for the last series of n games is defined as
(14)
The cumulative success CSj for a population of m agents
A for the last series of n games at game j is defined as
(15)
4.2. Lexicon acquisition
No one has ever proposed that humans acquire the vocab-
ularies of their language by genetic evolution, simply be-
cause lexical evolution is too rapid, most humans are bilin-
gual, and children clearly go through a long phase in which
they acquire new words (Bloom 2000; de Boysson-Bardies
1999). Nevertheless, a number of mathematical and com-
putational models show that genetic evolution can in prin-
ciple do the job (Cangelosi 2001; Nowak & Krakauer 1999).
These models code the lexicon as part of an agent’s genome,
use communicative accuracy as selection pressure, and pro-
pose gene spreading as the mechanism by which the group
reaches coherence. Here we stick to the more realistic view
that lexicons are learned and that coherence arises through
self-organisation in the population. Two kinds of computa-
tional models have been proposed in such a case: observa-
tional learning models that do not use negative evidence
(Hurford 1989; Oliphant 1996) and active learning models
that use both positive and negative evidence (Steels 1996b).
It is the latter approach that is used in this paper.
The word-learning algorithm for the hearer and the
speaker works as follows:
1. Assume that a speaker has associated the word forms
{ f1, . . . , fm}with the discriminating category ck and assume
that fj is the word form with the highest strength skj between
fj and ck.
(a) If the communication is successful, the speaker in-
creases the strength skj by dinc  0.1 and decreases the
strength of connections with other categories by dinh (this
mechanism is called lateral inhibition).
(b) If the communication is unsuccessful, the speaker
decreases the strength skj by ddec.
2. Assume that the hearer has associated categories
{c1, . . . , cm} with the word fk and assume that cj is the cat-
egory that had the highest strength for fk.
(a) If the communication is successful, the hearer in-
creases the strength skj by dinc and decreases the strength
of competing words associated with the same category by
dinh.
(b) If the communication is unsuccessful, the hearer de-
creases the strength sjk by ddec.
The algorithm has therefore three parameters. In later sim-
ulations we use dinc  dinh  ddec  0.1. Lateral inhibition
is based on positive evidence (a successful game) and is
necessary to damp synonyms. When ddec  0, negative ev-
idence plays a role, and this has been found to be necessary
to damp homonymy.
When a speaker does not have a word yet for a category
that needs to be expressed, the speaker creates a new word
form (by generating a random combination of syllables
from a prespecified repertoire) and adds an association be-
tween this word and the category in its associative memory
with initial strength s  0.5. This ensures that new words
enter into the population and it explains how a group of
agents may develop a grounded lexicon from scratch. When
a hearer does not have the word used by the speaker in its
associative memory, it stores the new word with a category
that is capable of discriminating the topic pointed at by the
speaker with initial strength s  0.5.
The positive feedback loop between use and success
causes self-organisation, in the sense of nonlinear dynami-
cal systems theory (Nicolis & Prigogine 1989; Stengers &
Prigogine 1986). An example of self-organisation is path
formation in an ant society. Ants deposit pheromone when
returning to the nest with food. This attracts other ants who
also deposit pheromone, and so there is a a positive feed-
back loop that causes all ants to assemble on the same path
(Camazine et al. 2001). In a similar way, the more speakers
adopt a word and the meaning underlying it, the more suc-
cessful communication with that word will be and hence the
more speakers will adopt it. The positive feedback loop be-
tween the use of a word and its success in shared commu-
nication causes that use to spread in the population like
viruses and eventually dominate. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 10, taken from a large-scale experiment in lexicon for-
mation discussed in Steels and Kaplan (1998). The agents
converge towards the same lexicon because once a word
starts to become successful in the population its success
grows until it takes over in a winner-take-all effect due to
the nonlinear nature of the positive feedback loop.
Lexical incoherence may remain in the population if dif-
ferent categories are compatible with a large set of contexts;
for example, a particular word may for a long time be asso-
ciated with bright and yellow if in most situations the
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brightest object is also the one that is uniquely yellow. (This
relates to Quine’s [1960] well-known puzzle in which a lin-
guist observing a native can never be sure if gavagaimeans
rabbit, or hopping, or a temporal slice of a four-dimensional
space-time rabbit.) Incoherence is disentangled when situ-
ations arise where two meanings are incompatible – as
when, for example, a bright object is blue. This type of dis-
entanglement is also observed with the mechanisms de-
scribed here; see Figure 11 (taken from Steels & Kaplan
1999), which considers this “semiotic dynamics” in more
detail.
4.3. Cultural learning
Given these processes, we can now begin to study the in-
teraction of word learning and category acquisition. The
first experiment uses learning both for categories and for
words. When a category has been successful in the language
game (i.e., it led to a successful communication), it is reen-
forced by increasing the weights of its network according to
equation 10. This increases the probability that the category
stays in the repertoire of the agent and that it is the cate-
gory of choice when a similar situation arises in the future.
So there is a two-way structural coupling (Maturana &
Varela 1998) between category formation and language:
Language communication stimulates the formation of cat-
egories because it calls for a discrimination game that might
lead to the learning of new categories. Category formation
in turn stimulates language because the generation of a new
category by the discrimination game leads to the creation
of a new word. The discrimination game itself provides
feedback about whether a particular category is successful
and so it embodies environmental and ecological con-
straints. The language game provides feedback about
whether the category worked in the communication, and so
it exercises a cultural constraint.
Figure 12 shows that these components lead to a satis-
factory outcome. The agents reach discriminative success
and communicative success.10 The graph plots on the x-axis
the number of games and on the y-axis average discrimina-
tive success (top) and communicative success (bottom).
The latter goes up to 90%. This experiment shows, there-
fore, that cultural learning is capable of establishing a
shared repertoire of words in a population. It also shows
that the categories underlying the words are culturally co-
ordinated, even though there is no telepathic access of an
agent to the categories used by another agent and even
though the colour categories are not innately given “at
birth.”
Figure 13 looks at the similarity between the categorical
repertoires of the agents. We see that now the agents do
have similar repertoires – in contrast to the experiment in
individualistic learning (sect. 3.2). This is due to the struc-
tural coupling between the category formation process and
language. Success (or failure) in language communication
feeds back into whether new categories are created or
maintained in an agent’s repertoire. So this experiment
shows that the Sapir-Whorf thesis, advocating a causal in-
fluence of language on category acquisition (Sapir 1921;
Whorf 1956), is entirely feasible from a theoretical point of
view. Even more so, it shows that only due to such a causal
influence will the agents develop a sufficiently shared cate-
gorical repertoire to allow successful communication. This
does not imply that the colour categories are not influenced
by embodiment and statistical structure of the environment
also. Hence these results do not imply that colour cate-
gories are arbitrary. The point is simply that language com-
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Figure 10. This graph plots the usage rate of all possible words
for the same meaning in a consecutive series of language games.
Initially, many words are competing until one dominates due to a
winner-take-all effect.
Figure 11. This graph plots (on the y-axis) the usage percentage
of different meanings associated with the same word. Different
meanings may coexist until a situation arises that disentangles
them.
Figure 12. Average discriminative success DS (top line) and av-
erage communicative success CS (bottom line) for a population of
10 agents for which the colour categories are learned under influ-
ence of linguistic communication.
munication is a very effective way for a population of agents
to go the final stretch in arriving at a shared categorical
repertoire.
Note that first learning colour categories and only then
learning words as advocated by those arguing against such
a causal influence would not work because language learn-
ing is crucial for the convergence of colour categories.
When agents learn categories independently of language
(as they do in the experiments discussed in sect. 3.2) their
categories diverge too much to support communication
later. So both must be learned at the same time in a coevo-
lutionary dynamics. This shows that the Sapir-Whorf thesis
is not only feasible but is the best way to reach categorical
coherence, and this based on coupling category formation
to language. Even with the same environmental, physiolog-
ical, and ecological constraints, two populations without
contact with each other would develop different colour cat-
egories and consequently colour names with different
meanings. Multiple solutions are possible, but only one so-
lution gets culturally frozen and enforced through language
in each population. This is further illustrated in Table 3,
which shows that the interpopulation coherence between
agents in one population is high but between populations it
is far lower.
To conclude this section, we examine what happens
when populations with this kind of semiotic dynamics
change. This is done by introducing a flux in the population.
At regular time intervals an agent is removed from the pop-
ulation and another agent is inserted. The new agent has no
prior knowledge of the colour categories or of the words
used in the population. Figure 14 shows that at renewal
rates that are not too high, communicative success is es-
sentially maintained. New agents obviously fail initially but
pick up quickly the words and meanings that are commonly
used. This means that the lexicon and the colour repertoire
get transmitted between generations purely through cul-
tural learning. These results are in line with other experi-
ments with much larger agent populations and much larger
vocabularies (Steels et al. 2002). They are among the first
concrete computer simulations showing how the memetic
evolution of language and meaning is possible (Blackmore
1999; Dawkins 1976).
We conclude that:
1. Cultural learning leads to the development of an ad-
equate repertoire of colour categories and an adequate
repertoire of colour terms.
2. The colour categories are shared among the members
of a population.
3. The colour categories are not shared across populations.
4.4. Genetic evolution
The next experiment tests the potential influence of lan-
guage on the genetic evolution of colour concepts. It uses
the same genetic model as is used in section 3.3 and the
learning algorithm for the acquisition of colour words ex-
plained in section 4.2. Rather than using discriminatory
success to determine fitness, communicative success is
used, so that the colour repertoire of the agents, genetically
encoded in their genes, is not only influenced by physio-
logical, environmental, and ecological constraints but also
by cultural constraints as embodied in language, despite the
fact that the lexicon itself is not genetically transmitted but
learned by each generation. The agents that remain in the
population keep their lexicons so that they can be acquired
by the new agents resulting from mutation.
Figure 15 shows the outcome of the experiment. It dis-
plays communicative success for successive generations of
agents (bottom graph) and the discriminative success (top
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Figure 13. The category variance for the simulation described
in Figure 12. To show the influence of language, the category vari-
ance is plotted as well for exactly the same circumstances but now
without language. The ratio between the two clearly demonstrates
how the similarity of the colour categories is drastically increased
by using language.
Table 3. Interpopulation category variance of five populations
for which the categories are learned under linguistic pressure
cv
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
A1 0.30
A2 4.29 0.45
A3 3.83 4.52 0.36
A4 5.09 5.60 5.31 0.51
A5 5.26 5.80 5.37 6.08 0.55
Figure 14. Illustration of memetic evolution in a population of
five agents. In each game the context consists of four stimuli cho-
sen from the complete Munsell set. A flux is introduction by 
replacing an agent after n games (where n  1,000, 200, and 20, re-
spectively). Too high a flux destabilises the communicative success.
graph). As discrimination is a prerequisite for further com-
munication, communicative success can only be reached
when there is also discriminative success. We see that the
same sort of results are obtained as in the previous models.
The agents manage to evolve a shared repertoire of colour
concepts – although now they do it in a genetic way – and
evolve a language for expressing these concepts – in a cul-
tural way.
As in the previous genetic evolution experiment, the
colour repertoires of different populations (and of course
also the vocabularies that emerge) diverge, even if the same
physiological, environmental, and ecological constraints are
used. As explained earlier, the randomness inherent in ge-
netic evolution causes the exploration of different parts of
the search space. When cultural factors play a role in fit-
ness, as is the case here, this divergence is even more pro-
nounced.
We conclude that:
1. Genetic evolution leads to the development of an ad-
equate colour repertoire of colour categories, even if the se-
lectionist force includes learned cultural habits.
2. The colour categories are completely shared among
the members of the population.
3. The colour categories are not shared across populations.
5. The role of chromatic distributions
We can already draw a number of conclusions from the ex-
periments so far. The first two results constitute a necessary
baseline that proves our models satisfy at least minimal
working conditions.
1. The self-organisation of a shared lexicon in a popula-
tion has been shown to occur through adaptive language
games. The learning process must include a positive feed-
back loop between the choice of which words to use and
their success in use (sect. 4.3).
2. The formation of a repertoire of colour categories has
been shown to occur through consecutive discrimination
games, both for individual learning (sect. 3.2) and for ge-
netic evolution (sect. 3.3).
The next results are about the possible causal influence
of language on category acquisition.
1. Language may have a causal influence on category ac-
quisition, both in the case of cultural learning if there is a
structural coupling between success in the language game
and adoption of categories by the agents (sect. 4.3) and in
the case of genetic evolution (sect. 4.2), including if the fit-
ness function integrates communicative success (sect. 4.4).
2. When there is this causal influence, the colour cate-
gories of agents within the same population become coor-
dinated in the case of cultural learning because of the
strong structural coupling between concept acquisition and
lexicon formation (sect. 4.3). Colour categories also become
shared within the same population in the genetic evolution
model, because of the proliferation of “successful” colour
categorisation genes (sect. 3.3).
3. On the other hand, sharing across populations did not
occur for genetic evolution or for cultural learning. Genetic
evolution necessarily incorporates randomness in the search
process, which causes divergence as soon as two popula-
tions develop independently, even when exactly the same
constraints are active. Different ecological and cultural cir-
cumstances, which are inevitable in split populations, will
only increase this divergence (sect. 4.4). Learning adapts
even faster to ecological and cultural circumstances and as
soon as these circumstances diverge, colour categories di-
verge as well (sects. 3.2, 4.3).
So both a cultural learning hypothesis (with causal influ-
ence of language on category acquisition) and a genetic evo-
lution hypothesis (with integration of communicative success
into fitness) could explain how agents in a population can
reach a shared repertoire of categories and a shared lexicon
for communicating about the world using these categories.
The difference between the two models appears to be in
terms of the time needed to adapt to the environment or
reach coherence. Genetic evolution is orders of magnitude
slower than cultural learning and so it could only work when
almost no change takes place in the environment or the ecol-
ogy of the agents. The larger the population and the more
it is spread out, the longer it takes for genes to become uni-
versally shared. Moreover, genetic evolution requires that
a lot more information is stored in the genome and that the
developmental process will be more complex, as it requires
fine-grained genetic control of neural microcircuits (in-
cluding genetic coding of the weights in networks). We
leave it up to geneticists and neurobiologists to judge the
plausibility of such an assumption in the case of humans
(Worden 1995). But there can be no doubt that for de-
signing autonomous robots the cultural learning solution is
preferable.
We have not examined yet what happens when the sen-
sory data presented to the agents has a statistical structure.
That might also lead to the creation of a repertoire of
shared categories – even in the absence of language inter-
action. So we will now introduce samples taken from real-
world scenes as stimuli. This will allow a fair examination
of the empiricist argument that colour categories are coor-
dinated precisely because the real-world environment
has enough statistical structure so that any kind of clus-
tering algorithm (and ipso facto a neural network that em-
bodies a statistical clustering algorithm) would allow the
population to arrive at shared categories. It would also
give support to the nativist position because environ-
mental constancy and regularity is required for genetic
evolution to zoom in on these statistical regularities (e.g.,
Shepard 1992).
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Figure 15. Average discriminative success DS (top line) and av-
erage communicative success CS (bottom line) for a population of
20 agents for which the colour categories are evolved. The fitness
of the agents is based on success in the guessing game.
5.1. Categories from real-world samples
Chromatic data of natural surfaces and the frequency with
which these stimuli occur in natural scenes are available
(see, e.g., Burton & Moorhead 1987; Hendley & Hecht
1949; Howard & Burnidge 1994), but it is obviously diffi-
cult to get data reflecting the ecological importance of
colour stimuli for a particular culture and thus the data can
never show what aspects of real-world scenes people actu-
ally pay attention to. Nevertheless, Yendrikhovskij (2001b)
has investigated how colour categories can be extracted
from the statistics of natural images. He used a clustering
algorithm to extract colour categories from a sample of nat-
ural colours and concluded not only that categories can be
reliably extracted but also that the extracted colour cate-
gories resemble the basic colours identified by universal-
ists, and that this is due to the chromatic distribution of the
perceived environment. Also, increasing the k parameter
(where k is the number of desired clusters) leads to a grow-
ing set of categories that more or less correspond to the evo-
lutionary order as proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969). This
is a very important and relevant result for the present dis-
cussion and so we decided to replicate it.
The neural networks used in previous sections for mod-
eling categorisation are sensitive to the statistical distribu-
tion of colours in the environment. Indeed, Radial Basis
Function networks (on which the categorical networks are
based) stem from linear models research in statistics and
have been generally used to induce a function from sample
input-output pairs (Medgassy 1961). It therefore makes
sense to use real-world colour samples as source of data in
discrimination games and see what categories come out.
We have collected two batches of data: one from natural en-
vironments and another from urban environments. The
natural data set contains 25,000 pixels drawn randomly
from photographs of animals, plants, and landscapes; the
urban data set contains 25,000 pixels drawn from pho-
tographs of buildings, streets, traffic, shops, and other ur-
ban scenes. Both data sets have a specific distribution, with
an abundance of lowly saturated colours and far fewer
highly saturated colours (as already observed by Hendley &
Hecht 1949). To allow comparison, a third data set con-
taining 25,000 uniformly random sampled Munsell chips is
also used. All constraints on embodiment used in earlier ex-
periments, including the use of the CIE L*a*b* colour ap-
pearance model, have been maintained.
Results of discrimination games with these data are
shown in Figure 16, where the left side shows the focal
points of 10 agents for natural environments and the right
side displays the same for urban environments. Agents were
left to play discrimination games until they each reached,
on average, 11 categories.11 Results from another experi-
ment where agents were given samples from a randomly
distributed data set are shown in Figure 17. For reference,
the location of human foci are shown as well in all diagrams
(Sturges & Whitfield 1995).
We see that the statistical structure in the data clearly
helps the agents to reach a higher degree of categorical
sharing than would otherwise be the case. There is, for ex-
ample, a clustering around the origin a*  b*  0 for both
natural and urban environments, whereas we do not see
these clusters in randomly distributed samples. This com-
parison is made more precise in Figure 18. Notice, how-
ever, that there is still significant categorical variance be-
tween the agents exposed to the same type of environment.
These results clearly show that even if there is a statisti-
cal structure, there is increased sharing but the sharing is
surely not complete, neither among the members of the
population nor among different populations. There are sev-
eral reasons why this is the case. Although the natural and
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Figure 16. Results of discrimination game experiments for natural (left) and urban data (right). The centroids of all colour categories
of 10 agents are plotted. Agents arrive at focal points that are more constrained than for random data but not sufficiently to explain 
sharing.
Figure 17. Results of experiments in statistical learning of col-
our categories for random data. Note how categories are spread
out over the colour space.
urban data now have natural chromatic distributions, there
is random sampling going on within these data sets so
agents within the population do not get exactly the same
data series. The opposite would be a very unrealistic as-
sumption anyway, both for human beings and for au-
tonomous agents. Second, the influence of the two envi-
ronments (urban versus natural) works also against sharing,
simply because the statistical structure of the two environ-
ments is different. Anthropological observations show,
however, that individuals growing up in different environ-
ments but speaking the same language have the same
colour categories, and vice versa – individuals growing up
in similar environments but speaking different languages
often have diverging colour categories (cf. Papua New
Guinean cultures; Kay et al. 2003).
It could be argued that the sensitivity observed here is
due to the specific clustering method used, namely dis-
crimination games and adaptive RBF networks. But this is
not the case. We applied the clustering algorithm used by
Yendrikhovskij (2001b) and used his method of sampling,
and similar results were obtained. Figure 19 shows the cat-
egory variance12 for categories extracted from random, nat-
ural, and urban stimuli. Categories extracted from natural
and urban stimuli have approximately half the variance of
categories extracted from stimuli with a uniform distribu-
tion. From this we can conclude that learning without the
influence of language in a structured environment indeed
increases the sharing of categories across agents, but the
sharing is never absolute.
Yendrikhovskij (2001b) used the CIE L*u*v* colour ap-
pearance model instead of the CIE L*a*b* model used in
this article, and so we compared the outcome for both
colour appearance models (Fig. 20) and even between
these we see significant variation. The fact that clustering is
sensitive to the colour appearance model shows that even
small variations in colour perception, as surely occur in hu-
mans (Gegenfurtner & Sharpe 1999; Neitz et al. 2002),
drive a purely empiricist acquisition of colour categories to
diverging results.
Perhaps even more important, the categories that agents
end up with (still using Yendrikhovskij’s clustering algo-
rithm and the same data sets) vary significantly both with
respect to natural versus urban environments and with re-
spect to the basic human colour categories proposed in the
literature (Sturges & Whitfield 1995). This is evident from
Table 4, which shows the correlation13 between (a) cate-
gories extracted by the clustering algorithm14 and (b) hu-
man colour categories (as measured by Sturges & Whitfield
1995). Perhaps surprisingly, statistical extraction of cate-
gories from natural colour data with a clear statistical struc-
ture does not deliver categories that resemble human
colour categories more than do categories extracted from
random data. Even more, the correlation between cate-
gories extracted from natural, urban, or random colour data
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Figure 18. Category variance for three runs of 10 agents playing
discrimination games. The agents have in each run been offered
different kinds of colour stimuli: Munsell stimuli, having a uni-
form statistical distribution, and natural and urban colour stimuli,
having a nonuniform distribution. The statistical structure of the
natural and urban stimuli aids the agents in achieving more co-
herent categories.
Figure 19. Category variance for categories extracted from three
different types of chromatic stimuli: random, natural, and urban
stimuli. The agents now used a clustering algorithm instead of dis-
crimination games and each agent extracts 11 categories.
Figure 20. Clusters extracted from natural chromatic data. Five
clusters are extracted in the CIE L*a*b* space (diamonds) and
five are extracted in the CIE L*u*v*, but then mapped onto and
displayed in the L*a*b* space (squares). The clusters differ to a
large extent, demonstrating how the colour space influences the
clustering.
is approximately equal. This demonstrates that the nonuni-
form chromatic distributions (i.e., the urban and natural
data) do not lead to categories that are similar. They corre-
late as much with each other as with categories extracted
from random data.
Clearly the chromatic distribution of colours in the envi-
ronment can influence which colour categories are adopted
by a population and how similar they are, but it is far from
obvious that it alone can explain the sharing of perceptually
grounded categories in a population and even less so the
universal sharing of colour categories across populations.
What all this means for human colour categorisation re-
mains a matter of debate. We do not claim that inductive
learning on real-world environments could not potentially
yield the basic human colour categories, perhaps with many
more constraints on embodiment, with much greater expo-
sure to a variety of environments, and so forth, but it does
not seem so straightforward as often assumed.
We do claim, however, that the experiments allow a clear
conclusion for the design of artificial agents: It would be risky
to rely only on embodiment constraints and statistical clus-
tering for forming the repertoire of perceptually grounded
categories for use in communication. Inevitable variation in
hardware, camera calibration, sampled data, colour appear-
ance model, and arbitrary choices during clustering would
lead to important categorical variation between the agents
or between agents exposed to different environments. It is
also unlikely that (artificial) genetic evolution without inte-
grating communication in the fitness function would work
to sufficiently coordinate perceptually grounded categories.
Given that we have a very straightforward and effective
mechanism of coordinating categories through language (as
shown in sect. 4), it would be irrational not to use it.
6. Conclusions
This target article has examined the question of how a per-
ceptually grounded categorical repertoire can become suf-
ficiently shared among the members of a population to al-
low successful communication, using colour categorisation
as a case study. The article did not introduce new empirical
data but examined through formal models the conse-
quences of adopting certain approaches that were all in-
spired from the study of human categorisation and naming.
We explored in particular three positions: (i) All human be-
ings are born with the same perceptually grounded cate-
gories (nativism). So when children learn a language, their
categorical repertoire is already shared with that of care-
givers and they only have to learn the names of these cate-
gories. (ii) All human beings share the same learning mech-
anisms, so given sufficiently similar environmental stimuli
they will arrive at the same perceptually grounded cate-
gories, which reflects the statistical structure of the real
world (empiricism). Hence the acquisition of language is
again a matter of learning labels for already known shared
categories and there is no strong influence of language on
category formation. (iii) Although learning mechanisms and
environments are shared, there are still important degrees
of freedom left. Language communication (or other forms
of social interaction where perceptual categories play a
role) helps to coordinate perceptual categorisation by pro-
viding feedback on how others conceptualise the world
(culturalism). So language now plays an important causal
role in conceptual development.
As stated several times, our motivation for these investi-
gations was to find the best way for designing agents that
are able to develop a repertoire of perceptually grounded
categories that is sufficiently shared to allow communica-
tion. But we believe that these results are relevant to a
much broader audience of cognitive scientists who have
been puzzling over the same question.
The first contribution of this target article is to introduce
concrete models so that a comparison of the different posi-
tions is possible. The models have been defined in enough
detail and precision to allow computer simulation. Most of
the time debates on categorisation and naming have as-
sumed particular mechanisms (e.g., for acquiring cate-
gories or for associating names with categories) without
specifying exactly how these mechanisms were supposed to
work. This has made it difficult to formulate clear argu-
ments for or against certain positions.
The second contribution of this article is to establish some
important properties for each model. First, we have shown
that the coupling of category formation with language leads
to the coordination of perceptually grounded categories
(both in the case of genetic evolution and in cultural evolu-
tion with learning of language), even if there is no statistical
structure in the data. Second, we have confirmed that al-
though clustering algorithms (and neural networks that em-
body them) are sensitive to the statistical structure of real-
world data, it is not so obvious that this alone can explain how
perceptually grounded categories can become shared.
The models presented here could be made more com-
plex and more realistic, integrating more constraints based
on what is known about human physiology, neurological
processing, brain development, genetics, language, real-
world environments, ecology, and so forth, but this com-
plexity would be more of a hindrance than a help because
it would obscure the contribution of the dynamics. On the
other hand, integrating all these additional constraints will
be necessary to explain the kinds of cross-cultural trends
that have been observed in colour naming (Kay & Regier
2003; Kay et al. 1991) or why certain cultures have adopted
particular categorical repertoires and not others.
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1. k is a normalising constant; the colour spaces use relative col-
orimetry with k  0.00946300, which is based on the standard
CIE illuminant called “D65”: if the D65 illuminant is used as stim-
ulus, the Y value will be exactly 100.0. For other stimuli, this re-
sults in XYZ values between 0 and approximately 100.
2. An alternative to the CIE L*a*b* space is the CIE L*u*v*
space (Fairchild 1998; Wyszecki & Stiles 1982/2000), which is also
intended to be an equidistant colour model, meaning that colours
can be compared using a simple distance function (something that
is not possible in other colour spaces such as CIE XYZ or RGB,
the last one being the technical colour representation used in
colour display devices such as television and computer monitors).
3. The results are not very sensitive to different values of s
within a certain range. In the simulations reported here,  is fixed
to 10. The adaptive networks do not share locally reactive units;
however, this does not mean that they cannot have units sensitive
to the same region in the colour space.
4. Alternatives could be considered for the representation of the
colour categories. One possibility would be to implement categories
as single points in colour space. In addition, with a distance metric,
this representation would exhibit most properties associated with
perceptual categories. However, categories would have a spherical
membership function in the colour space, which is an assumption
we would not like to make. Another alternative, which avoids this,
uses k nearest-neighbour classification (Mitchell 1997). Here a
category is made up of several examples of colour stimuli, and clas-
sification of a stimulus occurs by measuring the distance between
the stimulus and the exemplars belonging to each category.
5. For the category variance measure, equations (9) and (12),
a distance metric D between two category sets is needed. For this
we first define a distance metric d between two point sets A 
{a1, . . .} and B  {b1, . . .},
(16)
This distance metric d has the following properties: (i) The dis-
tance between two identical sets is zero, d(A,A)  0. (ii) The dis-
tance is symmetrical, d(A,B)  d(B,A). (iii) The distance is non-
negative, d(A,B)  0. (iv) The sets need not have the same number
of elements.
Recall that a category consists of locally reactive units with a
central value m and a weight w. The distance between two cate-
gories c and c
 can be computed as the weighted distance between
the central values of the locally reactive units. We define the dis-
tance between two categories as
dcategory(c,c
)  d({m1, . . . , mn}, {m
1, . . . , m
m}) (17)
with
where n and m are the number of locally reactive units in cate-
gories c and c
, respectively.
An agent has a set of categories; the distance D between two
category sets of agent A and agent A
 is defined as
(18)
where A and A
 are the number of categories of agent A and A

respectively. Note that the distance measure is sensitive to the
number of categories: more categories result in a lower D(A,A
)
value. The category variance is therefore necessarily a relative
measure – to be interpreted by comparing it to other category
variances – rather than an absolute measure.
6. The learning rate b is a positive value and is by default b 
1. The rate determines how fast weights of the locally reactive
units increase in reaction to the successful use of the category. b
is not critical to the results attained, but should be set so that it
balances the decay rate a of weights in equation (11). a takes care
of a slow forgetting of categories, and is set by default to a  0.1.
7. The baseline discriminative success – that is, the chance suc-
cess that agents would achieve by randomly creating categories –
is proportional with the number of categories of an agent and in-
versely proportional with the size of the context. The baseline dis-
criminative success can be estimated numerically; in this particu-
lar example it is 0.26 at game 1,000.
8. The Munsell codes of the stimuli are 5 R 5/14, 5 Y 8.5/10, 5
G 7/10, 5 B 5/8, 5 P 5/8, 5 R 9/15, and 5 R/2.
9. The four added stimuli are 5 YR 7/10, 5 GY 8/10, 5 BG 7/8,
and 5 PB 5/10.
10. The baseline average communicative success is always
lower than the average discriminative success. When agents do
discriminate the stimuli in the context perfectly and when they are
able to interpret the communicated words, the baseline commu-
nicative success will never be lower than 1/size of context – that
is, the hearer’s success of randomly guessing the topic. Commu-
nicative success in most circumstances never reaches 100%; some
topics are located just between two categories, and subsequently
two agents might classify the topic with categories having differ-
ent colour terms, which makes the guessing game fail. Just like ar-
guing over the colour of one’s shirt, the agents do not always agree
on what category a stimulus belongs to.
11. Berlin and Kay (1969) said that there are 11 basic colour
categories, but other than that there is no specific reason why we
let the agents play discrimination games until they have, on aver-
age, 11 categories.
12. The category variance for categories extracted with a clus-
tering algorithm is computed in the same way as the category vari-
ance for adaptive networks; see equation (9), in which D is now
defined as equation 16. Note that the category variance reported
in Figure 19 cannot be compared to category variance values else-
where, as the distance measure is different in this case.
13. The correlation measure used is the Kendall’s Tau-b cor-
relation. We chose this measure as it is a nonparametric test and
does require the data to have a normal distribution. The test re-
turns values between 1 and 1. A value of 1 indicates that the cor-
relation is perfect, and a value of 1 that the correlation perfect
but inverse. Values between 1 and 1 indicate a correlation to a
lesser degree, with 0 signifying that is no correlation between the
data.
14. The cluster algorithm used here is the k – nearest-neigh-
bour algorithm (Mitchell 1997), as also used by Yendrikhovskij
(2001b). It extracts k clusters from a set of values using an itera-
tive optimisation method. First, k  11 clusters were extracted
from each data set (the nature data set, the urban data set, and a
data set containing random colours). Then the extracted centroids
of these clusters were taken to compute the correlation with 
human colour categories. For this, the centroids needed to be
D A A
d c c d
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′ =
′ +
′∈ ′ ∈
category category ( , )
.
,
c c
A A
c Ac A
′
′
′∈ ′∈
∑∑
m m m m− ′ = ′ − ′∑w w. ( ) .2
d A B
a b a b
A B
b B a A
b Ba A( , )
min min
.=
− + −
⋅
∈ ∈
∈∈
∑∑
Steels & Belpaeme: Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language
488 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:4
matched with the human colour categories; this was done by an
exhaustive search to find the optimal match. Next, correlations
were computed in the L*, a*, b*, C*ab, and Hab dimensions (with
C*ab and Hab being the chroma and hue of the CIE L*a*b* space;
see Wyszecki & Stiles 1982/2000). Each correlation reported in
Table 4 is the mean of these five correlations.
Open Peer Commentary
Intimations of optimality: Extensions of
simulation testing of color-language
hypotheses
David Bimler
Health and Human Development, Massey University, Palmerston North, New
Zealand 5331. d.bimler@massey.ac.nz
Abstract: By emphasizing that color categories are the collective achieve-
ment of a language community, the methodology of Steels & Belpaeme
(S&B) suggests a number of corollaries. It focuses attention on whether a
system of categories is optimized to match color experience. If a hypoth-
esis can be operationalized about the nature of the optimality – about how
color language becomes standardized – it becomes testable.
It was not the intention of Steels and Belpaeme (S&B) to advance
one or another of the rival nativist, empiricist, or culturalist posi-
tions on color language. Even so, the interest of many readers will
center on the prospect of support or disconfirmation from their
methodology for specific assumptions about color language (if not
from the present report, then from its potential extensions). I
would like to make five observations, intended not to reject S&B’s
results, but to note possible omissions and to expand on insights
that follow.
1. In the pure empiricist position as defined by S&B, an ob-
server’s color lexicon verbalizes a system of color categories that
matches regularities in the distribution of colors in the visual en-
vironment. Each observer derives this optimized category system
independently. S&B also consider a combination of the empiricist
and culturalist approaches in which category systems, derived to
match a structured color environment, are compared and harmo-
nized among agents (Fig. 18). The pure position is undermined by
evidence in section 5 of S&B. First: minor differences in the met-
ric of color dissimilarity (a prerequisite for any algorithm of clus-
tering or category formation) lead to significant departures be-
tween clustering solutions (Fig. 20). But individuals certainly do
vary in their dissimilarity metrics, that is, in color perception.
This point becomes more salient when the extremes of varia-
tion are considered. Observers with forms of color deficiency
(dichromacy, monochromacy, and even complete blindness),
whose experiences of color perception are grossly aberrant, nev-
ertheless acquire category systems that are organized in ways not
so far removed from normal (Marmor 1972; Shepard & Cooper
1992). Presumably they internalize the standard category organi-
zation in the course of language acquisition. Clearly, no picture is
complete if it omits a component of culturalism. Again, Jameson
and Hurvich (1978) showed that dichromats were intellectually
aware that “red” and “green” are distinct categories, and indeed
diametrically opposite. This awareness was not derived from per-
sonal experience, because it did not deter the same dichromats
from rating red and green stimuli as subjectively most similar
(when sequencing them by similarity), even though lightness cues
allowed them to identify the red and the green stimulus within
each most-similar pair.
2. Citing these reports also serves to highlight a shortcoming in
S&B’s “guessing game,” compared to natural language. This game
couples the separately-derived category systems among agents in
simulations. It certainly captures one channel of color conversa-
tion, when speakers agree or disagree about their verbalized cat-
egories. But natural language also contains a second channel, one
conveying information about category relationships – whether
two categories are adjacent or extreme opposites – in an abstract
sense or in the context of actual examples. This embedded or im-
plicit information is part of language acquisition, utilized by the
color-deficient observers discussed earlier. It is not immediately
obvious how the guessing game might be extended to enable sim-
ulations to model this second channel.
3. A second problem with the pure empiricist position is that
not all observers experience identical color distributions. The cat-
egory systems created by clustering the distributions for rural and
urban environments are significantly different (Fig. 16). Varia-
tions in color distribution among human habitats, and even be-
tween seasons for the same habitat, are well-documented (Mi-
zokami et al. 2003; Webster & Mollon 1997). Thus, empiricism
alone cannot account for the observed cross-cultural consensus on
where the boundaries and the foci of color categories should be
drawn.
The World Color Survey (Kay et al. 1997) has confirmed earlier
observations that despite wide separation and long histories of di-
vergent development, languages from a range of cultures have
converged on similar ways of partitioning the gamut of perceived
colors (though specific languages deviate from this consensus, and
speakers within a language community are never unanimous).
A pure nativist position cannot solve this problem either,
though it may conceal it. According to strong nativism, Basic Color
Terms (BCTs) consistently appear across many languages because
they have been “hard-wired” by evolution into the neural sub-
strate of visual processing, having conferred a selective advantage
on our ancestors. This begs the question as to the nature of that
selective advantage. One might argue that the BCTs provide an
optimal match to the visual environment, but this is simply pro-
jecting the empiricist position into the distant past.
The development of color lexicons over historical time is
thought to be progressive (“Languages are infrequently or never
observed to lose basic color terms”: Kay & Maffi 1999, p. 744).
Thus, languages verbalizing all 11 BCTs are historically recent
(Stage-VII languages, in the terminology of Berlin & Kay 1969).
Any advantage bestowed by hard-wired BCTs could hardly be one
of improved communication, if they were not all used by early lan-
guages.
4. Griffin (2004) used a triad test, similar to S&B’s “discrimina-
tion game,” to quantify the optimality of different category sys-
tems. Triads of stimuli were categorized by color, predicting an
odd-one-out within each triad, and the accuracy of this prediction
was found by comparing it to the actual odd-one-out, known on
the basis of object identity. Stimuli in Griffin’s study were images
of actual objects (using the WWW as an image database), so their
color statistics were considerably more structured than a sparse
selection of points in color space, or even pixels of real environ-
mental scenes. Intriguingly, the BCTs provided more correct pre-
dictions than plausible alternative categories.
5. The structure within color experience that drives multiple
populations to converge on a single optimal system of categories
might come from the sensory apparatus of the agents. Notably, the
color gamut is not a featureless circle, any more than the “color
solid” in three dimensions is spherical; there are cusps and pro-
trusions in the Commission Internationale de l’Eclairage spaces
(Fig. 20), providing natural anchors for color categories. See also
the Interpoint Distance Model (Jameson & D’Andrade 1997). If
such ultimately physiological sources of structure can be opera-
tionalized for testing with S&B’s methodology, combined with a
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realistic color environment and coupling among agents, it may be
that they lead to convergence. It is not clear whether to classify
this as a nativist or empirical position.
Implications for memetics
Susan Blackmore
Department of Psychology, University of the West of England, Coldharbour
Lane, Bristol BS16 1QY, United Kingdom.
susan.blackmore@blueyonder.co.uk www.susanblackmore.co.uk
Abstract: The implications that Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) models have
for memetics are discussed. The results demonstrate the power of memes
(in this case colour words) to influence both concept formation, and the
creation of innate concepts. They provide further evidence for the
memetic drive hypothesis, with implications for the evolution of the hu-
man brain and for group differences in categorisation.
Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B) results are, as they point out, among
the first computer simulations to show “how the memetic evolu-
tion of language and meaning are possible.” They do not explore
the further implications of this for memetics, and I propose to do
so here.
The basic principle underlying memetics is that memes (in-
cluding words) are replicators; they can compete with each other
and with other replicators in both memetic evolution and meme-
gene coevolution. This contrasts with some other theories of cul-
tural evolution in which, as Wilson puts it, the genes will always
keep culture on a leash (Lumsden & Wilson 1981). For memetics
there is no obvious leash; a replicator can take on either the role
of dog or owner under different circumstances. These interactions
have previously been modelled (e.g., Bull et al. 2000; Kendal &
Laland 2000) and are modelled in new ways by S&B.
The critical experiment for meme-gene coevolution is in sec-
tion 4.4 where the authors explore the influence of language on
the genetic evolution of colour concepts. In their model, not only
do word forms compete to describe the colour space, but agents’
concepts evolve “genetically.” In this key experiment, commu-
nicative success of the agents determines fitness, so that agents
with the best communicative skills are used to make mutated
copies for the next generation.
There are two processes here that are highly relevant to memet-
ics. First (sect. 4.3), when the simulation is run many times the
successful memes (colour words) are different each time, which
in turn influences the colour concepts that the agents adopt (the
Sapir-Whorf thesis). This shows the power of memetic evolution
to influence concept formation. Second (sect. 4.4), when commu-
nicative success determines fitness, the adopted concepts become
genetically assimilated. This is the process that I have previously
called memetic drive (Blackmore 1999). It implies that the direc-
tion taken by memetic evolution (in this case, the winning words)
drives the direction taken by genetic evolution (in this case, innate
colour categorisation). In other words, the vagaries of memetic
success end up influencing the genetically encoded colour cate-
gories.
Although S&B do not mention this, it seems likely that as the
simulation proceeds, the mutated agents will increasingly start
with a fitness advantage over agents like those who started the sim-
ulation, because their innate colour concepts map more closely
onto the memetically evolved colour words in use in that popula-
tion. In other words, outsiders would be at a disadvantage in learn-
ing the colour words and so (in this model) would be less likely to
become good communicators and survive to the next generation.
This would be another reason why, when cultural or memetic fac-
tors play a role in fitness, the divergence between populations be-
comes more pronounced.
If this process occurs in human evolution, there are two signif-
icant implications. First, our brains could have been shaped by the
results of memetic evolution. That is, the words that happened to
evolve in the past (and they might easily have evolved differently)
have influenced the ways in which we innately categorise the
world. Second, it implies that differences between populations
could be greater, or form more quickly, than is assumed in purely
genetic models or in models of cultural evolution that do not treat
their cultural units as replicators.
Is this plausible? I think so. There is plenty of evidence that, in
human mate selection, being articulate, artistic, and creative
(S&B’s “communicative success”) is highly prized. Miller (2000)
interprets this in terms of runaway sexual selection, but the mod-
els used here demonstrate the memetic alternative. Although it is
generally assumed that people from any ethnic background are
equally capable of learning any human language (Pinker 1994),
there may still be differences to be found if we knew what to look
for. The methods used here would allow the relevant variables,
such as population size and degree of isolation, to be modelled,
and specific predictions made.
S&B have confined their models to colour concepts and words,
and to some extent have generalised their findings to all of lan-
guage. The memetic drive hypothesis can be extended well be-
yond this to the idea that many aspects of brain design are the way
they are because of the history of memetic evolution. For exam-
ple, the way religious memes evolved in the past (including ritu-
als, or concepts of gods and spirits) could have shaped our pecu-
liarly religious natures (Blackmore 1999; Dawkins 1989), and
could thus explain the persistence of religious concepts even in
highly educated societies. The way that musical memes happened
to evolve could have designed our musical abilities (Dennett
1999), thus explaining a skill that Pinker (1997) describes as being
biologically “useless.”
More controversially, the process of memetic drive might have
implications for understanding group differences in cognitive abil-
ity. Indeed, this troublesome issue might usefully be reframed,
building on S&B’s work, in terms of group differences in innate
categorisation. Making plausible assumptions about human pop-
ulation sizes, degree of isolation, and time scale, the methods de-
veloped here could be used to model human gene-meme coevo-
lution and find out whether we should expect to see existing
human populations that differ in their innate ways of categorising
the world because of differences in their past memetic evolution.
In these and other ways, S&B’s work should prove valuable for
testing many memetic hypotheses.
Language, ecological structure, and
across-population sharing
Alexa Bódog,a Gábor P. Háden,b Zoltán Jakab,c and
Zsolt Palatinusb
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Abstract: We propose a way to achieve across-population sharing within
the authors’ model in a way that is plausibly in accordance with human evo-
lution, and also a simple way to capture ecological structure. Finally, we
briefly reflect on the model’s scope and limits in modeling linguistic com-
munication.
We found the authors’ approach fascinating and their results very
interesting. In this commentary we wish to propose a few amend-
ments that could be implemented using their model. Then we will
comment on some interpretations of the results offered in the tar-
get article.
Modeling across-population sharing. According to the au-
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thors’ findings, genetic evolution and language can both lead to
within-population sharing of color categories, whereas compara-
ble across-population sharing was not obtained in any simulated
scenario, not even using structured environments. However, con-
sider the following simulation experiment. (1) Start with lan-
guageless genetic evolution (as in sect. 3.3) in a single larger pop-
ulation, and wait until a shared set of categories evolves. (2) Divide
the larger population into a few subpopulations, and start a lin-
guistic evolution in each subpopulation. This should go as in sec-
tion 4.3, but let all agents start this stage with their previously
evolved color categories. At this point, the following dilemma
arises: (i) When evolution stops, should color categories freeze,
that is, not be further modified by word learning, or (ii) alterna-
tively, should learning take over and continue to shape color cate-
gories once evolution stopped?
Point (i) of the dilemma will trivially result in between-
(sub)population sharing of color categories; it might still be inter-
esting to see how color words evolve here. In point (ii), initial be-
tween-subpopulation sharing may fade if, at the initial stage of
linguistic evolution, communication failures resulting from unco-
ordinated individual vocabularies tend to largely alter previously
evolved categories, and eventually result in different category sys-
tems (as language develops) shared only within populations
(Sapir-Whorf effect). Also, marked environmental differences be-
tween subpopulations at stage (2) may contribute to the elimina-
tion of between-subpopulation sharing.
Note that something like this happened in human evolution.
Phylogenesis of trichromacy preceded the occurrence of lan-
guage.1 Instead of a dilemma, the authors could vary the extent to
which color categories, evolved at stage (1), can be changed by
word learning at stage (2).2 Here is the constraint we would like
to see at work, followed by motivating considerations.
As we understand, univeralism about basic color categories im-
plies that linguistic evolution in humans cannot alter some previ-
ously evolved (basic) color categories that are grounded in physi-
ology. (However, discrimination and communication efforts can
still refine these categories, introducing narrower subcategories
within their range.) Our basic color categories are inseparable
from the dimensions of color space. The two also evolve together.
Trichromat color space is inhomogeneous. It essentially includes
a partititoning into color categories, which, in turn, are coupled
with its dimensions. For example, unique reds correspond to one
side of one chromatic dimension (red-green) and at the same time
the midpoint (zero perceptual value) along the other (yellow-blue)
one. Bluish greens correspond to perceptions comprising the so-
called negative end of both chromatic dimensions, and so on.
In the authors’ model, however, dimensions of the CIELAB
space (L*, a*, and b*) have no impact on category formation. The
categories are unrelated to the dimensions – they arise from an in-
dependent system, the adaptive networks. These networks can
partition the L*a*b* space in any arbitrary way; they are not con-
strained by the three dimensions. In addition, in the genetic
model, categories evolve, whereas the dimensions of the sensory
(L*a*b*) space are the same for every agent and never change.
Incorporating the strong relationship of dimensions and basic
color categories in the authors’ model seems technically easy.
Agents could start with a sensory (e.g., L*a*b*) representation
plus a few (4 to 8) basic color categories whose focal points and ex-
tents are oriented toward the chromatic axes of the sensory space.
For example, locally reactive units of one additive network could
have central values in the a*  0, b*  0 range, and narrow ex-
tents – this would be the category called unique red. Another
adaptive net could have local units with central values in the a* 
0, b*  0 range, and wider extents, corresponding to the category
orange, and so on. It could be stipulated that unsuccessful dis-
crimination games do not eliminate these basic categories, but
only introduce new narrower subcategories within their range.
Next, how could such a system evolve? In the program, genes
could code the spectral sensitivities of the three cone types as well
as the linear combination coefficients (nonlinear exponents?) of
the cone outputs. As in the opponent processing model, one such
combination corresponds to one dimension of color space. The
number of combinations could also vary genetically, or be fixed at
three. On the other hand, a set of basic color categories should al-
ways remain anchored to the dimensions, the number of dimen-
sions determining that of basic color categories. This idea could
be included in stage (1) of the simulation suggested previously.
Such a simulation, we think, could account for physiology-based
between-population sharing, in a way faithful to what we know
about human evolution.
Language versus nonlinguistic communication. Although the
authors use learned lexicons in their simulation, this is the only
similarity between natural languages and the the agents’ commu-
nication. The use of signs occurs in prelinguistic animals as well
(typical examples are call signs: food, dominance, alarm, predator,
etc.). Signs can also be learned or invented; plenty of examples of
this can be found among birds (e.g., Hauser 1996, p. 274). What
the authors’ model does show is the feasibility, in principle, of
sharing color categories via prelinguistic communication, without
dealing with the complexity of human language. Without the ab-
straction, combinatorial complexity, and other crucial features of
human language in the model (Hauser 1996; Hauser & Fitch
2003; Hauser et al. 2002; Hockett 1960; Pinker & Jackendoff
2004), the analogies drawn between category acquisition on the
one hand, and linguistic relativism, or meme evolution, on the
other, appear a bit farfetched. For example, the phenomenon that
the majority forces their category system upon new members
(sect. 4.3) is not, in itself, an interesting parallel with memetics. A
more important phenomenon of meme evolution occurs when
one individual comes up with an attractive idea that, in turn,
quickly spreads among others. We cannot see how the authors’
model could produce such an effect.
Ecological structure. Although ecological factors are fre-
quently mentioned in the article, they are not examined in the sim-
ulation experiments. However, there is a straightforward way to
capture ecological structure in the authors’ model. Environmen-
tal structure was characterized by the frequency distribution of
the samples; ecological significance could easily be modeled by
rendering different weights of relevance to the samples. (An in-
frequently occurring stimulus can be highly relevant for the or-
ganism, whereas some frequent ones can be less so. Say, the yel-
low shade of a deadly snake is highly relevant even though
infrequent.) Successfully discriminated topics could contribute
their relevance ratings to the agent’s fitness score. We are curious
as to how relevance ratings (in addition to statistical structure)
would affect the formation of category repertoires as well as vo-
cabulary acquisition. It would also be interesting to see how the
simulation results thus obtained relate to instances of animal cat-
egorization and communication.
NOTES
1. The Old World and New World monkeys diverged about 30 million
years ago (Mollon 2000, p16). It is believed that the transition from dichro-
macy to human-like trichromacy occurred at an early stage of catarrhine
(Old-World-monkey) evolution (op. cit. p. 20). (Humans are descendants
of Old World monkeys.) By any evidence, language is a much more recent
achievement. (Simpler or more complex forms of it arose sometime be-
tween 3 million and 100,000 years ago.)
2. That is, categories successful in communication could be strength-
ened according to Eq. 10 (p. 477), whereas unsuccessful ones could fade
according to Eq. 11.
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How to learn a conceptual space
Antonio Chella
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica, Università di Palermo, 90128
Palermo, Italy. chella@unipa.it http://www.csai.unipa.it/chella/
Abstract: The experiments proposed in the article by Steels & Belpaeme
(S&B) can be considered as a starting point toward a general methodology
for the automatic learning of conceptual spaces.
In recent years, several frameworks for cognitive robotics have
been proposed that take into account a level that is intermediate
between the “subsymbolic” low level, directly linked to the exter-
nal sensors, and the “linguistic” high level, oriented toward sym-
bolic inferences.
A cognitive intermediate level of this kind has been proposed
by Gärdenfors (2000). Different from other proposals, Gärdenfors
introduces an intermediate level, based on “conceptual spaces,”
with a precise geometric structure. Briefly, a conceptual space is
a metric space whose dimensions are related to the quantities pro-
cessed by the agent sensors. Examples of dimensions could be
color, pitch, volume, and spatial coordinates. Dimensions do not
depend on any specific linguistic description: A generic concep-
tual space comes before any symbolic-propositional characteriza-
tion of cognitive phenomena.
A point in a conceptual space is the epistemologically primitive
perceptive element at the considered level of analysis. Chella et
al. (1997; 2000) describe a robot vision system based on concep-
tual spaces in which each point corresponds to a geon-like 3-
dimensional geometric primitive (Biederman 1985) perceived by
the robot. Therefore, the perceived objects, like the agent itself,
other agents, the surrounding obstacles, and so on, are all recon-
structed by means of geons, and they all correspond to suitable sets
of points in the agent’s conceptual space. A related conceptual
space has been proposed by Edelman (1999), which also proposes
an implementation based on Radial Basis Functions (RBF) neural
networks. Song and Bruza (2003) adopted a conceptual space
framework for information retrieval applications, and Aisbett and
Gibbon (2001a) propose a suitable conceptual space for clinical
diagnosis applications. From a theoretical point of view, Gärden-
fors and Williams (2001) discuss the conceptual space approach
for generating nonmonotonic logic inferences, and Chella et al.
(2004) discuss conceptual spaces in the framework of the anchor-
ing problem in robotics. Balkenius (1998) proposes a more realis-
tic implementation of a conceptual space, from an empiric point
of view, by a set of RBF units, and Aisbett and Gibbon (2001b) dis-
cuss a related implementation based on voltage maps.
One of the problems with all of the previously cited approaches
is that the structure of the adopted conceptual spaces are a priori
defined by the designer according to the addressed problem, in
the sense that the designer has to define how many axes are nec-
essary for a correct representation of the problem at hand, what is
the meaning of the axes and the corresponding type and range of
values, what are the separable and the integral dimensions, and so
on. No general methodology has been adopted or proposed to al-
low the machine to inductively learn a conceptual space, with the
exception of the multidimensional scaling algorithm (Shepard
1962a; 1962b) proposed by Gärdenfors, which is generally not
suitable for real world robotic applications.
Analyzing the article by Steels and Belpaeme (S&B) from the
point of view of the conceptual space theory, the described agents
effectively build a conceptual space in order to represent the per-
ceived colors. A “category,” implemented by a RBF neural net-
work, identifies a subspace of integral dimensions of colors, be-
cause each RBF unit defines a color subdimension, whereas
different categories correspond to separable subspaces of colors.
Therefore, the color conceptual space of the agent is generated by
the union of all the subspaces of integral dimensions of colors cor-
responding to all the agent categories. The agent inner represen-
tation of a color is therefore given by the collection of the re-
sponses of all the RBF units built by the agent, that is, by the com-
ponents of the conceptual space dimensions, in agreement with
the conceptual space theory. It should be noted that each color
subspace is implemented by a RBF neural network, along the
lines of the approaches by Edelman and by Balkenius.
The new and important point brought forth in the S&B exper-
iments is that the agent conceptual space is not defined a priori by
the system designer, but it is learned by the agent itself according
to its inner and external constraints, as fully described in the tar-
get article. Therefore, the strategy adopted by S&B is effectively
able to address the previously described problem of how to learn
a conceptual space. Interestingly, the conceptual space is gener-
ated not only by means of the agent perceptions, but also by the
linguistic interactions among agents, that is, by means of the agent
actions.
Along this line, it would be interesting to investigate the possi-
bility for an agent to have more powerful representation capabil-
ities that allow the agent to infer the conceptual spaces of other
agents, through, for example, a sort of higher-order guessing
game. In this way, the problem of sharing categories among pop-
ulations could be correctly addressed, in the sense that an agent
belonging to a population Ax may build an inner representation of
the conceptual space of another agent belonging to a population
Ay to acquire all the needed capabilities to “translate” its own color
categories to the color categories of the other agent.
In conclusion, the S&B article is a seminal starting point for the
investigation of a general methodology for inferential learning of
conceptual spaces from an agent’s external perceptions, its inner
and external constraints, and its actions.
Color categories in biological evolution:
Broadening the palette
Wayne D. Christensena and Luca Tommasib
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Abstract: The general structure of Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) central
premise is appealing. Theoretical stances that focus on one type of mech-
anism miss the fact that multiple mechanisms acting in concert can pro-
vide convergent constraints for a more robust capacity than any individual
mechanism might achieve acting in isolation. However, highlighting the
significance of complex constraint interactions raises the possibility that
some of the relevant constraints may have been left out of S&B’s own mod-
els. Although abstract modeling can help clarify issues, it also runs the risk
of oversimplification and misframing. A more subtle implication of the sig-
nificance of interacting constraints is that it calls for a close relationship
between theoretical and empirical research.
Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) study attempts to combine research
objectives for robotics and human science. But, although using
human communication as a model may be a useful starting point
for robotics, the radical differences in physical constraints be-
tween robots and humans makes it unclear how much overlap
there need be between the two areas. The evolution of human
communication abilities occurred in a specific biological context,
with perceptual, motor, cognitive, social, and ecological con-
straints that don’t apply to robots. Exotic abilities like direct shar-
ing of perceptual information are possible for robots, and ulti-
mately the most effective robot communication systems may be
no more similar to human verbal communication than human
communication is to that of honeybees or dolphins. This is not to
suggest that there will be no important commonalities, but rather
to point out that divergent specific constraints can generate very
different possibilities.
Commentary/Steels & Belpaeme: Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language
492 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:4
The study is at a sufficiently high level of abstraction that such
differences enter the picture only minimally. In taking inspiration
from categorization and naming by humans, S&B only focus on
the fact that humans are capable of open ended generation of so-
cially shared names, without attempting to model any specific bi-
ological or psychological mechanisms that may be involved. Such
a strategy offers the potential for generality, but it also faces chal-
lenges in demonstrating that the results will be robust against de-
partures from S&B’s assumptions, and that the models are infor-
mative despite the lack of realism. In their conclusion, S&B
suggest that additional realism would only obscure the dynamics,
but this very much depends on assuming that unmodeled con-
straints do not contribute to the dynamics.
Their primary hypothesis is that “embodiment and statistical
regularity of the environment is not enough to achieve sufficient
sharing for communication and that cultural constraints also play
a role.” However, this sounds suspiciously like its addressing an ill-
formed problem: What counts as “sufficient sharing” and “not
enough” may well be sensitive to a variety of factors and vary in
different contexts. For example, focal color categorization is pre-
sent in birds and might have been selected for because it simpli-
fies the cognitive demands of discriminating multiple items in an
array, be they landmarks in the environment (Tommasi & Vallor-
tigara 2004), potential mates (Bennett et al. 1997), or the incen-
tive value of different types of food (Gamberale-Stille & Tullberg
2001). Thus, task complexity is one dimension in which departures
from S&B’s assumptions could have a significant impact: The
complex task demands faced by birds may have favored focal color
categorization independent of any social referencing constraints.
The general problem is that it is very hard to know in advance
where and how such interrelations arise, and hence, it can be hard
to evaluate whether an abstract model has aptly represented the
issues.
Comparative research provides a strategy for disentangling
some of these kinds of complexities. In the case of color catego-
rization, birds and mammals are an informative contrast, given the
evolutionary radiation that separated these amniote groups from
a common ancestor, and the highly sophisticated visual abilities of
birds (Güntürkün 2000; Vallortigara 2004). Color perception is
more refined in avian species from the level of retinal photore-
ceptors, because the presence of double cones, oil droplets, and
tetrachromacy provide for earlier color-opponency processes than
those found in mammals (Vorobyev et al. 1998).
Birds are thus endowed with the structural and functional fea-
tures necessary to perceive, discriminate, and generalize color
stimuli. Selective pressures undoubtedly shaped color spaces in
the direction of those sensory aspects that are ecologically relevant
to the species. Some behavioral responses (e.g., feeding behavior)
are genetically biased in the direction of specific colors (Roper &
Marples 1997), but, not surprisingly, the development of chro-
matic perception is dependent on the statistical structure of the
colors experienced in the environment, because rearing newly
hatched birds in abnormally colored environments results in al-
terations of the spectral range to which the birds respond when
compared with control animals in color discrimination tests (Mik-
lósi et al. 2002).
As noted, birds have been shown not only to discriminate and
generalize colors, but also to categorize the color continuum in
discrete regions centerd around focal points, as found in humans
(Jones et al. 2001). Even more strikingly, birds have exhibited
spontaneous emergence of vocalizations akin to color naming.
Manabe et al. (1995) trained budgerigars to emit a high pitch call
in case of the presentation of one color and to emit a low pitch call
in case of the presentation of another color. Once this association
was learned, spontaneous differential vocalizations were observed
in response to forms when some new association of forms to col-
ors was being established, as if the birds were anticipating the pre-
sentation of a color by its learned vocal label. Research on parrot’s
chattering has provided evidence of color referencing mediated
by vocal communication and apparently equally depending on
both parrot–parrot and parrot–human observational learning
(Pepperberg & Wilcox 2000). Birds share a basic neural architec-
ture that is substantially different from that of mammals, and yet
their evolution independently achieved functions strikingly simi-
lar to humans, with the potential for categorization of color in ref-
erential communication.
Several points can be drawn from this. Comparing similar traits
across diverse phyla is a useful strategy for casting light on evolu-
tionary processes and biological mechanisms, and can help disen-
tangle the general from the specific. However, the differences also
make such comparisons fraught; analogies (e.g., describing a par-
ticular bird behavior as “naming”) must be drawn very carefully.
Similar problems of interpretation face theoretical modeling re-
search. If a bird species ever evolves language that involves color
naming, do S&B’s results imply that the color categories must be
socially shaped? We suggest that this is far from clear because it
isn’t clear how well the assumptions of S&B’s models will map to
the constraints operative in the particular evolutionary process.
Given the difficulty of predicting a priori which constraints, or
even which kinds of constraints, may prove relevant in evolution-
ary and cultural processes, there is reason to try to develop a close
coupling between empirical and theoretical research so that the
respective strengths and weaknesses can be balanced against each
other. In arguing this, we are not seeking to dismiss S&B’s work.
It is an elegantly structured study that may provide a robust mod-
eling platform for much productive theoretical exploration. But
closer empirical links will help its development.
In the beginning: Word or deed?
Stephen J. Cowley
Department of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire
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Natal, South Africa. s.j.cowley@herts.ac.uk
Abstract: Emphasizing that agents gain from culture-based patterns, I
consider the etiology of meaning. Since the simulations show that “shared
categories” are not based in learning, I challenge Steels & Belpaeme’s
(S&B’s) folk view of language. Instead, I stress that meaning uses indexi-
cals to set off a replicator process. Finally, I suggest that memetic patterns
– not words – are the grounding of language.
Using remarkable simulations, Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) show
why autonomous robots can gain from sensitivity to culture-based
patterns. These can be used to supplement categories grounded
in embodiment and, as a result, actions can be better coordinated.
The simulations thus illuminate “how the memetic evolution of
language and meaning is possible” (sect. 4.3). In this commen-
tary, stressing that agents use indexical signs, I focus on the etiol-
ogy of meaning. Language itself, I suggest, may depend on how
grounded categories interact with memetic patterns or indexical
signs.
Although “sharing” develops in genetic simulations, as for color,
this may be gross. Equally, as with herring gull chicks, it may de-
pend on “relational signs” that arise in the niche (Tinbergen 1953).
Further, the simulations show that shared categories will not arise
from individual learning. Mapping a word-form to a color is, for
this reason, beyond autonomous devices that lack sensitivity to
culture-based patterns. It becomes possible, however, provided
that an encultured pattern is consistently coupled with what sen-
sors can detect. Given learning, coupling can give a population
grounded relational categories.
S&B draw on a folk view of language. Taking shared categories
for granted, they assume that a lexicon maps words onto mean-
ings. Accordingly, they adopt what has been called the “funda-
mental assumption of linguistics” – the view that, “in every speech
community, some utterances are alike in form and meaning”
(Bloomfield 1935, p. 78; for critique, see Love 2003). In spite of
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what simulations show, form–meaning relations are treated as
sacrosanct. Challenging this, Chomsky emphasizes that internal
language gives thought that is independent of “the sensory field”
(2002, p. 75). In parallel, Wittgenstein’s later writings show why
form–meaning models cannot explain even what is before our
eyes. Using careful consideration of utterances like “I know that
is a tree” (1969, p. 467), a major goal of On Certainty, is to show
that, strictly, the claim makes no sense. For Wittgenstein, under-
standing what we see often rests – not on what is known – but
rather a sui generis kind of judgment. Uttering “that’s a tree” can
make sense only to those familiar with how [tri:] (“tree”) syllables
can be integrated with social activity.
Despite appeal to “shared categories,” S&B’s results are consis-
tent with philosophical investigation. In color “naming,” agents re-
late patterns to current sensory impressions. Given consistent
cooccurrence of the inputs, learning captures a relation. As for
herring gulls, what matters is the pattern’s use. This, moreover, is
consistent with finding that “shared categories” are rendered im-
possible by minor differences in ecology or vision. As in S&B’s sim-
ulations, relational events enable agents to combine ecological and
use-based resources. Shared meaning is thus merely a (valuable)
fiction. Further, if use-based patterns modify embodied cate-
gories, this fits Dennett’s (1995) view that “memes” exploit neither
natural nor neural languages (p. 354). Given benefits associated
with relational signs, moreover, use-based patterns will be able to
spread. In a population, natural or artificial selection will favor
games where agents benefit from memetic patterns. Applied to
humans, this suggests that the rise of indexical patterns may un-
derpin a “culturally-based replicator process” (Aunger 2000). Fur-
ther, this conforms to how Wittgenstein sees his garden game. For
the philosophers, utterances of “that’s a tree” depend – not on
shared categories – but on relations. Specifically, they integrate
pointing with gazing at objects and, in the same time-scale, utter-
ing (“that is a tree”). The capacity uses neither a lexicon nor shared
meanings, but what the Philosophical Investigations call a “natural
history” (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 415) that engenders human
“agreement” (1958, p. 241).
Many animals call to each other and human embryos sensitize
to particular voices. It is perhaps to be expected, therefore, that
memetic patterns use perceptually grounded discrimination. Not
only do many species assess grounded sound-patterns, but, espe-
cially in birds and mammals, individuals often use indexicals to
manage others (Owings & Morton 1998). Whales can sing and
many birds duet; by three months, human infants find what they
do shaped by caregiver vocalizations (Cowley et al. 2004). Within
this frame, one can generalize S&B’s simulations. If consistent use
of indexicals prompts cognitive effects, our nervous systems may
resemble those of herring-gull chicks in relying on relational signs.
Whether exploiting physics (e.g,. blue light), affect (e.g., pain)
and/or social relations (e.g., dominance), memetic patterns may
trigger cognitive change. Mere exposure to use-based dynamics
may conceivably influence activity and, as Tomasello (1999) sug-
gests, directing attention may be a basic function of language. Fur-
ther, indexicals do shape conversational events (Spurrett & Cow-
ley 2004). Even in broad terms, speakers of languages like French,
isiZulu, and Thai draw on similar syllable-based rhythms to
achieve interpersonal goals. Is this not memetic? Are these per-
haps carriers of public emotions that serve, above all, to protect
agents from social dilemmas (Ross & Dumouchel 2004)? If so, the
simulations show how “strategic signals” can take on semantic and
social roles. In humans, the basis of meaning may not only be
memetic, but, strikingly, many of its cognitive effects may arise
from events within cultural and ecological boundaries.
The simulations raise many issues. How do animals get caught
up with memetic patterns? How do individual consumers use cog-
nition enhancing resources? As S&B imply, such issues can be in-
vestigated through strategic games. In a “trumping” game, for ex-
ample, credit could be given to agents who anticipated actions or,
echoing sexual selection, a “charming” game might credit musical
performance. After all, it is striking that no less a figure than Dar-
win (1871) posited that the evolutionary history of language is to
be traced – not to words – but to song. Further, given cultural sen-
sitivity, autonomous robots might simulate how patterns of life
codevelop with increasing variability in strategic signaling. Index-
icals could be used, at least in principle, by culturally-sensitive ma-
chines that coordinated not only inner categories but also interac-
tional events. Given capacities to self-organize, memetic control
could thus come to exert an influence on both perception and ac-
tion. Such agents would do what, following Goethe (1959), Faust
and Wittgenstein came to believe in. Culturally-sensitive robots,
would ground capacities for meaning (and communicating) – not
in words – but in patterned deeds.
Language impairment and colour categories
Jules Davidoffa and Claudio Luzzattib
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Abstract:Goldstein (1948) reported multiple cases of failure to categorise
colours in patients that he termed amnesic or anomic aphasics. These pa-
tients have a particular difficulty in producing perceptual categories in the
absence of other aphasic impairments. We hold that neuropsychological
evidence supports the view that the task of colour categorisation is logi-
cally impossible without labels.
Our commentary contains no fundamental disagreement with the
position put forward by Steels & Belpaeme (S&B). We too hold
that language, at least in the form of commonly held labels, is a
necessary condition for colour categorisation. Furthermore, we
hold that as those labels differ between languages, consequently
the content of categories will also differ. Our support for S&B
comes initially from the cross-lingual evidence quoted in the tar-
get article (Davidoff et al. 1999; Roberson et al. 2000). Similar re-
cent data (Roberson et al. 2004) gives further evidence for the
Whorfian (Whorf 1956) stance on colour categories; it showed
that children who have no colour terms perform colour similarity
tasks based solely on perceptual discrimination. Categorical dis-
crimination, as opposed to perceptual discrimination, was evident
only after label acquisition. Thus, before label acquisition, both
English and Himba (a tribe whose language contains only five
colour terms) confuse navy blue with purple – a perceptually close
colour. After label acquisition, Himba children confuse navy blue
with black; these colours have the same label in Himba. They do
not confuse navy blue with royal blue that has a different label in
Himba, whereas the English children do make that confusion.
Neither group of children continue to confuse navy blue with pur-
ple as they have a different label in both languages.
There is, however, an aspect of the S&B argument about which
we have comment. The comment derives from the neuropsycho-
logical literature, which is a strong source of support to their ar-
gument. Goldstein (1948) reported multiple cases of failure to cat-
egorise colours in patients that he termed amnesic or anomic
aphasics. These patients, as part of their language disturbance,
had lost the ability to name or point to named colours. Despite
normal colour vision, they found the task of colour categorisation
completely bewildering. On being asked to sort colours, they pre-
dominantly adopted one of two strategies (see also the case of
LEW: Davidoff & Roberson 2004; Roberson et al. 1999; 2002). Ei-
ther they declared that there were very few (even only one cate-
gory) or there were many categories (even as many as there were
different colours). For example, LEW would choose a colour
sample and look round for one that was identical. As none were
identical, he would reluctantly place the colour with the one per-
ceptually closest. The procedure was repeated and could even
continue until all the samples were in the same group. In LEW, at
least, the extraordinary behaviour cannot be attributed to a failure
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in all categorisation tasks, as he very promptly divided pictures of
animals into British versus foreign (Roberson et al. 1999). Nor, in
general, could it be attributed to the patients’ poor language skills.
For example, the patient AV investigated by Luzzatti and David-
off (1994) showed only minimal aphasic disturbance, but never-
theless could not sort colours.
The performance of these anomic aphasics lends support to the
argument that agreed upon labels are essential for the production
of colour categories. However, it might ask for a reconsideration
of the agent’s performance in its individualistic (empiricist) simu-
lation. S&B show that agents who cannot communicate with each
other arrive at solutions sufficiently different that they could not
form the basis of a common colour categorisation. Nevertheless,
if we inspect Figure 3, we see that each agent arrives at reliable
categories, even ones that at first glance look somewhat similar.
The somewhat similar categories are produced because S&B give
the agents a categorisation device based on a prototype. If such a
device were available to the patients, one might have predicted, at
least, idiosynchratic categories after their language loss. If the pa-
tients had, premorbidly, the usual category prototypes, one might
even predict normal categorisation. Yet, the patients are unable to
produce proper categories. In our view, allowing the agents a cat-
egorisation device considerably underestimates the importance of
the labels.
In our view, the task of colour categorisation is logically impos-
sible without labels (Dummett 1975; Roberson et al. 1999). The
agent in the natural world is confronted with coloured sensations
that vary on a perceptual continuum. Importantly, the continuum
has no natural discontinuities (or prototypes) that would allow ob-
vious division into categories. The agent is confronted with dis-
plays that conform to what is known as the Sorites paradox. Imag-
ine the situation where the stimuli in the discrimination game are
not widespread, as in their example, but vary by so little that the
perceptual discrimination mechanism cannot tell them apart.
Let’s say that the samples are light sources of 620 nm, 619.9 nm,
619.8 nm, and 619.7 nm. As they cannot be told apart, they can all
be given the same label – let’s call it red. If they were then re-
placed by four further colours, each decreasing by 0.1 nm, none
of these could be distinguished from the 619.7 nm sample. So, the
agent could call all the new four red, as well. The procedure could
be repeated over and over again until paradoxically colours at the
other (blue) end of the spectrum would also be called red. This
nonsensical situation (Sorites paradox) is resolved by making a
nonperceptual (e.g., verbal label) discontinuity in the continuum
(Dummett 1975). As we see in the behaviour of the anomic apha-
sics, they behave as if the Sorites paradox is more than a philo-
sophical speculation. So, there is a reason to doubt whether any
agent relying solely on its own feedback in the real world would
produce categorical performance of any reliability.
The neuropsychological evidence adds support to the argument
for the importance of labels in category formation. Only if the
world was constrained to present examples that were sufficiently
far apart perceptually to allow discontinuities in colour space,
could the agent form any useful categories. Those discontinuities
would not arise from the changes in perceptual input that denote
differences between urban and rural environments. And, as for
the discontinuities arriving genetically, we still wait for any con-
vincing evidence that the human visual cortex contains neurons
that selectively act as detectors for red, green, blue, or any other
colour.
Realistic constraints on brain color
perception and category learning
Stephen Grossberg
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems, Boston University, Boston, MA
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Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) ask how autonomous agents can de-
rive perceptually grounded categories for successful communication, us-
ing color categorization as an example. Their comparison of nativism, em-
piricism, and culturalism, although interesting, does not include key
biological and technological constraints for seeing color or learning color
categories in realistic environments. Other neural models have success-
fully included these constraints.
Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) approach the symbol-grounding prob-
lem using learning algorithms that “take as much inspiration as
possible from categorisation and naming by humans” (sect. 1,
para. 3). They nicely summarize three traditional positions about
this problem, but then test these positions using models that do
not simulate biological data and are tested on toy problems that
do not demonstrate superior performance against the best mod-
els available. Talking biology without data and talking technology
without comparative benchmarks does not satisfy the demands of
either biology or technology.
At least two processes subserve color categorization: color
preprocessing and recognition learning to categorize prepro-
cessed data. The authors used a small stimulus set: “four stimuli
chosen from a total of 1,269 Munsell chips” (sect. 3), measured
their reflected spectral energy, and claimed that they “start from
realistic colour data” (sect. 2.2) and use a “reasonable model of hu-
man lightness perception” (sect. 2.3.1). However, perceived col-
ors cannot be derived from local measurements. Lighting condi-
tions and surface context dramatically influence color perception.
Preprocessing requires discounting the illuminant, perceptual
grouping, surface filling-in and anchoring processes that have
been simulated by other neural models, including lightness data
(e.g., Grossberg & Todorovic 1988; Hong & Grossberg 2004; Min-
golla et al. 1999; Pessoa et al. 1995). The authors’ studies of color
category learning and naming used inputs that do not represent
challenges that autonomous robots would meet in the real world.
The authors’ neural categorization models are also inadequate.
A realistic model must realize stable incremental learning of both
small and large categories in response to changing environmental
statistics. Concerning stability: Its dot products (equation 2) and
winner-take-all choices (equation 3) are well-known in competi-
tive learning and self-organizing map models (e.g., Grossberg
1976a; Kohonen 1984; Rumelhart & Zipser 1986). These models
suffer from a problem common to most learning models. I called
the problem the stability-plasticity dilemma; some others call it
catastrophic forgetting (Carpenter 2001; Grossberg 1980; Page
2000); namely, the memory of learned categories can be rapidly
erased in response to changing environmental statistics. Thus, the
authors’ categorization models cannot work well in a realistic in-
cremental learning setting. It has been mathematically proven
that catastrophic forgetting can be overcome by an appropriate
top-down matching and attentional focusing mechanism (Car-
penter & Grossberg 1987; 1991) that has been embodied in Adap-
tive Resonance Theory, or ART, algorithms (Grossberg 1999) and
supported recently by many behavioral and neurobiological ex-
periments, reviewed in Raizada and Grossberg (2003). Indeed,
ART was introduced as an attempt to solve the catastrophic for-
getting problem that was identified in competitive learning and
self-organizing map models (Grossberg 1976b).
Concerning adaptive control of category size: Unsupervised
clustering is sensitive only to the statistics of the input environ-
ment. Supervision enables categories of variable size to be learned
that are also sensitive to cultural and language constraints. The
claimed ability of Eskimos to perceive and name unusually subtle
shades of blue may combine both properties. Realistic models
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must automatically switch between incremental unsupervised
clustering, when predictive feedback is unavailable, and super-
vised clustering, when predictive feedback is available, without a
loss of memory stability, to learn categories that are sensitive to
both environmental statistics and cultural constraints. ARTMAP
algorithms achieved this goal by combining top-down matching
and attention with vigilance or sensitivity control that together
maximize generalization while minimizing predictive error using
a patented concept called match tracking (Carpenter & Grossberg
1991). In this regard, S&B discuss distinguishing between edible
and nonedible mushrooms, notably the need to distinguish “fine
shades of orange” (sect. 2.2) in mushroom databases. However,
they do not simulate classical mushroom databases (Schlimmer
1987). ARTMAP has been benchmarked on the mushroom data-
base with a 99.8% accuracy during on-line learning (Carpenter et
al. 1991).
S&B also note the importance of studying “categorization and
naming by humans” (sect. 1), but do not do model human per-
formance. ARTMAP has simulated the set of thirty human cate-
gorization experiments, called the 5–4 category structure (Smith
& Minda 2000), which is a standard benchmark for human cate-
gorization (Ersoy et al. 2002). Whereas traditional cognitive mod-
els can fit these data, they do so without learning the categories
and without describing underlying brain dynamics. ARTMAP
learns the categories and fits the data at least as well as cognitive
models, and also proposes how to settle the classical exemplar/
prototype debate concerning whether exemplars or prototypes
are stored in memory. ARTMAP predicts that critical feature pat-
terns to which humans learn to pay attention are stored in mem-
ory. Under language/cultural supervision, these prototypes can
be either specific (“exemplars”; Estes 1994; Medin & Smith,
1981; Medin et al. 1983) or general (“prototypes”; Posner &
Keele 1970; Smith & Minda 1998; 2000; Smith et al. 1997). Typ-
ically, both specific and general information will be learned
(“rule-plus-exceptions”; Nosofsky 1984; 1987; Nosofsky et al.
1992; Palmeri et al. 1994).
ARTMAP is a standard tool for learning complex categorical re-
lationships from high-dimensional input vectors that include color
among other visual features, while autonomously discovering hi-
erarchical knowledge relationships among the categories (Car-
penter et al. 2004a; 2004b; Parsons & Carpenter 2003).
S&B summarize familiar features of neural models of super-
vised learning using nomenclature about games. Although these
games sound novel, they actually embody well-known neural
modeling concepts, including memory search or hypothesis test-
ing to create new categories, the use of predictive success to cul-
turally constrain learned naming, and the need to control category
size. All of these properties are unified and proceed automatically
in ARTMAP algorithms. It remains for S&B to demonstrate,
through comparative benchmarks, that their models can cope with
the categorical challenges that this alternative approach has al-
ready handled.
Modeling category coordination: Comments
and complications
James A. Hampton
Psychology Department, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V
OHB, United Kingdom. hampton@city.ac.uk
www.staff.city.ac.uk/hampton
Abstract: Consideration of color alone can give a misleading impression
of the three approaches to category coordination: the nativist, empiricist
and culturalist models. Empiricist models can benefit from a wider range
of correlational information in the environment. Also, all three approaches
may explain a set of perceptual categories within the human repertoire.
Finally, a suggestion is offered for supplementing the naming game by
varying the social status of agents.
The broad conclusion drawn by Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) on the
basis of their explorations of three general models for category
name coordination is that, whereas the genetic and the cultural/
language-based models can lead to coordinated categorization
and naming practices within populations, the statistical structure
available for colors in the immediate environment is insufficient
to allow the empiricist model to achieve the same level of perfor-
mance.
The latter claim is critically dependent on the choice of envi-
ronmental structure provided to the empiricist model. S&B ex-
plored only one source of structure – a random sampling of pixels
taken from photos of environmental scenes. Before drawing any
firm conclusion about the possibility of achieving full coordination
of categories simply from statistical covariation in the world, a
more realistic characterization of the environment is surely nec-
essary. In particular, colors are not seen by individuals as inde-
pendent pixels, but as reflectances of the surfaces of objects and
parts of the visual scene, which can be tracked through space and
time as the individual moves through the scene. Other visual prop-
erties such as shape and size of the color patch, where it is located
relative to objects in the scene, and sensory properties from other
modalities all provide rich sources of correlational structure which
establish a categorization of the world. Coordination of color cat-
egories may then benefit from the association of colors with ob-
ject classes (oranges are typically orange, lemons typically yellow,
the sky typically blue, blood red, and so forth). To take one of their
examples, if coordination of color categories is important for the
detection of poisonous mushrooms, then it is unrealistic to sup-
pose that the morphology, size, smell, and habitat of the mush-
room will not also play a role in categorization – and hence pro-
vide crucial evidence about where to draw the color category
boundary in this instance. It is therefore an empirical question
whether a richer modeling of the statistical structure in the envi-
ronment would be sufficient to allow a purely empiricist model to
develop coordinated categories as efficiently as the other two
model types.
Presenting the three approaches to the problem as mutually
contrasting accounts may also be misleading. Human categorizers
(and human cultures that develop category systems) form and
name categories on the basis of a wide range of sources of infor-
mation. It is easy to find prima facie candidates for perceptual cat-
egories that are grounded in each of the three models explored –
genetic, empirical, or cultural. Coordination of names for basic
emotions such as happiness and grief, or bodily states such as
hunger, thirst, or fatigue is presumably based on our common ge-
netics. Coordination of names for biological classes probably re-
lies on the fact that the similarity structure of biological classes at
an intermediate level (e.g., elephant, tiger) contains clearly de-
fined clusters with high within-cluster similarity and low between-
cluster similarity, giving relatively universal taxonomic systems
across different cultures at this level (Lopez et al. 1997). Artifact
classification at the basic level may similarly rely solely on high
levels of distinctiveness (Rosch et al. 1976). Other categories that
depend more on language may be found in culturally-specific cat-
egories relating to social practices. For example, classification of
ceramics, painting, or music in terms of different artistic styles, or
notions of good and bad taste in clothing or decoration are per-
ceptually grounded, but may depend heavily on language for their
coordination. It is only the fact of having the concept in the lan-
guage that leads the language learner to attend to the relevant per-
ceptual cues and construct the necessary prototype representa-
tions. A wider view of perceptual categories suggests therefore
that the three approaches considered by S&B – nativism, empiri-
cism, and culturalism – all have their place in explaining the rich
repertoire of human concepts.
My final comment relates to the cultural model itself. S&B’s
model assumes a fully cooperative pair of individuals in the lan-
guage game. Each is willing to adapt his/her categorization and us-
age of language in the service of improving communication. In ac-
tual human societies, the degree of cooperation may be less
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evident. The right to determine how things are categorized and
named is not so evenly distributed. Children are expected to con-
form to adult norms. In Western cultures, social classes whose ed-
ucation has given them greater access to the elaborated use of lan-
guage (Bernstein 1981) may determine that there are right and
wrong ways in which to classify and name the world. For an in-
creasing number of domains, the correct use of a word is the
province of an expert – Putnam’s Division of Linguistic Labor (Put-
nam 1975) – to whom other language users are inclined (and ex-
pected) to defer (Kalish 1995). It would be an interesting exercise
for S&B to consider introducing differing levels of social status in
the naming game. Agents of lower status would be willing to adapt
their representations rapidly, whereas agents of higher status
would hold on to their beliefs longer in the face of disagreement,
particularly if the interlocutor was of lower status than themselves.
It would be fascinating to know if introducing this dimension into
the game leads to quicker coordination of categories throughout
the community, and whether the higher or lower status players end
up showing greater or less variance as a subclass of agents.
Language and the game of life
Stevan Harnad
Centre de Neuroscience de la Cognition, Université du Québec à Montréal,
Montréal, Québec H3C 3P8, Canada. harnad@uqam.ca
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/
Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) simulations contain all the right
components, but they are put together wrongly. Color categories are un-
representative of categories in general and language is not merely naming.
Language evolved because it provided a powerful new way to acquire cat-
egories (through instruction, rather than just the old way of other species,
through trial-and-error experience). It did not evolve so that multiple
agents looking at the same objects could let one another know which of
the objects they had in mind, co-coining names for them on the fly.
Contra Wittgenstein (1953), language is not a game. (Maynard-
Smith [1982] would no doubt plead nolo contendere.) The game
is life, and language evolved (and continues to perform) in life’s
service – although it has since gained a certain measure of auton-
omy too.
So are Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) inquiring into the functional
role for which language evolved, the supplementary roles for
which it has since been coopted, or merely the role something pos-
sibly resembling language might play in robotics (another supple-
ment to our lives)?
For if S&B are studying the functional role for which language
evolved, that role is almost certainly absent from the experimen-
tal conditions that they are simulating. Their computer simula-
tions do not capture the ecological conditions under which, and
for which, language began. The tasks and environments set for
S&B’s simulated creatures were not those that faced any human
or prehuman ancestor, nor would they have led to the evolution of
language had they been. On the contrary, the tasks faced by our
prelinguistic ancestors (as well as our nonlinguistic contempo-
raries) are precisely the ones left out of S&B’s simulations.
S&B do make two fleeting references to a world in which for-
agers need to learn to recognize and sort mushrooms by kind –
with color possibly serving as one of the features on the basis of
which they sort. But a task like learning to sort mushrooms by kind
is not what S&B simulate here. They simulate the task of sorting
colors, and not by kind, but by a kind of “odd man out” exercise
called the “discrimination game.” In this game, the agent sees a
number of different colors (the “context”), of which one (the
“topic”) is the one that must be discriminated from the rest. If 
this is done by two agents, it is called the “guessing game,” with
the speaker both discriminating and naming the topic-color, and
the hearer having to guess which of the visible context-colors the
speaker named. Both agents see all the context-colors.
Now the first thing we must ask is: (i) Were any of our prelin-
guistic ancestors ever faced with a task anything like this? (ii) And
if they had been, would that have led to the evolution of language?
(iii) Indeed, is what is going on in S&B’s task language at all?
I would like to suggest that the answer to all three questions is
no. S&B’s is not an ecologically valid task; it is not a canonical prob-
lem that our prelinguistic ancestors encountered, for which lan-
guage evolved as the solution. And even if we trained contempo-
rary animals to do something like it (as some comparative
psychologists have done, e.g., Leavens et al. 1996), it would not be
a linguistic task – indeed it would hardly even be a categorization
task, but more like a joint multiple-choice task requiring some
“mind-reading” (Premack & Woodruff 1978; Tomasello 1999)
plus some coordination (Fussell & Krauss 1992; Markman & Ma-
kin 1998).
On the other hand, there is no doubt that our own ancestors,
once language had evolved, did face tasks like this, and that lan-
guage helped them perform such tasks. But language helps us per-
form many tasks (even learning to ride a bicycle or to do synchro-
nized swimming) for which language is not necessary, for which it
did not evolve, and which are not themselves linguistic tasks. (This
is S&B’s “chicken/egg” problem, but in a slightly different key.)
Let’s now turn to something that is ecologically valid. Our
prelinguistic ancestors (and their nonlinguistic contemporaries, as
well as our own) did face the problem of categorization and cate-
gory learning. They did have to know or learn what to do with dif-
ferent kinds of things, in order to survive and reproduce: what to
eat or not eat, what to approach or avoid, what kind of thing to do
with what kind of thing, and so forth. But categorizing is not the
same as discriminating (Harnad 1987). We discriminate things
that are present simultaneously, or in close succession; hence, dis-
crimination is a relative judgment, not an absolute one. You don’t
have to identify what the things are in order to be able to discern
whether two things are the same thing or different things, or
whether this thing is more like that thing or that thing. Catego-
rization, in contrast, calls for an absolute judgment of a thing in
isolation: “What kind of thing is this?” And the identification need
not be a name; it can simply be doing the kind of thing that you
need to do with that kind of thing (flee from it, mate with it, or
gather and save it for a rainy day).
So categorization tasks have not only ecological validity, but cog-
nitive universality (Harnad 2004). None of our fancier cognitive
capacities would be possible if we could not categorize. In partic-
ular, if we could not categorize, we could not name. To be able to
identify a thing correctly, in isolation, with its name, I need to be
able to discriminate it absolutely, not just relatively – that is, not
just from the alternatives that happen to be copresent with it at
the time (S&B’s “context”), but from all other things I encounter,
past, present, and (one hopes) future, with which it could be con-
fused. (Categorization is not necessarily exact and infallible. I may
be able to name things correctly based on what I have sampled to
date, but tomorrow I may encounter an example that I not only
cannot categorize correctly, but that shows that all my categoriza-
tion to date has been merely approximate too.)
Notice that I said categorize correctly. That is the other element
missing from S&B’s analyses. For S&B, there are three ways in
which things can be categorized: (N) innately (“nativism”), (E) ex-
perientially (“empiricism”), and (C) culturally (“culturalism,” al-
though one wonders why S&B consider cultural effects nonem-
pirical!). To be fair, the way S&B put it is that these are the three
ways in which categories can come to be shared – but clearly one
must have categories before one can share them (the chicken/egg
problem again!).
Where do the S&B agents’ color categories come from? They
seem to think that categories come from the “statistical structure”
of the things in the world, such as how much things resemble one
another physically, how frequently they occur and cooccur, and
how this is reflected in their effects on our sensorimotor trans-
ducers. This is the gist of S&B’s factor E, empiricism. Where the
statistical structure has been picked up by evolution (another em-
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pirical process) rather than experience, this is factor N, nativism.
But then what are we to make of factor C, culturalism? I think that
what S&B really have in mind here is what others have called “con-
structionism.” With factors N and E, categories are derived from
the structure of the world; with factor C they are somehow “con-
structed” by cultural practices and conventions. It is in this light
that S&B introduce the “Whorf Hypothesis” (Whorf 1956), ac-
cording to which our view of reality depends on our language and
culture. But the Whorf Hypothesis fell on especially hard times
with color categories, and S&B unfortunately inherit those hard-
ships in using colors as their mainstay.
There are many ways in which color categories are unrepre-
sentative of categories in general. First, they are of low dimen-
sionality (mainly electromagnetic wave frequency, but also inten-
sity and saturation). Second, they have a known and heavy innate
component. We are born with sensory equipment that prepares us
to sort (and name) colors the way we do with incomparably higher
probability than the way we sort the categories named by most of
the other nouns and adjectives in our (respective) dictionaries.
Nor are most of the categories named by the words in our dictio-
naries variants on prototypes in a continuum, as colors are.
Yes, there are variations in color vision, color experience, and
color naming that can modulate color categories a little; but let’s
admit it: not much! Moreover, color categories are hardly decom-
posable. With the possible exception of chromatographers, most
of us cannot replace a color’s name with a description – unlike with
most other categories, where descriptions work so well that we
usually don’t even bother to lexicalize the category with a cate-
gory-name and dictionary-entry at all. Even “the color of the sea”
is only a one-step description, parasitic on the fact that you know
the sea’s color. Compare that with all the different descriptions
that you could substitute for “chair.”
Why does describability matter? Because it gets much closer to
what language really is, and what it is really for (Cangelosi & Har-
nad 2001). Language is not just a category taxonomy. We use
words (category names) in combination to describe other cate-
gories, and to define other words, which makes it possible to ac-
quire categories via instruction rather than merely the old, prelin-
guistic way, via direct experience or imitation. S&B think naming’s
main use is to tell you which object I have in mind, out of many
we are both looking at now. (It seems that good old pointing would
have been enough to solve that problem, if that had really been
what language was about and for.)
But not only are color categories unrepresentative of categories
in general, and the joint discrimination game unrepresentative of
what language evolved and is used for, but categories do not de-
rive merely or primarily from the passive correlational structure
of objects (whether picked up via species evolution or via individ-
ual experience). It is not the object/object or input/input correla-
tions that matter, but the effects of what we do with objects: the
input/output correlations, and especially the corrective feedback
arising from their consequences. What S&B’s model misses, fo-
cusing as it does on discrimination and guessing games instead of
the game of life, is that categories are acquired through feedback
from miscategorization. We have this in a realistic mushroom for-
aging paradigm, but not in a hypothetical discrimination/guessing
game (except if we gerrymander the game so that successful dis-
criminating/guessing becomes the name of the game by fiat, and
then that is fed back in the form of error-correcting conse-
quences).
Yet all the right elements do seem to be there in S&B’s simula-
tions. They are simply not put together in a realistic and instruc-
tive way. The task of mind-reading in context seems premature.
Every categorization in fact has two contexts. First, there is its con-
text of acquisition, in which the category is first learned (whether
evolutionarily via N or experientially via E) by trial-and-error, with
corrective feedback provided by the consequences of miscatego-
rization. The acquisition context is the series of examples of cate-
gory members and nonmembers that is sampled during the learn-
ing (the “training set” in machine learning terms). Until language
evolves, categories can only be learned and marked on the basis of
an instrumental “category-name” (approaching, avoiding, manip-
ulating, eating, mating). With language, there is the new option of
marking the category with an arbitrary name, picked by (cultural)
convention.
When a category has already been learned instrumentally,
adding an arbitrary name is a relatively trivial further step (and
nonlinguistic animals can do it too). But then comes the second
sense of “context”: the context of application (for an already ac-
quired category) in which the learned arbitrary category-names
are used for other purposes. S&B’s paradigm is, in fact, just one
example of the context of application (telling you which of the col-
ors that we are both looking at I happen to have in mind), but not
a very representative or instructive one. Far more informative (lit-
erally!) is a task in which it is descriptions that resolve the uncer-
tainty, and the alternatives are not even present. This is not dis-
crimination but instruction/explanation. But for that you first
need real language, and not just a taxonomy of arbitrary names
(Harnad 2000).
What follows from this is that a “language game” in which words
and categories are jointly coined and coordinated “on the fly,” as
in S&B’s color-naming simulations, is not a realistic model for any-
thing that biological agents ever do or did. There is still scope for
Whorfian effects, but those will come from the fact that both our
respective experiential “training samples” (for all categories) and
our corrective feedback (for categories about which our culture
and language have a say in what’s what, and hence also a hand in
dictating the consequences of miscategorizing) have degrees of
freedom that are not entirely fixed either by our inheritance or by
the structure of the external world.
Categories are underdetermined, hence so are the features we
use to pick them out. In machine learning theory, this is called the
“credit/blame” assignment problem (“which of the many features
available is responsible for my successful or unsuccessful catego-
rization?”), which is in turn a symptom of the “frame problem”
(how to anticipate all potential future contingencies from a finite
training sample?) and, ultimately, the “symbol-grounding prob-
lem” (how to connect a category-name with all the things in that
category, past, present, and future?) Underdetermination leaves
plenty of room for Whorfian differences between agents.
A synthesis of many levels of constraints as
a modern view of development
Derek Harter and Shulan Lu
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Abstract: The debate of nativisim versus empiricism is over the relative
importance of evolutionary versus ontogenetic mechanisms. This is mostly
seen today as a false dichotomy. The synthesis of these positions provides
a modern viewpoint of grounded category formation. This combined view
places equal importance on feedback between these levels in guiding de-
velopment, and is more appropriately compared to culturalist positions.
Much of the debate between nativism and empiricism seems to us
to echo similar debates that have been prevalent in developmen-
tal psychology and biology on the question of nature versus nur-
ture. That is to say, how much of a role does genetic evolution play
in the development of behavior in humans and animals? How
much can be attributed to ontogenetic learning by the individual?
Is either factor predominant and, if not, are there some areas of
behavior and learning where one or the other is the main con-
tributing factor? These debates seem, however, to have reached
somewhat of a preliminary consensus, that it is neither and both
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at the same time (see, e.g., Oyama 1985), the basic idea being that
both complex adaptive systems (evolution and ontogenetic devel-
opment) are at once separate, but also tightly coupled with each
other in mutual feedback relations. The complex and constant
feedback between these levels are what define and shape the suc-
cessful behavioral strategies (from micro-cellular to societal) that
such systems constantly seek out in order to survive and reproduce
in their environments (Thelen & Smith 1994; Thelen et al. 2001).
So, from this we believe it may be a bit of a straw-man to com-
pare a culturalist position to simple nativist and empiricist posi-
tions as separate from one another. A more modern viewpoint
(Lewontin et al. 1984; Oyama 1985) would need to view nativism
and empiricism in a synthesized manner and conclude that the
complex mutual feedback between the evolutionary and ontoge-
netic processes is what coordinates the development of categories.
Therefore, the culturalist position is mainly innovative in that it
posits a new complex adaptive system, that of language and cul-
ture use, as a third factor that plays a role in the feedback among
levels to coordinate the development of categories.
The authors describe the culturalist position as “viewing lan-
guage . . . as a complex adaptive system that is constantly coordi-
nated by its users” (sect. 1, para. 8). However, they go on to indi-
cate that they believe that a consensus needs to be reached on
which approach, nativist, empiricist, or culturalist, is most appro-
priate in explaining the grounded development of categories, and
therefore most useful for an engineer in developing a mechanism
to implement robust category development in an artificial system.
Even if language use and social interaction are shown to be an-
other type of system that plays an important role in the develop-
ment of categories, does this really mean that genetic evolution
and/or individualistic learning would be shown to play lesser
roles? No, we believe, and possibly the authors would agree. All
three are involved, and understanding the development of cate-
gories necessitates understanding all three systems, as well as how
they interact with and feedback on one another. As the authors say,
the question is really one of levels of freedom, and which levels of
adaptive systems are most involved in constraining which levels of
freedom.
The authors maintain neutrality on the question of nativism,
empiricism, and culturalism as to which, if any, theory best ex-
plains observations and data on human performance. However,
they do state a position, saying that multiple sources of constraints
are present in the formation of shared categories. They list three
constraints: those coming from embodiment, those from the en-
vironment, and those from culture; and they generally identify na-
tivists as emphasizing the first category, empiricists the second,
and culturalists as throwing cultural constraints into the mix. It
would seem that the true position they favor, and one we would
very much agree with, is that all of these sources of constraints play
important roles. Emphasizing one over the others always misses
an important point, that it is the interaction between these con-
straints at different levels that is the key component of develop-
ment. This article provides important results that will help us to
tease apart the contributions of these various influences, using
simplified models of developmental processes. However, we feel
that the authors don’t go far enough in pushing a synthesized view.
Some people may still be stuck in a viewpoint maintaining the pri-
macy of one type of constraint in the developmental process, but
at least in terms of genetic and environmental constraints, it is
clear to many that both play important roles, interact with each
other, and the interactions between the mechanisms must be stud-
ied, as well as the mechanisms themselves.
Language and social interaction, as complex adaptive systems,
would seem to occupy an intermediate level, in terms of time
scale, between the relatively slow processes of evolutionary de-
velopment, and the quick processes of ontogenetic learning.
Therefore might they represent a kind of bridging level between
the long-range and short-range processes? What level of social in-
teraction is necessary so that a population will develop a shared set
of grounded categories? The experiments in this article are a type
of communication, but a very simple one at that. Is it really nec-
essary to have a human-like language, or is some much more sim-
ple type of social interaction capable of developing shared cate-
gories? For example, is simply the fact of animals being social,
where they have to act together and coordinate behavior, enough
to provide some type of simple semiotic symbols that would allow
for the development of coordinated categories? If any type of so-
cial interaction is capable of producing shared categories, does a
more full-blown human language accomplish something even
more in constraining levels of freedom? What extra mileage might
a human-like natural language add to the development of shared
categories?
It is not evolution, but a better game would
need a better agent
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Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) refer to the neural plausibility and
evolutionary plausibility of their algorithms. Although this is not central to
their goal of effective artificial agents, their algorithms are not neurally or
evolutionarily plausible. Their communication games are interesting, and
more complex games would lead to more effective agents. However, the
algorithms could be improved either by using standard subsymbolic algo-
rithms or by algorithms that are really neurally or evolutionarily plausible.
We accept Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B) main point that communi-
cation can increase the overlap between conceptual representa-
tions of both human and artificial agents. This said, we find sev-
eral faults with it, including their inconsistent use of arguments,
and their poor usage of evolutionary algorithms. We also find two
related areas that should be addressed: hierarchical categories and
more complex games.
S&B play fast and loose with their overarching methodology.
They are inspired by the main approaches to human categorisa-
tion, but are not constrained by these approaches. This is fine
when they are making points about artificial agents, but they fre-
quently make references to evolutionary, environmental, and
neural arguments.
For example, they state that their evolution simulations are too
slow: “the agents need . . . at least 400 years” (sect. 3.3). This is a
legitimate argument against people learning categories by evolu-
tion, but it is probably not appropriate for other types of biologi-
cal systems. For example, fruit flies could learn the category in 20
days. A better argument against humans learning categories by
evolution is that a person born to one language group, but raised
in a second, learns the second. However, this argument is entirely
irrelevant to their main point about artificial agents.
They also describe the use of environmental stimuli (sect.
2.4.1). S&B go into depth about the environment and mushrooms,
but, in fact, their stimuli are just a set of 3-tuples. Their simula-
tions have very little to say about the environment.
S&B make frequent use of the word language (e.g., sect. 4).
However, their simulations only use labels. This is clearly a differ-
ent thing from what is typically referred to as language, which in-
cludes syntax, grammar, semantics, and pragmatics. At best, their
simulations are dealing with a symbol-grounding problem.
We are sceptical of the biological plausibility of radial basis
function networks, though individual neurons do seem to map
reasonably well to neurons. Moreover, the system they model has
a network topology and learning algorithm that does not seem bi-
ologically plausible.
We find real problems with the genetic evolution simulations.
S&B say that a generation is formed by retaining the best half of
the previous generation, and a single mutated copy of each. This
Commentary/Steels & Belpaeme: Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:4 499
is a very high mutation rate, and the mutation that they use is very
different from standard mutation. The standard genetic algorithm
(GA) mechanism involves crossover, and surprisingly, they have
none in their simulations. It is not clear why S&B do not use
crossover, but it may be because they get saturation in the popu-
lation. One way to fix this problem would be to use structured GAs
(Dasgupta & McGregor 1992). Finally, their population sizes of
ten are very small. We find it surprising that this system does as
well as reported, because it does not use crossover to explore the
search space; mutation, at best, gives simulated annealing, and the
number of agents is small. Undoubtedly, a more traditional system
would do better. It is a bit of stretch to say that standard GAs are
an accurate representation of evolution, and a much greater
stretch to say that S&B’s system reflects evolution.
These problems are minor, and do not significantly affect the
main points of the article. The main point is to develop agents that
have collective shared categories. These categories could be im-
proved by developing more complex environments, and by devel-
oping hierarchical categories.
The two games that are explained are very simple. That is, the
agents that are being developed are developed to function in very
simple environments. One obvious way to improve the agents is
to put them in more complicated environments. That is, they
could develop in more complex games, and the inputs could be
more sophisticated.
The games are simple for several reasons. First, the objects are
simple, being made up of 3-tuples. Moreover they are discrete in
that they do not overlap. This could easily be changed by playing
the game on standard categorisation tasks instead of colors (Cairns
et al. 2001). Human agents could even move the categories so that
the system shared the vocabulary with the agents. Second, the
games are very simple. The discrimination game is entirely about
categorisation and nothing else. The guessing, as S&B say, is “the
most basic language game one can imagine.” A range of more dif-
ficult games and environments can be easily imagined, including,
for example, different objects, variable pay out, delayed response,
and multiple players. These could all significantly affect the type
of agent that would be best.
On simple expansion, what we are interested in is hierarchical
categories. One of the works that S&B refer to is Rosch (1978) and
one of the major points of her work is that people store hierarchi-
cal categories (Rosch & Mervis 1975). The best way to modify
S&B’s games to account for hierarchical categories is not entirely
clear. A simple way to integrate hierarchy into the problem is to
modify the discrimination game. If the target category is very dif-
ferent from the other members of the presentation set, then a
high-level category would be used. If the presentation set is simi-
lar, then a subcategory would be used. This would be one way to
expand the capability of artificial agents.
A host of other game modifications could be proposed: nega-
tion, short-term memory, sequences, payoff, deception, and even
full-fledged language could be added. It is not clear how well
S&B’s agents would respond to these modifications.
As they are not dependent on biologically plausible mecha-
nisms, they could use standard machine learning algorithms and
normal programming techniques to enable their agents to have
the ability to manage these new game environments. However, a
better way might be to use nets that are more biologically plausi-
ble. This would enable S&B to develop agents that are more hu-
man-like and could use human-like solutions.
Dynamical categories and language
Takashi Ikegami
Department of General Systems Sciences, University of Tokyo, Komaba,
Tokyo 153–8902, Japan. ikeg@sacral.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp
http://sacral.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~ikeg
Abstract: The dynamical category uses the sensory-motor coordination to
do categorization. If categories are inevitably grounded in sensory-motor
coordination, sharing categories may also share the same sensory-motor
coordination. Concerning this aspect, we discuss the color category as a
dynamical categorization. Additional to the converging effect of a category
by communication, we discuss the diverging effect of communication that
creates new categories.
A category (of the perceptually grounded type) can be generated
easily, but is difficult for the members of a population to share.
From the study of embodied agents, we know that agents can syn-
thesize categories that inevitably reflect their own physical expe-
riences and constraints (Pfeifer & Scheier 1999).
Because different agents have different experiences and con-
straints, it is not trivial for them to share categories among them-
selves. Fortunately, communication through language actually
helps agents share a common category. Steels and Belpaeme’s
(S&B’s) article studies this, taking the category of colors as an ex-
ample.
Indeed, color seems to be a most intriguing category. As Lakoff
(1987) argues in Woman, Fire and Dangerous Things, color is a
typical example of what he calls a radial category. That is, color
lacks a rigid boundary (e.g., between red and blue), as each color
is only characterized by a protypical tone of color. Lakoff argues
that in addition to color, the grammar of language also forms a ra-
dial category. Generally, perceptually grounded categories are
best characterized as radial categories.
To study the mechanism by which radial categories develop, we
simulated a mobile agent that explores a two-dimensional space.
We use a unique neural architecture whereby the agent au-
tonomously opens and closes its own sensory neural connections
(Iizuka & Ikegami 2004). Using these mobile agents, we studied
frequency discrimination as a case study. We examine how agents,
evolving via a genetic algorithm, come to categorize lights that
flash with different frequencies into likes and dislikes. When a
flashing light is placed in front of an agent, the agent approaches
the light if it flashes with a frequency belonging to the “favorite”
category, otherwise it is avoided.
We may draw two main conclusions from this study. First, the
category of likes and dislikes indeed forms a radial category. That
is, no simple criterion exists for the category, such as a particular
frequency above which all lights belong to the “favorite” category.
Second, the category is not represented in a separate neural sub-
strate. The neural representation of the category coexists in the
same neural network which guides the agent’s exploring dynam-
ics. Thus we conclude that it is a dynamical category, which can be
synthesized via motion behavior but is difficult to be analyzed an-
alytically. The dynamical category uses the sensory-motor coordi-
nation to do categorization.
If categories are inevitably grounded on sensory-motor coordi-
nation, sharing categories means sharing the sensory-motor coor-
dination. Therefore, S&B’s article can be interpreted in terms of
the communication among agents involving the agents’ sensory-
motor coordination.
By designing guessing and discrimination games, S&B suggest
that agents develop communication in order to get the meaning of
pointing and word expressions. This is also true for color. Com-
munication helps agents to get the meaning of color. Indeed, we
claim that to get the meaning of color is to share the same sensory-
motor coordinations behind the color categorization. We thus un-
derstand that color categories converge via communication.
What we must next consider is the creative role of linguistic
communication. We do not just share the same sensory-motor co-
ordination but we acquire the new categorization via communica-
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tion. A repertoire of language is apparently much larger than that
of motion. Therefore, it may provide a new source for the sensory-
motor coordination. We thus expect that the diversity of a color
category is enhanced by using language, if language can generate
more novel sensory-motor coordination of colour experience.
Finally, it is more interesting to study the category for interme-
diate colors (tones), not the colors themselves, because tones are
more subtle than colors and are mixtures of prototypical colors.
Without having to worry about such intermediate colors, commu-
nication may become easier. Interestingly, however, by using com-
munication the intermediate colors become diverse. In other
words, we feel that not only the convergence of color categories,
but the increasing diversity of intermediate colors are both caused
by social and linguistic communication. This is what we consider
to be a creative role of communication beyond sensory-motor co-
ordination.
Sharing perceptually grounded categories in
uniform and nonuniform populations
Kimberly A. Jameson
Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California –
Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-5100 and The Center for Research in Language,
University of California–San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0526.
kjameson@uci.edu
http://aris.ss.uci.edu/cogsci/personnel/kjameson/kjameson.html
Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B) procedure does not model much of
the important variation that occurs across human color categorizers. Hu-
man perceptual variation and its corollary consequences impact real-world
color categorization. Because of this, investigators with the primary aim of
understanding color categorization and naming across cultures should ex-
ercise some caution extending these findings to explain how different hu-
man societies lexicalize color appearance space.
Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) clearly state that their simulated “per-
ceptually grounded color categories” do not strive to model hu-
man categorical representation, but, rather, are practical models
of color categorization by artificial embodied agents, or “robots.”
Their aim is to clarify the conditions under which robot category
repertoires make feasible robot communication with human color
categorizers. Their approach to color categorization is powerful
and refreshingly comprehensive. They synthesize different con-
straints and contributing factors – biology, psychology, and culture
– that are typically pitted against each other in the color cognition
and categorization literature.
Despite the authors’ statements concerning the work’s limited
applicability to the behavior of living categorizers, readers of the
article are likely to extend these findings to other forms of color
categorization phenomena, including human color categorization
across cultures. For this reason, discussion is needed of the find-
ings’ implications for category processing within and between hu-
mans.
S&B state “the agent’s architecture is intended to model what
we know today about human colour perception, categorization,
and naming.” (sect. 2.1). Within a population “all agents are as-
sumed to have exactly the same perceptual process.” (sect. 2.3.1).
And agents base their categorization task decisions (sect. 2.4) on
sensory input “So” from a standard uniform perceptual represen-
tation (i.e., CIE [Commission Internationale de l’Éclairage, or In-
ternational Commission of Illumination] L*a*b*). S&B vary spec-
tral distributions that are sampled, but the stimuli are always first
converted from spectral distributions to CIE tristimulus values,
and then to CIE L*a*b* values before agents engage in any cate-
gorization games. Thus agents make all categorization decisions
on CIE translations of spectra, rather than on actual spectra (eq.
5). S&B make the following related assumptions:
(A) All agents embody a CIE standard model.
(B) All agents in a population uniformly replicate the same per-
ceptual process.
It should be noted that the above-mentioned details are impor-
tant considerations if one is seeking an independent neural net-
work or computational modeling verification of human color cat-
egories (Cf., Yendrikhovskij 2001a), because these details impose
consequences on the artificial network that will influence the net-
work solutions obtained.
Assumption (A) places undeniable constraints on the shared
category solutions obtainable by a population of agents. It fixes the
dimensionality, metameric class relations and the gamut of the
stimulus space to be equivalent with the CIE standard observer.
This is a good idea when engineering a robot that strictly aims to
perceive spectra with a standardized human eye. Under such cir-
cumstances one would minimally expect agents to categorize stim-
uli in ways compatible with humans, because much of stimulus
structure (i.e., metamer equivalences and relations, dimensional
structure, and the perceptual gamut of the space) is prepro-
grammed.1 Indeed, predefining metameric equivalences alone is
enough to establish how agents lump spectra into equivalence
classes. This preprogrammed lumping of spectra, however, would
not match how most other terrestrial species sort spectral stimuli.
Thus, the CIE network-input settings used by S&B differ from
others that could be programmed into the agents – say, a standard
observer model for male spider monkeys, turtles, or the honey-
bee – all of which would predictably produce category repertoires
fundamentally different from those the authors obtained.2 Con-
sequently, in addition to S&B’s clear disclaimers about the gener-
alizability of the processes by which their robots establish category
repertoires, those interested in human color categorization should
note that it is also wrong to infer that their networked agents repli-
cate human color categorization behaviors because it is purport-
edly an optimal species-independent way of categorizing the
available terrestrial spectra (this view about optimality appears in
the cognitive literature, e.g., Shepard 1994; 1997).
Because assumption (A) predetermines the dimensionality,
metamers, and gamut of the categorized color space, a general-
ization of (A) would also accommodate subspaces of natural cate-
gories from agents possessing fewer dimensions and restricted
gamuts. However, such subspaces bring S&B the additional chal-
lenge of modeling different metametric class equivalences.3 Such
network modeling adjustments for (A) would be an important step
towards modeling human categorization, and bear on assumption
(B).
Assumption (B) limits extending S&B’s findings to human color
categorization, because real human groups that develop and share
categorical repertoires are not comprised of individuals with uni-
form perceptual processing, or uniform color processing exper-
tise. Indeed, relatively minor perceptual variation could signifi-
cantly impact the network solutions that S&B report. First,
considering just perceptual processing variation across agents
(i.e., differences of dichromacy and anomalous trichromacy com-
pared to trichromacy), such subgroup processing could impact
convergence rates and robustness of solutions under the simplest
situations (i.e., learning without language, sect. 3). Discrimination
game outcomes could vary for dichromat agents, compared with
anomalous-trichromat or trichromat agents, in accord with the
observation that “even small variations in colour perception . . .
drive . . . colour categories to diverging results” (sect. 5.1). Inter-
actions between actual dichromats and trichromats suggest that
perceptual variation effects could extend beyond single agent pro-
cessing to learning with language scenarios (sect. 4) and guessing
game outcomes, making plausible the idea that agent perceptual
variation could effect robustness and variance of a population’s
category repertoire, and, in turn, indices of discrimination success
and number of converged on categories.
Human dichromats occur at different rates across ethnolin-
guistic societies, and, with varying degrees of effectiveness, com-
municate using trichromat-based lexical categories for which they
have no perceptual distinctions (e.g., Jameson & Hurvich 1978;
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Shepard & Cooper 1992). In one society where rod monochro-
macy commonly occurs in the population, color normal individu-
als share a pragmatic categorical repertoire with achromatopes
who perceive a “colorless” world (Sacks 1997). In other societies,
other complexities arise during processes wherein perceivers
learn through social interaction to use normative linguistic codes
despite perceptual differences that could undermine the code’s
meaning (Jameson 2005a; 2005b; Jameson et al. 2001). Thus,
within populations, variation in perceptually correlated knowl-
edge is integral to the cognitive side of learning and sharing a color
repertoire, but such human variation runs counter to Assumption
(B).
Addressing both (A) and (B) as suggested here would permit
S&B to make useful comparisons between perceptually grounded
categories shared by uniform populations and those shared by
nonuniform populations.
NOTES
1. This seems to work against the suggestion that “artificial agents
might end up with a quite different categorical repertoire compared to . . .
human beings” (sect. 1).
2. Just as S&B demonstrate different sets of “chromatic distribu-
tions . . . do not lead to categories that are similar . . .” (sect. 5.1), so too
would very different category solutions arise if initially agents were given
a honey-bee observer model, and these category solutions would almost
certainly bear little resemblance to the category solutions they found us-
ing their agent populations.
3. Just as dichromats are accommodated by the CIE standard observer
model, but have different known metameric class relations.
Seeing and talking: Whorf wouldn’t be
satisfied
Boris Kotchoubey
Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioral Neurobiology, University of
Tübingen, 72074 Tübingen, Germany.
boris.kotchoubey@uni-tuebingen.de
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Abstract: Although Steeles & Belpaeme’s (S&B) results may be useful for
development of technical devices, their significance for behavioral sci-
ences is very limited. This is because the question the authors asked was
“Why do people use similar words in a similar way?” rather than “How can
similar words stand for similar experience?” The main problem is not
shared word usage, but shared references.
Polonius: What do you read, my lord?
Hamlet: Words, words, words.
—Hamlet, Act II, Scene II
The clarity with which the target article is written makes the cri-
tique easier. The main goal is formulated from the very beginning:
To explore how colour words “may become sufficiently shared
among the members of a population” (sect. 1) so that if I say “red”
everybody can select a red (and not a yellow) object from a pre-
sented set. Moreover, Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) make no secret
that this “goal is entirely practical . . . to design . . . robots that are
able to do this task.” (sect. 1) Though I am not an expert in robot-
ics, it appears that the authors attained substantial progress in ap-
proaching their goal.
The question is, however, whether this pragmatic approach can
shed light on the real mechanisms in question. I agree that the
study can contribute to “designing agents that are able to develop
a repertoire of . . . categories that is sufficiently shared to allow
communication” (sect. 6). But I doubt that “these results are rel-
evant to . . . an audience of cognitive scientists” (sect. 6) who are
interested in the psychology of colour perception. Although the
authors admit that “the artificial agents might end up with a quite
different categorical repertoire compared to . . . human beings,”
(sect. 1) they miss a much worse peril, that their agents come to
categories very similar to human categories (thereby creating the
illusion of relevance), but using processing means that have noth-
ing in common with those used by human brains.
S&B suggest that their data support the Sapir–Whorf thesis on
the dependence of colour perception on language. This thesis has
been formulated in rather ambitious terms, for instance, by Sapir:
“We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do
because the language habits of our community predispose certain
choices of interpretation” (cited by Whorf 1962, p. 134), or by
Whorf ’s commentator S. Chase: “Speakers of different languages
see the Cosmos differently” (ibid, p. x). Particularly, Whorf em-
phasised the importance, not only of verbal categories, but rather
of the syntax of different languages (e.g., tenses, subject–predi-
cate structure, use of plurals and singulars, etc.), in organisation
of our basic mechanisms of perceiving and conceiving of the
world.
This expected relationship to the very structure of colour expe-
rience is lacking in the target article. Not sharing perception (e.g.,
the fact that you see red where I also see it) but sharing word us-
age is the problem the entire study is pivoted around. By the way,
colour may not be the best case for study interaction between sen-
sory and cognitive factors because the sensory information can
only be obtained with central vision (there are no cones on the pe-
riphery) and high luminance (cones do not work in twilight),
hence one may state that we see most objects grey most of the
time. But the main point is that mere agreement in verbal behav-
ior does not prove the agents’ similarity in their “segmentation of
the face of nature” (Whorf 1962, p. 241).
Of course, we cannot really know another person’s sensory
qualia (e.g., the qualium of redness), but we can approach this
knowledge by using a broad range of methods, beyond categori-
sation and naming. And probably the most reliable result obtained
to date is that if we vary tasks, conditions, instructions, cue avail-
ability, and so forth, so also varies the role of language as a deter-
minant of behavior. Thus, the long-assumed effect of language
spatial terms, such as “on the left of” or “to the north of,”on space
perception proved to be the effect of available spatial cues. Nat-
ural peoples, when tested in their natural conditions, use signifi-
cantly more objective (allocentric) spatial cues than Europeans
(Dutch or English) tested in the lab. Also English-speaking peo-
ple, without changing their mother language, use more allocentric
cues when tested outdoors as compared to being in a closed room
with blinds pulled down (Li & Gleitman 2002). The availability of
potentially useful information appears, therefore, to exert a
stronger effect on space perception than the language itself.
Turning back to colours, the data are not very different. For ex-
ample, most European languages have one basic term for blue,
whereas Russian has two; a popular Russian children’s song listing
“the seven colors of the rainbow” mentions light-blue and dark-
blue as two completely different colours, the latter being close,
but not identical, to purple. Nevertheless, being presented with a
large number of green and blue colour tones, Russian and English
subjects did not differ in their classification; particularly, Russians
did not tend to group dark and light blue separately (Davies &
Corbett 1997). There is no evidence that English speakers are un-
able to distinguish those hues that Russian speakers do.
Kay and Kempton (1984) developed colour triads, such as one
containing two green colours and one blue. One of the green
colours (Green 1) was separated from the other green (Green 2)
by a larger number of just noticeable differences than from Blue.
When asked to choose the stimulus that looked least like the other
two, subjects chose Blue. However, when asked to compare stim-
uli pairwise, they found Green 1 and Green 2 more different than
Green 1 and Blue. The issue may be even more complicated be-
cause neuropsychological data indicate that a patient who per-
formed like controls in this experiment (and who, therefore, could
distinguish between classification and similarity judgment) was
nonetheless unable to classify colours according to their names.
His sorting was based on superficial perceptual similarity (Robert-
son et al. 1999). This may indicate that not only the presence of
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verbal cues can substantially affect the result of classification, but
also the explicit versus implicit nature of those cues.
To summmarise, the Whorfian question was formulated (Li &
Gleitman 2002, p. 267) as follows: “Do the differences in how peo-
ple talk create the differences in how they think?” The target ar-
ticle, in contrast, answered a quite different question: “Do the dif-
ferences in how people learn to talk create the differences in how
they subsequently talk?” It is not surprising that the answer to the
latter question was positive, but this does not permit any conclu-
sion concerning the former one.
Not all categories work the same way
Sidney R. Lehky
Computational Neuroscience Laboratory, The Salk Institute, La Jolla, CA
92037. sidney@salk.edu
Abstract: The relative contributions of biological and cultural factors in
determining category characteristics almost certainly vary for different
categories, so that the results of these simulations on color categories don’t
necessarily generalize. It is suggested here that categories that pick out
structure in the environment of strong behavioral significance to individ-
ual agents will be predominantly biologically determined and will con-
verge without interagent communication, whereas those categories that
serve primarily to coordinate behavior in a population will require com-
munication to converge.
The computer simulations described in Steels & Belpaeme’s
(S&B’s) article provide an interesting example of a situation in
which language communication amongst a population of agents
can affect the development of color categories. Although the em-
pirical situation regarding color categories, of course, remains to
be determined, these theoretical studies will be valuable in con-
straining the debate about what is possible.
It seems likely, however, that the potential for cultural shaping
of perceptual categories can differ sharply depending on the par-
ticular category at hand. Some categories may be more culturally
dependent, others may have a stronger learning component, and
finally, some may be genetically hard-wired. In other words, there
may be different categories of categories, and the results of study-
ing one sort of category won’t necessarily generalize to others.
What characteristics might in general distinguish more cultur-
ally dependent perceptual categories from the more biologically
dependent ones? (Here I lump together genetic evolution and in-
dividualistic learning under “biology.”) I would suggest that if a
category represents structure in the environment that is of strong
behavioral significance to each individual agent, then that cate-
gory will develop in a predominantly biology-dependent manner
such that all agents in the population, without communicating, will
share the same category. If a category does not directly distinguish
any behaviorally critical feature of the environment, but rather
serves to coordinate the behavior of agents in the population, then
communication between agents will be required to ensure the
convergence of category properties.
Let us see how this distinction might operate in the context of
color categories. CIE (Commission Internationale de L’Éclairage,
or International Commission of Illumination) color space, of
whatever variant, is a continuous space. The question arises as to
in which situations is it advantageous to discretize this continuum
into a small set of fixed categories. Two possibilities will be given
here, corresponding to the distinction made earlier.
The first is if there were a small set of special colors that flag
aspects of the environment that have overriding significance to the
agents behaviorally (perhaps related to mating, food selection,
predator evasion, etc.). There could, in that case, be an advantage
in creating color categories centered on these special colors in or-
der to highlight them for structures associated with implementing
decisions and motor responses. To the extent that the embodi-
ment characteristics of agents within a population are essentially
the same (similar sensory apparatus, motor capabilities, etc.) and
they have similar behavioral repertoires, it seems a reasonable
possibility that all agents will converge to these same color cate-
gories independent of interagent communication.
The second situation is if agents needed to communicate infor-
mation about color to each other. In this case, discretization of the
color space reflects the discrete nature of the vocabulary used to
describe it. Here the color categories don’t correspond to anything
that is of behavioral significance to an agent operating in isolation.
A different set of categories would neither enhance nor detract
from the survival prospects of the isolated agent. Thus, there is lit-
tle pressure for isolated agents to develop the same categories. It
is only within a population that the categories acquire significance,
and the categories converge through interagent communication to
coordinate behavior within the population.
Without the presence of a set of ecologically “special” colors and
without language, the “discrimination game” described in the tar-
get article could probably be implemented in a robot by setting
receiver-operating characteristics within a signal detection model,
without fixed categories. Although statistical clustering of natural
inputs can lead to the creation of color categories, it is not clear
what benefits arise from building a robot with categories derived
in this manner, other than perhaps somewhat more efficient en-
coding of sensory inputs (in an information-theoretic sense, Si-
moncelli & Olshausen 2001). It is also possible that characteristics
of the sensory apparatus may lead to biases in color category for-
mation in noncommunicating agents, so that there is some degree
of correlation in the categories formed by them (as indeed we saw
in the simulations in this article). However, if these embodiment-
specific effects are confined to the input (sensory) stages of the
system and do not translate to something behaviorally meaning-
ful, as one considers the agent in its sensorimotor entirety, they
may not provide a sufficient drive to strongly coordinate the color
categories of noncommunicating agents (again, as we saw in this
article).
Moving away from color categorization, consider more abstract
categories, such as animals versus non-animals, or food objects
versus non-food objects. Membership in these categories can
rapidly be determined visually by both humans and nonhuman
primates (Fabre-Thorpe 2003). These are examples of perceptual
categories that are of strong behavioral significance to individual
organisms, perhaps more so than the color categories formed by
humans. The expectation here is that individuals undergoing un-
supervised learning in their natural environment will be able to
converge to the same visual categorization of food versus non-food
items (for example), without any communication amongst them-
selves, to a greater degree than color categories will converge for
non-communicating agents.
On sticking labels
Jan Pieter M. A. Maes
Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital Antwerp, 2650 Edegem,
Belgium. janpietermaes@hotmail.com.
Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) are clearly interested in the possible
test their models may provide for human language theories. However, they
only superficially address the assumptions underlying their own agent ar-
chitecture, while these are of crucial relevance to the topic of human lan-
guage. These assumptions fit an Augustinian picture of language, which
Wittgenstein challenges in his Philosophical Investigations. It is too early
to draw conclusions regarding human language evolution from such mod-
els.
Could a machine think? – Could it be in pain? – Well, is the human
body to be called such a machine? It surely comes as close as possible
to being such a machine.
—Wittgenstein (1953)
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Apart from their repeatedly stated practical and pragmatic goals,
Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) are clearly interested in the possible
test their models may provide for theories about human language
and concept formation. Seeing the models in action can bring out
hidden assumptions underlying the different approaches, that is,
if we assume that the approaches are appropriately modeled in the
first place (see later discussion). In discussing their results from
this point of view, they emphasize the causal influence of com-
munication and language on category formation and find in it an
argument regarding the feasibility of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis.
However, they only superficially address the assumptions under-
lying their own agent architecture and conceptualization of lan-
guage, and these are of crucial relevance to this topic. This creates
a constant tension in the article regarding the extent to which con-
clusions regarding the human situation can be drawn. Need their
agents be human, or are we humans like their agents?
It is not clear why the authors conclude from their results that
language must have a causal role in category formation. If sharing
a categorical repertoire is the goal, a genetic scenario without lan-
guage seems to do the trick just fine in a simpler way. Taking into
account real world chromatic distributions increases sharing, as
probably a combined genetic and individual learning model –
which is not used – would also do. I would rather interpret these
results as minimizing the role for language, that is, if the sharing
of categories is our only goal. But is it? Why, for example, would
we not imagine animals (or agents) and humans developing some
shared categories? For both of us, it is not good to eat poisonous
mushrooms that are only distinguishable from the good ones by
color. Only animals do not talk. There are some fundamental dif-
ferences between animal and human categories that are not ad-
dressed in the article. An animal cannot consider or ask itself what
colors are; we can. From this point of view it would be nice to see
how the models handle some form of colorblindness (which can
be programmed into the constraints coming from embodiment).
Even if it is not obvious to imagine what it would be like to be col-
orblind, it is something we can talk and inquire about. Even if
there clearly is no sharing of categories, there still is useful com-
munication. We can see from this that the authors’ conceptualiza-
tion of language and concept formation misses an important as-
pect of the human situation.
In the learning with language experiments, agents are given the
ability to play language games and engage in joint attentional in-
teraction (pointing) to start with. The authors don’t discuss how
these abilities themselves emerge and their relevance to language
and concept formation. They claim that their approach resonates
with the philosophical work of Wittgenstein. In this regard, it is in-
teresting to see to what purpose Wittgenstein (1953) invented his
language games. In the opening paragraphs of his Philosophical
Investigations he draws attention to an Augustinian picture of lan-
guage in which words are learned by ostensive teaching (pointing)
alone. He likens this to learning a foreign language when you al-
ready have a language of your own. You then only have to learn to
correctly stick new labels to already mastered concepts by means
of feedback. Only someone who already knows how to do some-
thing with it can significantly ask a name of something. Wittgen-
stein shows that if you do not presuppose such knowledge in lan-
guage games, pointing would be inherently ambiguous. There
would be no shared reference. There is more to language and con-
cept formation than labeling.
In discussing the nativist and empiricist approaches, the authors
say that in these theories, the learning of language is just a matter
of learning labels for already acquired categories. They do this to
highlight the contrast with the culturalist approach in which they
reserve an additional, causal role for language. But if we take into
account the Augustinian way (by assuming the ability to engage in
language games) in which the authors model this approach, it be-
comes clear that the contrast isn’t so great anymore. In the cul-
turalist model, agents are just better at sticking on labels than their
counterparts in the other models would be. The authors stay
trapped in a referential theory of meaning by coupling names and
categories by means of associative networks. It is true that in this
model language can have a causal role in category formation. I
only want to argue that this way of modeling dangerously simpli-
fies the human situation, if we do not take into account our as-
sumptions when doing so. As a consequence, one cannot draw
conclusions regarding the feasibility of the Sapir–Whorf hypoth-
esis based on model mechanics alone. The authors are correct to
highlight the fundamental differences between the three ap-
proaches, but the way they model them does away with these dif-
ferences.
The culturalist approach is fundamentally different. In these
theories, the “gift of sharing attention and achieving a workable
intersubjectivity” (Bruner 2000), together with a nurturing social
context serves as a scaffolding for the child’s acquisition of lan-
guage. Just as with language games, there is shared reference and
successful communication before there is a fully developed lan-
guage. With the cultural psychologists like Vygotsky (1934) we can
say that these abilities together with developing linguistic abilities
are already influencing each other and changing from the begin-
ning. Again, assuming joint attentional interaction and then just
building a naming module on top of it is not an appropriate way to
model this.
I think the authors have used a novel and interesting approach
to the evolution of communication in artificial agents. Maybe one
day robots will communicate with each other and human beings
using technology based on their models. However tempting, I
think it is too early to draw conclusions regarding human language
from these kind of models.
Is color perception really categorical?
Mohan Matthen
Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British
Columbia V6T 1Z1, Canada. mohan.matthen@ubc.ca
http://www.philosophy.ubc.ca/matthen
Abstract: Are color categories the evolutionary product of their useful-
ness in communication, or is this an accidental benefit they give us? It is
argued here that embodiment constraints on color categorization suggest
that communication is an add-on at best. Thus, the Steels & Belpaeme
(S&B) model may be important in explaining coordination, but only at the
margin. Furthermore, the concentration on discrimination is question-
able: coclassification is at least as important.
The categoricity of color perception is useful for communication
(telling you that my car is green is a lot easier than communicat-
ing the exact shade; usually the latter is informationally superflu-
ous anyway), also as a help to color constancy (it appears green in
a wide range of illumination conditions, but it looks different
shades in these conditions), as well as for retaining eidetic mem-
ories within certain boundaries (I will be able visually to recall its
greenness long after I have lost the ability correctly to recall its
shade). All this tells us little about the origins of color categoricity.
Are color categories accidental (albeit useful) side-effects of other
features of color processing (e.g., of opponent processing) or did
they emerge as a direct result of their usefulness in the previously
described ways?
The phonemes constitute a clear case of categorical perception
that emerged as a direct result of usefulness – at least if the mo-
tor theory of speech perception (Liberman & Mattingly 1985;
Liberman et al. 1967) is correct. The motor theory maintains that
speech perception is concerned not with acoustic patterns but
with the “articulatory gestures” of the human speech production
system. The acoustic patterns by which a /b/ is transmitted might
be very similar to those that characterize a /d/; nevertheless, these
phonemes are produced by different articulatory gestures. Con-
sequently, as a sound pattern gets close to the boundary between
these two syllables, it is still heard as an instance of one or another
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of /b/ or /d/, until, after a relatively narrow boundary zone of am-
biguity, the perceived sound flips over to the other. Human speech
perception seeks to decode clearly differentiated acoustic ges-
tures; it uses acoustic patterns to do this. This is why the bound-
ary between closely adjacent acoustic patterns is heard not as a
continuum, but as a boundary. Rather contentiously, I shall call
this paradigmatic categorical perception.
Color perception is not paradigmatically categorical. There are,
of course, basic color terms, as Berlin and Kay (1969) discovered,
and these are highly cross-cultural, even if not universal. But, as
Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) clearly recognize, the boundary effects
here are not anything like those observed in the case of phonemes.
There is substantial cross-cultural agreement with respect to the
identification of “focal instances” of terms like “black,” “white,”
“red,” “blue,” and so forth. However, there is not much agreement
about the boundaries of these terms. In the case of color, the per-
ceptual “flip” as one moves from blue to green is not marked. This
is the exact opposite of the case with phonemes, where focal in-
stances do not exist but the boundaries are sharp (though not
cross-cultural, because the learning of specific languages seems to
erase some phonemes that are perceptually available at birth, see
Werker & Tees 1984).
The empiricist theory of concept-building has been encapsu-
lated in a model of paradigm and foils (Quine 1969). The para-
digm is the central instance of a concept, generally identified by
a convention-creating act of stipulation; the foils are supposed to
be counterinstances that lie just beyond the concept boundary,
again identified conventionally. A concept is defined as compris-
ing everything more similar to the paradigm than the foils. Obvi-
ously, the model will work only for “perceptually grounded” con-
cepts involving a single submodality such as color, because
similarity is well-defined only within the similarity spaces of such
qualities. For things outside the context of such similarity spaces,
similarity is notoriously illogical (Tversky 1977), and cannot be
made to perform consistently even in the most stringent learning
regimes.
Now, one possibility is that human color categorization emerges
from the paradigm–foil method constrained not by stipulation and
convention, but by the salience of the so-called unique colours,
that is, those colors that consist of a single Hering primary. These
primaries are themselves subject to a certain amount of interper-
sonal variation (Kuehni 2004), which suggests biological but not
interpersonal constraint. However, the boundaries of color cate-
gories, that is, the foils, might be roughly determined by equal dis-
tance measures between foci. Thus, the S&B model of interper-
sonal feedback might prove useful, but only after the biological
embodiment of color processing in a given individual has done its
work. This would indicate a fuzzy concept centered on clear but
variant foci, which, as we have seen, is, in fact, what we find (Kay
& McDaniel 1978).
In such an account, embodiment shapes the concepts only by
creating natural paradigms and through the innate similarity space
of color, but not by giving us whole concepts ready-made. Thus,
the nativism of this account is tempered by a kind of develop-
mental dynamic. We might have as many categories as we do, sim-
ply because the basic colors fall out of a topologically natural way
of carving up color space (Jameson 2005b). Culture or environ-
ment may intrude to reduce the saliency of some of these factors,
as they do in the case of phonetic perception. (The cultural re-
duction of salience may well be sufficient to explain what variance
in categories there is across populations, and individual variations
in color perception can explain variance within populations.) Un-
like the boundaries between phonemes, color boundaries do not
represent anything other than themselves. Thus, the colors might
well be a natural system, largely explained by embodiment con-
straints on the empiricist model of learning. Though such a sys-
tem would assist us in communicative tasks, it is hard to be sure
that this is nonaccidental.
S&B make discrimination the determinant of categorization, in
other words, they use this task to replace the constrained tradi-
tional empiricist model outlined earlier. There are two points to
be made here.
First, discrimination is, of course, not the only thing that we do
with color. We also use color to coclassify things (i.e., to put them
in the same rather than different categories) in order to mark them
for object reidentification and association with other characteris-
tics (we assume, for example, that mutatis mutandis, two fruit of
very similar color are equally ripe). One might think that coclassi-
fication is actually more fundamental to understanding catego-
rization than discrimination. (On this point, see Matthen 2005, es-
pecially Chaps. 1 and 11.) It is hard to know how coclassification
influences the shape and number of color categories. Does it in-
terfere with or reinforce the categories spawned by the discrimi-
nation game?
Second, in the case of human development, the existence of dis-
tinguished points in color space (e.g., the unique hues) could have
ensured that there were focal points for categories in place before
any discrimination tasks were run. This would also account for the
sharing of categories across populations. In other words, the ad-
dition of distinguished points in color space, as suggested earlier,
might well reduce the importance of the simulations run here.
How culture might constrain color categories
Debi Roberson and Catherine O’Hanlon
Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex, CO4
3SQ, United Kingdom. robedd@essex.ac.uk
http://www.essex.ac.uk/psychology/psychology/CLIENTS/
debiRoberson/debiRoberson.html cgohan@essex.ac.uk
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Abstract: If language is crucial to the development of shared colour cat-
egories, how might cultural constraints influence the development of di-
vergent category sets? We propose that communities arrive at different
sets of categories because the tendency to group by perceptual similarity
interacts with environmental factors (differential access to dying and print-
ing technologies), to make different systems optimal for communication
in different situations.
Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) study introduces a novel and inge-
nious method for comparing nativist, empiricist, and culturalist
accounts of colour categorisation. Their findings suggest that lan-
guage is crucial to the development of a shared categorical reper-
toire. They make the point, also made by Roberson et al. (2000),
that acceptance of a causal role for language does not imply that
colour categories are free to vary arbitrarily, because physiological
and environmental factors also affect the process, but they com-
ment that “it is less obvious by what kind of process cultural con-
straints could play a role” (sect. 1.2). We here suggest two addi-
tional constraints (over and above those imposed by physiology
and the visual environment) that we believe operate on the range
of potential category sets and a process by which they might in-
teract with environmental constraints (the context from which
stimuli must be discriminated). They are, first, a universal ten-
dency to group by similarity, and second, the differential need to
communicate successfully experienced by different cultures
about a shared set of categories.
The tendency to group by similarity is pervasive, both across
cultures and across cognitive domains. Colour cognition is no ex-
ception to this and no culture or language has yet been reported
that violates this principle by grouping together two areas of
colour space (e.g., yellow and blue) in a category that excludes the
intermediate area (e.g., green). Young children (from two very dif-
ferent cultures) group colours on the basis of perceptual similar-
ity before they acquire any colour categories (Roberson et al.
2004), as does an adult patient with colour anomia, who had lost
the ability to categorise colours explicitly (Roberson et al. 1999).
Drawing children’s attention to the relative similarity of colours,
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through linguistic contrast, also promotes faster category learning
(Au & Laframboise 1990; O’Hanlon & Roberson 2004).
If categories are initially formed based on the relative similar-
ity of stimuli, as Dedrick (1996) and Roberson et al. (2000) have
argued, then both the range of available stimuli in the environ-
ment and variability in the need to communicate about colour
should affect the eventual set that a community arrives at. Com-
municative need varies widely across populations (Heider &
Olivier 1972; Jameson & Alvarado 2003a; Kuschel & Monberg
1974; Levinson 1997; MacLaury 1987) and different sets of cate-
gories may be optimal for colour communication in Western soci-
eties compared to traditional cultures lacking printing or dyeing
technologies (Davidoff et al. 1999; Roberson et al. 2005). In a re-
cent study, Roberson and Agrillo (under review) used a human
communication task similar to that modeled here. For English
speakers, the central (prototypical) exemplars of their eleven ba-
sic colour categories were communicated more successfully than
other colour stimuli in the context of the test array (160 Munsell
samples from a standard uniform distribution). These eleven
terms, common to most Western languages, may well be an opti-
mal set for their communicative needs (Guest & Van Laar 2002),
given the wide range of available colours in their environment.
However, the usefulness of the name in distinguishing individual
items of a set is attenuated by context. Where all mushrooms are
orange, the term “orange” is less useful.
Many traditional cultures, however, have fewer than eleven cat-
egories, each containing a wide range of exemplars, extending to
very desaturated colours, and with little interindividual agreement
on where the best examples of categories are located (Heider &
Olivier 1972; MacLaury 1987; Roberson et al. 2000; 2005). With-
out the full range of saturated stimuli that can be artificially pro-
duced, traditional communities may have no need of the finer cat-
egorical distinctions required when a wider variety is available,
and thus lack the motivation to refine their colour lexicon further.
At this stage, “different ecological and cultural circumstances”
(sect. 3.3) increase the divergence of colour categories in these
communities. The finding that “statistical extraction of categories
from natural colour data” (sect. 5.1) does not deliver the eleven
basic categories found in most Western languages supports this
hypothesis. However, as S&B show, even for categories formed
from a data set of stimuli from natural surroundings, language is
still “crucial for the convergence of colour categories” (sect. 4.3).
The reduced variance of the stimulus set may, however, result in
the formation of fewer categories.
What then might provide the impetus for convergence of colour
lexicons as contact between communities increases? Industriali-
sation may encourage the introduction of new terms (and cate-
gories) to increase both communicative power and discriminabil-
ity. MacKeigan’s work with Mayan weavers suggests that the
introduction of new colours of thread directly relates to changing
colour vocabulary, perhaps by altering the discriminability of col-
ors within an available set (MacKeigan 2004). Because discrim-
inability is a property of a colour stimulus “in the context of a par-
ticular array” (Lucy 1992, p. 165), the introduction of a new range
of colours reduces the communicative success of a previously op-
timal set of categories, and thus motivates change.
This combination of decreased discriminability (because of an
increase in the range of available stimuli) and the need for com-
municative success, combined with a shared tendency to group by
similarity, could yield convergence of colour categories and color
lexicons across populations without a requirement for a geneti-
cally determined set. As S&B have shown, shared categories
emerge fastest where there is “strong structural coupling between
concept acquisition and lexicon formation” (sect. 5).
It takes a(n) (agent-based) village
Teresa Satterfield
Department of Romance Languages & Center of Study for Complex
Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1275.
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Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) take technical and conceptual short-
cuts that have significant negative consequences on simulation imple-
mentation and agent behavior. Justifiably, their model represents a proof
of concept of the role of culturalism in category formation; nevertheless,
the absence of detailed information concerning the embodiment of agents
and the superficial implementation of learning approaches make their re-
sults less relevant than they could be.
One advantage of computational modeling over empirical re-
search is the ability to abstract away layers of the real world to fo-
cus on aspects considered most relevant for the problem to be
solved. However, in Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) attempt to ad-
dress the “acquisition problem” in terms of human color percep-
tion, categorization, and naming across a population, perhaps they
go too far in paring down the object of inquiry. They do not spec-
ify, or they eliminate altogether, a number of “details” that they
deem unnecessary to the learning process, contrary to empirical
data and current theoretical formulations. In all theoretical ap-
proaches simulated by S&B, the agent populations reach final
states reflecting successful acquisition of color categories and cor-
responding lexicons for the given environment and ecology, which
subsequently are shared across a speech community. However, to
obtain these results, S&B take technical and conceptual shortcuts
that have significant negative consequences on simulation imple-
mentation and agent behavior. Justifiably, the model represents a
proof of concept of the role of culturalism in category formation;
nevertheless, the absence of detailed information concerning the
embodiment (internal attributes and states) of agents and the su-
perficial implementation of learning approaches make S&B’s sim-
ulation results less relevant than they could be, either for com-
parison of the different theoretical positions or for understanding
the human phenomena investigated.
Conceptually, the key problem is S&B’s drastic simplification of
the learning/acquisition approaches explored. Nativism is sketched
as “all humans could be born with the same perceptually-grounded
categories as part of their ‘mentalese’.” By representing innateness
(formalized as a genetic algorithm) as a fixed network throughout
the agent’s lifetime, S&B equate nativism to an adult-like, fully-
operational repertoire of categories springing forth at birth, re-
quiring no further experience or maturation/development. Change
occurs in each successive generation through genetic mutation.
Yet, empirical observations indicate that despite our genetic en-
dowment, a child raised without exposure to any human language
will never come to speak one (Lenneberg 1967). Nativists ac-
knowledge both experience-dependent mechanisms and matura-
tional constraints in the learning/acquisition process (e.g., Chom-
sky 1980). Furthermore, S&B fail to keep the critical distinction
between acquisition and evolution. Phylogeny (how perceptually-
grounded categories evolved in the species over time) does not
necessarily beget ontogeny (developmental properties of day-to-
day learning by the child), and it is too simplistic to suggest that
the underlying mechanisms for these different domains are iden-
tical within a nativist approach. S&B alternatively claim in em-
piricist accounts (formalized as connectionist models) that “all 
human beings share the same learning mechanisms, so given suf-
ficiently similar environmental stimuli and a similar sensory-mo-
tor apparatus they will arrive at the same perceptually grounded
categories” (sect. 1). This overgeneralization is not only at odds
with attested maturational factors accounting for first (L1) versus
second language (L2) learning (Newport 1990; 1991; Sorace
2003), but also with connectionist models of L1 learning in which
neural networks function optimally when forced to “start small,”
thereby undergoing a developmental change that resembles the
incremental increase in working memory occurring over time in
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children (Elman 1993). Although S&B represent empiricist learn-
ing as adaptive categorical networks during the agent’s lifetime,
they stop short at realistically constructing models in which agents
within the same population vary developmentally.
Empirical studies pertaining to vision demonstrate similar pat-
terns of emergence. Infants show true color vision when they are
able to discriminate between two stimuli of different wavelength,
but equal luminance. At two to four months of age, infants can dis-
cern chromatic differences fundamentally at adult isoluminance
(Teller 1998). This said, color vision reaches its adult form only in
early adolescent years. Relative sensitivity to varying wavelengths
is said to change between infancy and adolescence, with the red–
green mechanism appearing to develop before the yellow–blue
mechanism (Teller 1998). It is also hypothesized that “appropri-
ate color naming depends on maturation and integration of spe-
cific cortical neurological structures” (Bornstein 1985). S&B claim
to capture the “prototypical nature of colour categorisation, as
demonstrated by the naming and memory experiments” (sect. 1.3)
through the use of neural nets; however it is difficult to know
whether they accommodate both adult and child learners.
The second problem is a technical shortcoming of S&B’s mod-
els, which, in fairness, falls out somewhat from the conceptual de-
fects. Absent in S&B’s simulations is the role of maturational/
developmental factors in constraining learning/acquisition. Mea-
sures such as, “all agents are assumed to have exactly the same per-
ceptual process,” sidestep the point that infant perceptual pro-
cesses may be sufficiently different from adults. If so, S&B’s
predictions are potentially invalid for the discrimination game,
where the “best” category is found through adult sensory repre-
sentation (computed CIE L*a*b* values). Success in the discrim-
ination task is crucial, as it is a prerequisite for ongoing commu-
nication. Agents are initialized with zero categories acquired, yet
all possess relatively powerful capabilities of perception, associa-
tive memory, and a pregiven repertoire/alphabet of syllables. One
speculates that these experiments depict a homogeneous group of
agents who are either “wunderkinds,” or cognitively challenged
adults (both possibilities represent individuals with mature/adult-
like capacities in language and vision, with immature repertoires
of color categories). Regardless, either population is anomalous.
One benefit of agent-based models is that we are able to design
multiple varieties of agents, whereby each agent retains its profile
of internal characteristics across a designated lifespan (Epstein &
Axtell 1996; Ferber 1998). Parameters including age, working
memory, attention, lexicon, and perception, and so forth, can be
used in a distributed population of heterogeneous child and adult
agents (Satterfield 2001; 2005). These properties are easily inte-
grated as instance variables in the models, and can further con-
strain agent interaction (culturalism). Lastly, to fully exploit the
power of agent-based models in generating complex structures
from the “bottom-up,” the initial attributes of each agent in the
population must be made explicit. S&B are vague about initial
states and specific attributes are not ascribed, nor is further elabo-
ration given on the agents’ basic architecture for perception, cat-
egorization, and naming, beyond “all agents have . . . unique as-
sociated information structures, representing its repertoire of
categories and its lexicon” (sect. 2.1) Moreover, the logic of learn-
ing/acquisition theories dictates that the initial state of the learner
be outlined, in order to make informed evaluations with respect
to the learner’s final state.
Colour is a culturalist category
J. van Brakel
Department of Philosophy, Catholic University of Leuven, 3000 Leuven,
Belgium. Jaap.vanBrakel@hiw.kuleuven.ac.be
Abstract: Extrapolation of Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B) results show that
colour is a culturalist category. Populations will only share the category of
colour if it is built into the system. If “left to themselves” different popu-
lations may or may not stumble on the colour category. Populations that
do not share a colour category may still be able to communicate in a wide
variety of environments.
Although Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B) agents are “grounded,” “em-
bodied,” “situated,” and “cultural,” nevertheless their target arti-
cle is a beautiful example of agents acting in a block world, that is,
in a world consisting of “1269 matte finished Munsell colour
chips” (sect. 2.2) or “25,000 pixels drawn randomly from pho-
tographs of animals, plants, and landscapes” (sect. 5.1). S&B’s the-
oretical models and simulations bring out many points relevant to
the debate between innatists, empiricists, and culturalists, as this
debate has been going on for more than a century. But this debate
is staged on the wrong assumptions.
Although S&B may agree that “1,269 matte-finished Munsell
colour chips” is a block world, they may reply that making the
models “more complex and more realistic” will “be more of a hin-
drance than a help because it would obscure the contribution of
the dynamics” (sect. 6). However, the kind of complexity and re-
alism they are thinking of would only make their block world, as
already defined, more complex and realistic. It wouldn’t address
the hidden presupposition shared by innatists, empiricists, cultur-
alists, and S&B alike, which can be succinctly expressed by the
rhetorical question: “What if colour is a culturalist category?”
There is no evidence that shows beyond any doubt that colour is
not a culturalist category. Note that it would have to be shown be-
yond any doubt, because if it is a possibility, the rhetorical ques-
tion needs to be addressed; in particular as S&B are keen to bring
out hidden assumptions of various positions. Moreover, that
colour is a culturalist category is supported by extrapolating the ar-
guments and simulations S&B present. Sections 3.2, 3.3, 4.3, and
4.4 all conclude that “colour categories are not shared across pop-
ulations.” The only reason why these populations are sharing
colour categories is because that constraint (“defining” the world
as a Carnapian colour chip/pixel world) has been built into the de-
sign of the particular hardware and software used, the environ-
ments provided, as well as all the knowledge that went into these
designs and the (meta)language used to speak about what the
agents are doing when playing their games.
Imagine a population of agents that is using six colour words
(trained/developed in any of the models of S&B) meeting a pop-
ulation of agents that also use six words. For convenience sake I
will translate the vocabulary of the latter population as follows:
very bright, medium bright, dark, unripe, ripe, overripe. What will
happen? I surmise that for a wide range of environments the two
populations would quite easily learn to communicate successfully
(in terms of S&B’s criteria) and over time through more interac-
tions this will improve further. The fact that one population is us-
ing “colour words” and the other is using labels for what I have
glossed as brightness and ripeness is quite irrelevant for the de-
gree of convergence in their communicative success.
The model I sketch (and which would need to be simulated) is
somewhat similar to Quine’s gavagai example of radical translation
(which S&B discuss). But it is not the case, as they suggest, that
the different (meta)categories will be disentangled in one unique
way when the “multicultural” population is presented with a
greater variety of environments. Of course (the typical situation
when human cultures interact), one of the two populations may
dominate the shared form of life and after a few generations all
agents may communicate in terms of brightness and ripeness and
colour may have been “forgotten.” The reason it may seem that
“incoherence is disentangled when situations arise where two
Commentary/Steels & Belpaeme: Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:4 507
meanings are incompatible” (sect. 4.2), is because one knows or
can easily stipulate a vocabulary in terms of which we (the exper-
imenters) can disentangle the situation. Of course, in specific
cases, something we might call disentanglement may occur. But
there is no unique way for disentanglement to go. This is also the
point of Quine’s radical translation thought experiment.
The arguments and simulations of S&B that support their 
conclusion that different populations will have different colour
categories will simply repeat themselves at a higher level of ab-
straction. Different “multicultural” encounters will converge to
different metacategories. Populations will only share the category
of colour (early and late), if it has been built into the system as an
absolute feature of the block worlds they live in. Language learn-
ing is not only “crucial for the convergence of colour categories”
(sect. 4.3), but also for convergence on the category of colour.
Which metacategories will survive “depends on environmental,
ecological, and physiological constraints, but there are multiple
solutions” (sect. 3.3). The chicken and egg problem (sect. 1.2, 6.2)
applies not only to naming colour categories, but also to calling “it”
a colour category.
As S&B correctly point out – a point which cannot be empha-
sised sufficiently – no culturalist has ever said that the choice of
colour categories is arbitrary. A culturalist doesn’t deny that there
are “cross-cultural trends that have been observed in colour nam-
ing” (sect. 6). This is self-evident, virtually a priori, given that the
only data studied are colour naming data. Similarly, no culturalist
will ever say that the category of colour is arbitrary. As we know
from science fiction literature, both the innate hardware (of human
beings or other agents) and the physical environment place strict
limitations on what categories are possible, that is, which categories
are afforded by the (innatists’) hardware and the (empiricists’) en-
vironment. But, as S&B point out as well, these severe constraints
still leave open innumerable options. By recognising this openness,
including the theoretical recognition that colour is a culturalist cat-
egory, there will be more options for survival and more options for
developing interesting artificial intelligence (AI) models.
AI could make a real contribution, if it would study more com-
plex models, not in the sense of better approaching, say, colour
perception of twenty-first-century humans, but in the sense of
dropping more and more culturalist assumptions. S&B’s correct
advice that we should not “program into the agents a specific
repertoire of categories” (sect. 1) applies to the specific category
of colour as well.
A categorial mutation
Oscar Vilarroya
Unitat de Recerca en Neurociència Cognitiva, Departament de Psiquatria i
Medicina Legal, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08035 Barcelona,
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Abstract: The proposal of Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) is on the right track
to solve the nativist/empiricist/culturalist controversy. However, their na-
tivist model of colour categorization does not correspond to a proper ge-
netic model. Colour perception is the outcome of a complex process of de-
velopment. A direct correspondence between genes and colour categories
cannot be the right approach to the problem.
The proposal of Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) is a breath of fresh air.
The idea that such an old issue as the nativist/empiricist/cultural-
ist controversy may be explored empirically must be welcomed. I
believe that the question of concept formation and shared cate-
gories will not be resolved until we have found the underlying de-
velopmental and learning mechanisms.
The fact that the authors use artificial theoretical models to test
the hypothesis does not diminish the relevance of their proposal.
Some may be tempted to claim otherwise. However, one can ar-
gue that learnability assumptions must be theoretically grounded
before any empirical data can be fully interpreted. A successful
theory of category acquisition must prove that the learning mech-
anisms proposed by the theorists not only account for all the data
under consideration (descriptive adequacy), but also for all the
possible categories that can be acquired, given the type of data and
cognitive resources that are typical of human conceptualization
(explanatory adequacy). If the authors show that category sharing
can be attained exclusively by: (a) genetically determined path-
ways present in a population; (b) extracting information from the
environment; or (c) cultural constraints in a community, then the
arguments against the feasibility of any of the positions in ques-
tion loses force. If the outcome is negative, as has been the case
in the empiricist model, the supporters of such a position must
counter with models that are able to attain such a competence, or
abandon the hypothesis altogether.
Despite my support for S&B’s overall proposal, I do have a se-
rious objection. This concerns the nature of one of the models in
the comparison. S&B have slipped the label “genetic” into their
nativist model of colour perception. Such a model is not an ade-
quate characterization of how genes are related to behavioral com-
petences. Note that I am not claiming that S&B’s nativist model is
inappropiate for humans, but rather that the model is simply not
a genetic model of any cognitive ability.
In their presentation of the nativist approach, the authors pro-
pose “a model of genetic evolution capable of evolving ‘genes’ for
focal colours” (sect. 1.3). However, in the context of relating ge-
netics and cognition, locutions indicating that focal-colour per-
ception has roots in the human genome does not entail that there
are genes for focal colour categories. The fact of the matter is that
every human cognitive capacity has a genetic basis. For example,
proficiency in reading or socializing ultimately depends on the de-
velopment of specific biological structures (Lewin et al. 1997;
Marshall 1980; among others). Let me expand on this.
It is uncontroversial that “genes for X” assertions are suscepti-
ble to the reading that a gene (or a set of genes) could, in a very
literal sense, encode a behavioral faculty. A gene of this kind would
be a set of instructions for the cortical representations that imple-
ment the faculty in question. Unfortunately, genes do not work
this way.
The assumption behind S&B’s genetic model is that phenotyp-
ical traits are somehow represented in the genome. This unfortu-
nately turns genes into what Schaffner (1998) labels “traitunculi,”
that is, copies of a trait codified in certain stretches of DNA.
Genes, however, have no representational resources to specify
phenotypical traits (Elman et al. 1996; Nijhout 1990; Oyama 1985,
among others). The way a gene is expressed as, say, a behavioral
output is the result of a complex intermeshing of processes re-
quiring many developmental levels and components. Now, the ex-
istence of these intermediate steps between genes and behaviors
is not only a question of complexity and distance, or of a simple hi-
erarchical control structure (Schlichting & Pigliucci 1998), but
also of emergence at each developmental level. Although genes
may be understood as coding for the production of proteins, they
do not encode how proteins interact, much less the more distal ef-
fects, such as how cells and tissues communicate, or how the cen-
tral nervous system forms. Consequently, genes do not hold a
blueprint or a program for the development of an organism. Even
more so, genes definitely are not a blueprint or program for the
specific functions or behaviors that are needed for the complete
developmental process.
The so-called genetic determination of a certain phenotype is,
in reality, the product of the whole epigenetic process and not only
that of genes. The implicit belief that a gene might control the de-
velopment of a certain behavioral competence, such as colour per-
ception stems, perhaps, from the empirical fact that certain gene
mutations and deletions may change the course of development
in remarkable ways. However, to paraphrase Nijhout (1990,
p. 442), this is like equating the steering wheel with the driver. All
that a specific connection between a given gene and a trait shows
is that the gene’s protein is necessary for the normal development
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of the phenotype. Finding such a correlation is neither an end
unto itself, nor is it really an answer; rather, it is, at best, only a first
methodological step that can be used to manipulate and explore
the developmental process at hand (Nijhout 1990).
The bottom line here is that the S&B’s nativist model, despite its
success, is not a good model of genetic development of colour cat-
egorization. The proof for this lies in the very evolutionary dynam-
ics that the authors’ model provides. Focal perception is a complex
process. It is not only determined by genetics, but by development,
neurophysiological constraints, as well as experience. The highly
rapid and diverse evolutionary dynamics observed in S&B’s exper-
iment is hardly, if ever, possible for complex neurophysiological
functions (Bowmaker 1998; Lickliter & Honeycutt 2003; Schlicht-
ing & Pigliucci 1998; Surridge et al. 2003; Worden 1995). This in
itself casts doubts on the appropriateness of the model.
In sum, I applaud S&B’s efforts to model category sharing. By
the same token, I believe that they need to come up with a better
model for the genetics of colour categorization. I encourage them
to do so.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I thank Joe Hilferty for discussions of this article. Portions of this article
have been extracted from a submitted manuscript by Oscar Vilarroya and
Joseph Hilferty “The gene out of the bottle” and from the communications
presented by the same authors at the 8th International Cognitive Lin-
guistics Conference (Logroño, Spain, July 2003).
Learning colour words is slow: A
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Abstract Research into child language reveals that it takes a long time for
children to learn the correct mapping of colour words. Steels & Bel-
paeme’s (S&B’s) guessing game, however, models fast learning of words.
We discuss computational studies based on cross-situational learning,
which yield results that are more consistent with the empirical child lan-
guage data than those obtained by S&B.
Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) have successfully shown how compu-
tational modeling can contribute greatly to the study of the evo-
lution of language and cognition. S&B have – in our opinion cor-
rectly – decided to write their article from an engineer’s point of
view. We feel, however, that their model of linguistic communica-
tion would have been more realistic, and therefore the results they
obtained more robust, if they had used a model of acquiring colour
categories through multiple contexts.
S&B model the communication between agents using the
guessing game model, which is, in itself, not unreasonable. Their
claim, however, that this game is “equivalent” to colour chip nam-
ing experiments carried out by anthropologists (sect. 2.4.2), is not
justified, in our opinion. The guessing game is primarily a model
of learning through corrective feedback, whereas colour chip
naming experiments consist of an anthropologist (A) asking an in-
formant (B) to point out, on a chip set, the focal colour of a colour
term from B’s language. There are three important differences be-
tween the anthropological experiments and the guessing game.
First, B is not doing any learning, in fact, A is learning about B’s
representation of colour and about B’s language. Second, A does
not correct B’s responses or provide any feedback about them. Fi-
nally, there is no negotiation between A and B about what the
words should refer to.
This positive feedback loop between the choice of which words
to use and their success in communication is the main learning
mechanism in the guessing game. Indeed, S&B claim that the
feedback loop is a necessary requirement for cultural language de-
velopment (sect. 5, condition 1), although in fact it is widely ac-
cepted that children receive little, if any, corrective feedback while
learning words (Bloom 2000, but see Chouinard & Clark 2003, for
an alternative account). In computational simulations of lexicon
creation and learning, similar to those presented by S&B, we have
shown that agents using a cross-situational statistical learner (a
variant of Siskind’s, 1996, cross-situational learner) can success-
fully develop a shared vocabulary of grounded word meanings
without corrective feedback (Smith 2003; Vogt 2004). In our
model, as in guessing games, hearers have to infer what speakers
are referring to, but unlike in guessing games, the agents do not
have any way of verifying the effectiveness of their attempts at
communication. Instead, the agents use covariances to learn a
mapping between words and categories based on the cooccur-
rence of words and potential referents across multiple situations.
Although young children do learn to relate colour terms to
colours, it takes them a considerable length of time to find the ap-
propriate mappings (e.g., Andrick & Tager-Flusberg 1986; Sand-
hofer & Smith 2001). For example, it has been estimated that, on
average, children required over 1,000 trials to learn the three ba-
sic colour terms “red,” “green,” and “yellow” (Rice 1980, cited in
Sandhofer & Smith 2001). Sandhofer and Smith suggest that chil-
dren go through different stages in learning colour words: First
they appear to learn that colour terms relate to the domain of
colour, and only then can they actually learn the correct mapping.
This has also been observed by Andrick and Tager-Flusberg
(1986), who additionally suggest that children find it difficult to
learn the boundaries of colour categories, thus slowing down the
learning of colour words. Research into child lexical acquisition is,
of course, dominated by the problem of referential indeterminacy,
and many constraints have been suggested to explain how children
reduce indeterminacy (see, e.g., Bloom 2000). Very few of these
accounts, however, allow for the fact that children hear words in
multiple different contexts, and can use this to determine the in-
tended reference. Recent empirical research, indeed, shows that
a cross-situational model of learning provides a robust account of
lexical acquisition in general, and of the acquisition of adjectives,
including colour categories, in particular. Houston-Price et al.
(2003) suggest that the children in their study used cross-situa-
tional learning to disambiguate word reference, even though their
experiments were designed with attentional cues. In addition,
Mather and Schafer (2004) show that children can learn the ref-
erence of nouns by exploiting covariations across multiple con-
texts. Akhtar and Montague (1999) demonstrate that children use
cross-situational learning to discover the meanings of novel adjec-
tives. Klibanoff and Waxman (2000), furthermore, provide empir-
ical support for their proposal that adjectival categories are
learned cross-situationally, within the context of basic level cate-
gories.
A comparison of the guessing game and a cross-situational sta-
tistical learner, using computational simulations, has shown that,
in the guessing game, coherence in production between agents is
considerably higher and that learning is much faster (Vogt &
Coumans 2003). This means that agents using cross-situational
statistical learning have considerable difficulties in arriving at a
shared lexicon, although in the end they manage to overcome
them. Note, however, that cross-situational statistical learning im-
proves when: agents’ semantic categories are similar (Smith 2003);
learners assume mutual exclusivity (Smith 2005); and the context
size is relatively small (Smith & Vogt 2004). This slower rate of ac-
quisition is thus consistent with the empirical evidence that chil-
dren learn colour words relatively slowly. Importantly, as yet un-
published studies have shown that the category variance among
agents in the cross-situational learner tends to be much higher
than that seen from the guessing games. This suggests that nego-
tiating category boundaries in the cross-situational learner is more
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difficult, which could confirm Andrick and Tager-Flusberg’s
(1986) finding.
S&B have presented a model of learning colour words that is
fast and based on corrective feedback. Research on child lexicon
acquisition suggests, however, that colour categories are actually
acquired slowly and through cross-situational learning. If cross-
situational learning is, indeed, a more plausible model than the
guessing game, then the results achieved by S&B may no longer
hold for their account of cultural learning.
Interindividual variation in human color
categories: Evidence against strong
influence of language
Thomas Wachtler
Department of Physics/Neurophysics, Philipps-University, 35039 Marburg,
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Abstract: With respect to human color categories, Steels & Belpaeme’s
(S&B’s) simulations over-emphasize the possible influence of language. In
humans, color processing is the result of a long evolutionary process in
which categories developed without language. Common principles of
color processing lead to similar color categories, but interindividual varia-
tion in color categories exists. Even color-deficiencies, causing large dif-
ferences in color categories, remain inconspicuous in everyday life,
thereby contradicting the hypothesis that language could play a role in
color category formation.
The main focus of Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B) study is category
formation in artificial agents and the role language could play in
this process. Beyond that, they consider the possible relevance of
language for color categories in humans. Neither issue seems to
be adequately addressed by the simulations.
First, under the conditions assumed by S&B, it is almost trivial
that language would make categories of the simulated artificial
agents more similar. S&B specify their stimuli in a homogeneous
color space. Because there are no constraints or dissipative mech-
anisms, any kind of coupling will increase the similarity between
categories, and eventually lead to identical categories. S&B intro-
duce such coupling in their simulations with color genes, lan-
guage, or nonuniform stimulus distributions. Not surprisingly, in
all of these cases, categories of different agents become similar.
Even for the simple case of artificial agents, however, success of
the “sharing by language” strategy requires that communication
corresponding to “guessing games” would occur with fairly high
frequency.
Second, for the case of human color categories, the scenarios
considered by S&B are similarly inappropriate. They ignore, for
example, the properties and constraints of neural processing and
representation in the visual system. There are strong nonlinear
mechanisms, such as the division in On- and Off-pathways, which
effectively segregates color space into categorical half-spaces.
Chromatic preferences of color-selective neurons tend to cluster,
both at precortical stages (e.g., Derrington et al. 1984) and in the
visual cortex (De Valois et al. 2000; Kiper et al. 1997; Komatsu et
al. 1992; Lennie et al. 1990; Wachtler et al. 2003). In other words,
not all chromaticities are equal. So far, the exact relation between
coding at early stages of the visual system and perceptual cate-
gories is still unclear (see e.g., the comments on Saunders & van
Brakel 1997; for a recent discussion see Valberg 2001). Neverthe-
less, nonuniform distribution of color preferences places con-
straints on category formation. Similarities between the proper-
ties of neurons in the visual system and efficient codes for natural
colors (Caywood et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2002; Wachtler et al. 2001)
further indicate that color vision is adapted to the statistics of nat-
ural chromatic signals, which implies shared categories.
The corresponding genetic coupling of color categories is not
realized by “color genes,” but rather by the genes that control the
development and function of the visual system. These genes
evolved over many millions of years, and evolutionary success was
not determined by successful communication, but by efficient
processing of visual information, probably including such impor-
tant tasks as image segmentation and the finding of food (e.g.,
Mollon 1989). Experimental evidence for shared color categories
has been found in other species, as well, such as chimpanzees
(Matsuno et al. 2004) or even flies (Troje 1993).
Despite the common processing principles underlying human
color vision, there are considerable interindividual differences in
the prereceptoral, receptoral, and postreceptoral stages of visual
processing. As a result, for example, the loci of unique hues are
broadly distributed (e.g., Webster et al. 2000). How does this vari-
ability compare to the results of S&B’s simulations? S&B fail to
specify how similar categories have to be in order to be “suffi-
ciently shared.” In any case, with respect to human color vision,
S&B’s ideal of “complete” sharing is not realistic.
Variation in color vision is most striking in “color-blind” sub-
jects. In dichromats, such as protanopes or deuteranopes, one
type of cone photoreceptor is entirely missing. Interestingly, de-
spite their receptoral color space of reduced dimensionality,
dichromats use the same basic color terms as trichromats when
asked to describe their color percepts (Boynton & Scheibner
1967). However, their category regions in color space differ con-
siderably from those of trichromats (Wachtler 2004). This is not
surprising, because certain colors belonging to different cate-
gories of trichromats, such as trichromats’ reds and greens, are in-
distinguishable for dichromats. Nevertheless, dichromats seem to
possess perceptual categories corresponding to those of trichro-
mats, and they seem to achieve them by dividing their reduced
color space using both spectral composition and luminance (Boyn-
ton & Scheibner 1967; Jameson & Hurvich 1978; Wachtler et al.
2004).
Several lines of evidence indicate that the color categories of
dichromats revealed by color naming reflect perceptual cate-
gories. For example, dichromats claim that “red,” “green,” “blue,”
and “yellow” constitute unique and different percepts. Further-
more, dichromats consistently report a “red” contribution both in
short-wavelength and in long-wavelength stimuli, asserting that
the “red” is of the same perceptual quality in both cases (Wachtler
et al. 2004).
The color naming behavior of color-deficient observers suggests
that language plays a role in the acquisition of the lexicon of color
names, but does not influence perceptual categories. Just like
color-normals, dichromats have to learn the words to name their
percepts. Given that the structure of their color space is different,
they cannot achieve a perfect match, so they assign those names
to their perceptual categories that constitute the best possible
match to those of trichromats.
It is impossible for dichromats to have the same categories as
color-normal trichromats. If communication about color would be
as crucial as S&B suggest, dichromats would be lost in continuous
frustration. No matter how long they would learn, it would be im-
possible for them to adjust their categories accordingly. Luckily,
however, color naming plays only a marginal role in everyday life,
situations that require accurate communications of color are ex-
tremely rare. Many color-deficient individuals are not even aware
about their condition until their first color-vision test. Thus, lan-
guage, although important in establishing a consistent lexicon for
our color categories, is too weak a link to influence perceptual cat-
egories.
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Categorization in artificial agents: Guidance
on empirical research?
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Abstract: By comparing mechanisms in nativism, empiricism, and cultur-
alism, the target article by Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) emphasizes the in-
fluence of communicational constraint on sharing color categories. Our
commentary suggests deeper considerations of some of their claims, and
discusses some modifications that may help in the study of communica-
tional constraints in both humans and robots.
The article by Steels & Belpaeme (S&B)presents a multiagent
model that adopts many prevalent mechanisms used in other sim-
ilar cognitive or self-organizing models, such as neural networks
(e.g., Munroe & Cangelosi 2002), associative networks (e.g.,
Smith et al. 2003), and strength-based competition (e.g., Steels et
al. 2002). The authors refrain from any judgment on mechanisms
that might be more realistic. However, further discussions are re-
quired to assess some of their conclusions.
Their article summarizes the categorical repertoire-sharing pro-
cess by using four types of simulations: (a) acquisition of repertoires
with the same learning mechanism (individual learning), (b) indi-
vidual learning and adjustment of acquired repertoires during lan-
guage communication (cultural transmission), (c) genetic trans-
mission of repertoires with occasional mutation (genetic evolution),
and (d) genetic evolution and cultural transmission. The compar-
isons of Category Variance (CV) of (a) and (b), as well as (a) and (c)
lead to the compelling conclusion that “both a cultural learning hy-
pothesis . . . and a genetic evolution hypothesis . . . could explain
how agents in a population can reach a shared repertoire of cate-
gories. . . . The difference between the two models appears to be
in terms of the time needed to adapt to the environment or reach
coherence” (sect. 5). Then, the authors suggest “the collective
choice of a shared repertoire must integrate multiple constraints,
including constraints coming from communication” (Abstract).
However, deeper discussions of these claims are necessary.
First, in their model, the rate of genetic evolution is controlled
by adjusting the parameters in the neural network. The rate of cul-
tural transmission is determined by a different set of parameters
that associate categories and their symbols. Although there is a
general consensus that cultural transmission operates at a much
higher rate, it is not clear how the two sets of parameters can be
made commensurate with each other and meaningfully com-
pared.
Second, to support the authors’ suggestion, is it necessary to
show why we must integrate cultural transmission, because ge-
netic evolution alone can already achieve category sharing? Can
cultural transmission influence genetic evolution, and if so, what
is the influence? The answers to these questions lie in the com-
parison of the CV difference between (c) and (d), or between (b)
and (d). In fact, this topic is touched on by Munroe and Cangelosi
(2002) in their mushroom-foraging model (M & C model). Based
on the Semiotic Square (Steels 2002, see Fig. 1), in the M & C
model, genetic evolution adjusts the sensorimotor tools (neural
network’s connection weights, Sensation aspect, aspect A), and
cultural evolution introduces changes to the outputs of neural net-
works in the previous generation, the combination of input times
being the connection weights (Representation aspect, aspect B).
The M & C model shows that cultural transmission can assist ge-
netic evolution; the learning time under cultural transmission and
genetic evolution is much shorter than that under only one of
these mechanisms. However, in the M & C model, both mecha-
nisms work on the internal aspects (aspects A and B), and it ne-
glects the Symbol aspect (aspect D). The framework of the target
article covers all four aspects of the semiotic square. The neural
network handles the color representation, and genetic evolution
adjusts these representations; the associative network handles the
mappings between semantics and symbols; and cultural transmis-
sion adjusts these mappings. Therefore, besides demonstrating
that both cultural transmission and genetic evolution can achieve
the sharing task, this model can also explore whether these two
mechanisms, separately working on different aspects, can affect
each other by comparing CV or the number of games necessary to
acquire certain CV in different simulations.
Finally, S&B should state clearly what “sufficiently shared”
means in their claim that “a perceptually grounded categorical
repertoire can become sufficiently shared among the members of
a population to allow successful communication” (sect. 6). In their
case study, because of identical learning mechanisms and limited
features considered in creating categories, the categories created
by different agents for the same color may be very similar, and suc-
cessful communication may require the sharing of identical cate-
gories. It implies that only by sharing identical categories can suc-
cessful communication be possible.
However, in general, this is not the case. Considering hetero-
geneous sensorimotor systems or learning mechanisms adopted
by agents and the multiple features contained in world items, it is
possible for agents, through different learning mechanisms, to
create different categories for the same world item based on its
different features. Besides, if both the categories partitioned in se-
mantics inside one agent and the word forms partitioned in sym-
bols can distinguish world items, it is possible that each agent will
develop its own associative network between word forms and its
categories, and successful communication is still possible even
though there are no shared categories. This is more obvious when
humans perceive abstract concepts like “friend,” “loyalty,” “game,”
and so forth. Different criteria are developed to represent these
concepts, and communication is still available on a certain level.
In addition, some of their methods need modification if the au-
thors want their results to be “relevant to a much broader audi-
ence of cognitive scientists” (sect. 6). First, the language game
(Steels 2001a) in this model adjusts the association between words
and categories, and the association between symbols and world
items. No matter whether or not it can represent the speaker’s
word form, the hearer always gets the association between the
symbol and the world item that this symbol represents in the
speaker’s mind. However, this method, similar to mind-reading, is
too strong to be realistic, because in actual conversations there are
communications in which the hearer gets no hints or even gets
wrong ones. This indicates that language, or other communica-
tional constraints, is not always reliable. Besides, as Quine’s (1960)
question about gavagai shows, nonlinguistic feedback only pro-
vides limited confirmation. Therefore, even without noise, mis-
understanding is inevitable, and mind-reading does not simulate
the actual influence of communicational constraints. Whether or
not communicational constraints still have similar effects on shar-
ing categories when occasional misunderstanding is allowed is
worth studying, and this is already discussed in some models (e.g.,
Gong et al. 2004).
Also, this model adopts a Genetic Algorithm (GA) (Holland
1995) without crossover, in which, mutations, “happen with a
probability inversely proportional to discriminatory success” (sect.
3.4). This method will undoubtedly accelerate the acquisition of
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Figure 1 (Wang & Gong). Semiotic Square modified from
Steels (2002).
common categories because categories that are not successfully
used will undergo more mutations. Therefore, this GA introduces
a selective force though the mutation itself has no intelligence
about what is good change. Genetic operations, like mutation,
should be independent of certain factors outside the genome. Be-
sides, the main driving force for evolution is the reorganization of
the available materials (crossover), instead of the occasional mu-
tation (Holland 2005). However, in this model, asexual reproduc-
tion does not incorporate crossover, and the low mutation rate may
not explicitly represent the speed of the genetic evolution.
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Abstract: The simulations of Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) suggest that
communication could lead to color categories that are closely shared
within a language and potentially diverge across languages. We argue that
this is opposite of the patterns that are actually observed in empirical stud-
ies of color naming. Focal color choices more often exhibit strong concor-
dance across languages while also showing pronounced variability within
any language.
Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) use theoretical simulations to explore
the potential role of physiological, environmental, and cultural
(linguistic) constraints on the acquisition of shared color cate-
gories. Although their stated aim is to identify principles that
could guide the design of communication among artificial intelli-
gence systems, they emphasize that the results are also relevant
for understanding color categorization in human observers. Our
commentary focuses on the extent to which the trends they ob-
serve are evident in actual studies of color naming.
In S&B’s simulations, whether or not a factor provides a loose
or tight constraint is evaluated by measuring the variance in color
categories across observers. In all cases, they find the variance to
be greater for agents drawn from separate populations than for
those drawn from the same population, yet this difference be-
comes dramatic when the categories are learned through lan-
guage, in which case, the within-group variance approaches zero.
This, in theory, points to a strong potential for cultural relativity in
color naming.
What are the patterns of variance in empirical measures of color
naming? There are two striking patterns. First, there are strong
universal tendencies across languages. These tendencies were
originally suggested by Berlin and Kay (1969) and have been con-
firmed by Kay and Regier (2003) in a recent analysis of the World
Color Survey (WCS), which provides color-naming responses
from an average of 24 primarily monolingual speakers from each
of 110 unwritten languages. Specifically, they showed that the cen-
troids of color-naming responses for different languages exhibit
much stronger clustering than would be predicted by chance. This
is qualitatively consistent with S&B’s analyses, showing that phys-
iological and/or environmental constraints can support some de-
gree of consistency among speakers. Whether it is quantitatively
consistent could potentially be evaluated by applying the authors’
variance metric to the WCS data (which is available on-line at
http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/wcs/data.html). This might allow
one to assess whether different languages show more concordance
in color categories than would be expected from their models of
physiological and environmental factors. Without such compar-
isons, it is difficult to interpret the relevance for human behavior
of the values they derive from simulations.
The second prominent property of actual color-naming data is
the pronounced variation among speakers of the same language.
Individual differences in unique hue and focal color choices have
been widely documented, though their causes remain poorly un-
derstood (Webster et al. 2000). For example, the wavelengths that
individuals select for unique green within a linguistically homo-
geneous group span a range of more than 80 nm; these variations
are in fact so large that the same wavelength might be chosen as
unique green by one observer and unique yellow or blue by an-
other (Kuehni 2004). Individual differences in focal color choices
remain large for more naturalistic spectra like the Munsell chips
and represent another obvious feature of the WCS data (as well as
for most other data sets on color naming). Moreover, comparable
differences persist even when the samples are restricted to indi-
viduals who select colors with the highest reliability (Webster et
al. 2000). In sum, in actual measures of color naming, as con-
trasted to simulations, within-group variance is very large.
This fact appears difficult to reconcile with the minimal vari-
ance predicted by S&B to arise from adding communication to the
simulated agents. Actual agents do not show the close agreement
that language could potentially support. As an illustration of this,
Table 1 compares the average within-language variance to the
variance in mean foci across languages for “red,” “green,” “blue,”
or “yellow” terms for the WCS respondents, based on an analysis
by Webster and Kay (in press). (These are calculated from the raw
distances in the Munsell palette for the Hue and Value dimensions
separately.) For each language, terms corresponding to the En-
glish terms were determined by finding the focal choices for con-
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Table 1 (Webster & Kay). Average variance in individual foci within a WCS language compared to the variance of mean foci between
languages, computed for the hue or lightness of “red,” “green,” “blue,” or “yellow.” F-tests compare the between-language variance to
the variance predicted by randomly sampling speakers of different languages. The hue scale runs from 1  Munsell 2.5R, in 40 steps,
to 40  Munsell 10RP. The lightness scale is Munsell Value
Focal Hue Focal Lightness
Predicted Predicted
Term # Mean Variance variance F p Mean Variance variance F p
red 103  1.77 .46 .25 1.81 .002  4.25 .095 .040 2.41  e-5
green 73  18.9 3.01 .96 3.16  e-8  4.74 .41 .099 4.12  e-10
blue 50  27.7 2.45 .93 2.56  e-5  4.30 .46 .093 4.84  e-10
yellow 86  9.46 .65 .31 2.13 .0002  7.79 .13 .038 3.38  e-8
sensus terms closest to the English foci. For “red” and “yellow”
these correspondences are obvious. For example, the means for
the “red” and “yellow” clusters are separated by approximately ten
times the cluster standard deviations, with only one language ex-
hibiting a consensus term nearer to the intermediate focal point
for English “orange.” This finding echoes the consistent cluster-
ing demonstrated by Kay and Regier (2003). For green and blue
the clustering is less obvious because many of the WCS languages
apply a common “grue” term to this region. The values shown are
thus restricted to the subset of languages that have both terms.
Mean foci across languages vary much less than individual foci
within languages. This suggests that a common language imposes
only a weak constraint, and a difference in language produces rel-
atively little divergence.
Another finding that may argue against a strong constraint of
language on human color categories is that individual differences
in focal choices for binary hues (e.g., blue-green or yellow-green)
are not obviously distinct from the differences measured for pri-
mary hues (e.g., blue or yellow or green). Malkoc et al. (2002) in
fact found less variation in “focal” blue-green than in the unique
hues blue and green. That is, English speakers were more consis-
tent at selecting the boundary between blue and green than at
choosing either primary category’s best example, even though
there is no basic term targeting this boundary, and, as noted, many
other languages do not have separate words for these categories.
Admittedly, the loci of color categories do vary significantly
across different language groups, and there are both extreme
(Davidoff et al. 1999) as well as more subtle examples of these dif-
ferences (Webster et al. 2002). For example, Webster and Kay an-
alyzed whether differences between the average foci for the WCS
languages were larger than predicted by random sampling across
languages; and as Table 1 shows, differences were significant for
all terms. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, the within language
variances are much higher than the variances in mean foci be-
tween languages. As S&B show, interlanguage differences can
arise from many sources. The question remains as to exactly what
degree the existence of different languages is an actual contribut-
ing factor to the total interpersonal variation in color naming.
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In the tiniest house of time: Parametric
constraints in evolutionary models of
symbolization
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Abstract: Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) describe the role of genetic evolu-
tion in linguistic category sharing among a population of agents. We con-
sider their methodology and conclude that, although it is plausible that ge-
netic evolution is sufficient for such tasks, there is a bias in the presented
work for such a conclusion to be reached. We suggest ways to eliminate
this bias and make the model more convincingly relevant to the cognitive
sciences.
“When you really look for me, you will see me instantly – you will find
me in the tiniest house of time.”
—Kabir (1440–1518)
We are sympathetic to computational models of language and
symbolization, and believe many questions about the structure of
symbols will only be answered by such modeling. We also agree
that cultural dynamics must be valuable for grounding shared cat-
egories within populations. Our commentary focuses on some of
the theoretical implications of Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) dis-
cussion on language and category sharing.
From a linguistic point of view, S&B’s model is of course highly
simplified, in keeping with their stated pragmatic goals. We ap-
preciate that an attempt has been made, as the authors note, to
keep the model “grounded, embodied, situated, and cultural.”
However, such uncontroversial foundational qualities of language
as representation of second-order relations, word-order con-
straints, combinatorality, and traditional transmission (to name
only a few) are not possible in the present model. This makes it
dubious as a model of language per se. Nevertheless, such a sim-
plified model may shed light on how symbols are grounded
through situated interaction, and thereby shed light on what one
might call the “prelinguistic stage” of language evolution. We take
this to be the goal of the present exercise. For this reason, we do
not wish to dwell on the model’s insufficiencies with respect to lan-
guage. Instead, our criticisms focus on the model’s evolutionary
parameters.
S&B provide a broad discussion that captures key points on how
individual learning, genetic evolution, and cultural constraints tie
into language development within a population. However, with
such breadth, it becomes difficult to bring out the implications of
each individual topic. We would like to bring up some points in re-
gard to the methodology in this study, which suggest that the con-
clusions presented in the current article are made prematurely,
based on the data presented. We have three main criticisms. The
first has to do with the way mutation is performed during repro-
duction. The second has to do with the small population size. The
third has to do with the immortality of organisms.
Mutation rates. Reproduction in the evolutionary computation
paradigm, genetic programming, is generally a destructive pro-
cess; offspring are likely to degrade in fitness with respect to their
parents (Nordin & Banzhaf 1995; Streeter 2003). We assume this,
or some similar property, is the motivation for reducing a new pop-
ulation member’s mutation chance as a function of the parent’s fit-
ness. Such a decision is useful from an engineering standpoint, as
it affects the trajectory of the evolutionary process; fit population
members will be more likely to have offspring with similar cate-
gories to themselves, than they would without such a feature.
However, in the current context, this means there is a bias towards
evolving populations where color categories are constant across
population members. It is plausible that individual agents might
evolve mechanisms that protect their children from the destruc-
tive forces of reproduction (e.g., Soule & Foster 1998); however,
building it directly into the evolutionary process seems out of
place, when the question is if evolution will do this on its own.
Population size. Although the authors mention that their tech-
nique “scales up,” we believe that using a small population affects
the way their problem is solved in important ways. When using a
small population to solve a large problem, initial populations can-
not include elements from many different optima in the solution
space. If the chances of finding a population member in a good
path to an optimum are low to begin with, the first path discov-
ered will probably be the only path explored. In Figures 6, 7, and
15 of the S&B article, no population member has any discrimina-
tive success until around the fifth generation; this is also true for
communicative success, as evidenced by Figure 15. This suggests
that the first population member to have any success at a task
probably directs the future evolution of the population. We find it
plausible that evolution can ground categories in an entire pop-
ulation, but it would seem premature to conclude this from the
present results because the small population is able to explore only
one optimum in the fitness landscape. The ability of evolution to
ground categories in a population of agents needs to be tested in
an environment where population members from many different
optima can compete against each other in the same population
pool.
Immortality. It is a common practice for evolutionary computa-
tion paradigms to allow parents and children to coexist indefinitely
(e.g., Fogel 2002; Koza 1992; Westbury et al. 2003). Keeping par-
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ents in the population pool reduces the chances that valuable in-
formation will be lost from generation to generation. However,
such a property seems out of place in the current context for two
reasons. First, organisms naturally die over time. Second, because
of the lack of change that comes along with keeping population
members across generations, there is a bias towards populations
that evolve (perhaps just faster) to a set of shared categories. In
any domain where there is more than one distinct solution to a
problem and there is a claim that evolution will home in on only
one of those solutions, convergence rates must be treated with
special care. The results seen may depend crucially on how fast a
population converges on a solution. To increase both the organic
validity and the generality of the experiments conducted con-
cerning genetic evolution in this article, we suggest putting an age
limit on population members. Such a constraint would paint a
much clearer picture of genetic evolution’s role in category shar-
ing.
S&B have achieved their pragamtic goal, by showing that evo-
lution is sufficient for grounding category sharing with at least one
set of parameters. However, the combined effect of those param-
eters is a large bias towards converging on one solution, which
brings into question how useful their model is for understanding
natural symbol grounding. It would be interesting to know if the
results presented by Steels & Belpaeme can be recreated with less
favorable parameter settings.
The question of the assumed givenness of
the singularity of the target
Edmond Wright
Cambridge CB4 1DU, United Kingdom. elw33@hermes.cam.ac.uk
http://www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~elw33
Abstract: Interesting as the experiments are, their relevance to the real-
life situation is rendered questionable by the unthinking use of given sin-
gularities as target objects. The evolutionary process does not respect what
one agent takes to be a singular referent. A “singling” from the continuum
is rather a varying feature of the necessity to track what is rewarding in it.
Although they are remarkably even-handed in their comparisons
of what they call the “nativist,” “empiricist,” and “culturalist” ap-
proaches, claiming that they wish to leave the debate for later res-
olution (sect. 1.2), Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) make a presupposi-
tion about objectivity that produces some distortion of their
experimental stance. For example, in considering the application
of a colour category in the actual world (e.g., to mushrooms edi-
ble and nonedible, sect. 2.2), they assume a binary perfection that
is exactly the same for all agents to be in existence before the cat-
egorization. It is interesting that Stevan Harnad used the very ex-
ample of mushrooms to show the impossibility of accepting the
idealizations of language. He described this in his amusing ac-
count of how he happily trusted a Russian student, when in au-
tumn he went hunting for mushrooms near Moscow, but was
deeply suspicious when the same student showed enthusiasm for
hunting for the same mushrooms in New Jersey (Harnad 1990,
personal communication). Harnad has emphasized the provi-
sionality of categories because of individual variation. S&B do 
acknowledge the failure of categorical equivalence across popula-
tions (sect. 3.2), and Harnad’s example falls within that character-
ization, but on the question of singular reference they do not get
beyond Quine’s “gavagai/rabbit” (sect. 4.1), and Quine’s own er-
ror is to assume that a logically singular entity is there in the Real
before human selection. Even though that singularity can be dif-
ferently characterized, for Quine it still retains a given singularity
(Quine 1960, pp. 20–46).
My argument has always been that singularity is a pragmatic but
not an ontological necessity for real-life communication (Wright
1992; 2005). It is pragmatically necessary for two agents in com-
munication to treat a puzzling region of the real as if it is singular,
but that is merely to get their differing perspectives into some kind
of harness so that correction of one by the other can go through.
S&B concede relativity for agent to agent on the sensory level, but
that obviously implies that a perfectly logical coinciding of their
percepts can never be wholly achieved. The obvious inference is
that pragmatic success, in what S&B call “collective decisions”
(sect. 1.2), even over considerable time, does not guarantee that a
perfectly singular objective referent preexists in the Real. Instead,
a number of roughly coinciding referents exist at the focus of so-
cial interest, but they are to be treated as one, so that communi-
cation about that doubtful region can be accomplished. Indeed,
evolution, which forms a key element in their thesis, can be viewed
as a means whereby continuous changes in the Real that provide
reward can be tracked by alteration of categorization across and
within individuals, and not a tracking of preexisting singularities
common to all. To believe in the givenness of singularities is an
evolutionary recipe for disaster. Communication can often be con-
cerned with a correction about singularity itself. To quote a sixth-
century Indian Buddhist philosopher, “even ‘this’ can be a case of
mistaken identity” (Dinnaga, see Matilal 1986, p. 332). So the in-
vestigation of the question of what S&B repeatedly call “ade-
quacy” of response in real-life situations cannot be pursued if one
begins with given countable distinctions, be they Munsell chips or
anything else. A species that determinedly stuck to an achieved
singularity in the face of changes in the Real would not survive,
which is certainly an “inadequacy” of response.
One cannot neglect the “iconic,” that is, the sensory registra-
tion, which is different for each individual (Harnad 1987, p. 550),
nor the differences in learning histories resulting in differing cri-
teria from person to person for what they take as the “same” ob-
ject (Rommetveit 1978, p. 31), because it is these that allow for
correction of an agent by another agent in a new circumstance. It
also reveals why the chicken-and-egg problem does not arise for
human beings (sect. 1.2) because the fictive assumption of perfect
coreference needed for a roughly common focus to be arrived at
seamlessly allows for its apparently paradoxical correction by an-
other.
Where S&B consider real-life situations, they certainly make it
clear that the “shared” convergence of categorical repertoires
does not achieve perfect superimposition of discrimination (sect.
4.3). They make the comment that “different meanings may co-
exist until a situation arises that disentangles them” (sect. 4.2, Fig.
11), but, although the new situation can produce new discrimina-
tions, it cannot finally produce logical perfection across the popu-
lation in what is being individually “singled.”
Of course, what is left out of the artificial experiments is the mo-
tivation of the agents. It is that which prompts the agent to do the
“singling” in the first place, for there is no knowledge or action
without intention. So, regarding artificial experiments, not until
the design of robots or computers has reached the inclusion of mo-
tivation (i.e., the effects of pleasure and pain modules) can the ef-
fects of “singling” in categorization be satisfactorily reproduced or
its changes evolve across a population. S&B do conclude that “[i]t
would be risky to rely on embodiment constraints and statistical
clustering for forming the repertoire of perceptually grounded
categories for use in communication” (sect. 5.1). They also insist
in their conclusion that “there are important degrees of freedom
left” for the individual in category formation, and it is those de-
grees of freedom that allow for the updating of one agent by an-
other when the external Real produces its unexpected challenges.
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What is culture made of?
Chen Yu and Linda Smith
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Abstract: Culture is surely important in human learning. But the relation
between culture and psychological mechanism needs clarification in three
areas: (1) All learning takes place in real time and through real-time mech-
anisms; (2) Social correlations are just a kind of learnable correlations; and
(3) The proper frame of reference for cognitive theories is the perspective
of the learner.
The target article argues that culture – sharing meanings – plays
a special role in the creation of concepts and that this special role
operates in addition to “empiricist” contributions to concepts. In
brief, the take-home message is that empiricist approaches are not
enough and learning in a socially guided culture is special. We
agree fervently with the latter point and reject the former. Culture
is just a broad – and deeply relevant – set of multimodal correla-
tions. The moment-to-moment interactions of a learner in the
world include things in the environment, the labels attached to
those things, and interactions with other social beings. All these
regularities are grist for the empiricist mill.
All learning, all development takes place in real time. Babies
learn language from scratch, through millisecond by millisecond,
second by second, minute by minute changes that arise from their
own sensorimotor interactions with the world. Any theory of learn-
ing has to start here in real time in the regularities that accrue over
those repeated interactions. It has been suggested that these regu-
larities include correlations in the audio stream sufficient to create
word-like units (Saffran et al.1996). These repeated interactions
will also yield other regularities – those resulting from the physical
structure of the world, or the time-locked multimodal dependen-
cies arising from looking, seeing, touching and feeling, as well as
those that arise from the actions of others. Mothers interact with
their infants using hand signals, touching, eye gaze, and intonation,
and all these cooccur in real time, with words, with objects, and with
the infants’ own actions and internal states. These patterns of social
interactions surely reflect culture in that the mother’s interactions
are a product of her own developmental history and the social
world in which that history was embedded. But from the devel-
oping infant’s point of view, from the perspective of the mecha-
nisms internal to the infant, it does not matter whether those cor-
relations are the products of physics, human biology, or a history
of learning in a social world. They are all learnable correlations.
Social correlations are just correlations, but ones that criti-
cally amplify other correlations. Recent studies in human devel-
opment and machine intelligence show that the world and social
signals encoded in multiple modalities play a vital role in language
learning. For example, young children are highly sensitive to cor-
relations among words and the physical properties of the world
(Colunga & Smith 2005; Smith et al. 1996). They are also sensi-
tive to social cues and are able to use them in ways that suggest an
understanding of speaker’s intent (Baldwin 1991; Tomasello
1992). The main point of Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) practical
perspective is that these social cues dramatically enhance learning
about relations between the physical world and language. This is
an important point and the main contribution. But, this need not
reflect a special link between concepts and culture, at least in a
mechanistic sense. Social information can only be made manifest
in correlations that arise from the physical embodiment of the ma-
ture partner (the mother) and the immature partner (the baby) in
real time. For example, the mother “jiggles” an object, the infant
looks, and simultaneously the mother provides the name. These
time-locked social correlations play two roles. First, they add mul-
timodal correlations that enhance and select some physical corre-
lations, thereby making them more salient and thus learnable.
Second, these time-locked and coupled interactions are, from the
perspective of an observer (though perhaps not from the per-
spective of the infant), shared meaning. The viability of these ideas
has been shown in a program of simulation and empirical studies
presented by Yu et al. (in press) and Yu and Ballard (2004),
demonstrating that body movements play a crucial role in creat-
ing correlations between words and world, correlations that yield
world-word mappings on the baby’s part that match those in-
tended by the speaker. The simulations show that the coupled
world-word maps between the speaker and the baby – what some
might call the baby’s ability to infer the referential intent of the
speaker – are made from simple associations in real time and the
accrued results over time of learning those statistics. Critically,
these statistics yield the coupled world-word maps only when they
include body movements such as direction of eye gaze and point-
ing. The power of these correlations results from this coupling of
social partners that enhances and selects the right correlations
(see Thelen & Smith 1994). But notice the mechanism: It is cor-
relational learning all the same.
Culture and the frame of reference problem. One might call a
learning system built on such social cues “culture,” but from the
perspective of the learner, it is just correlations. Culture is what
we, as observers, see as a system of correlations, a system that per-
petuates itself. However, from the perspective of a baby learning
language, culture is not a separate and special source of informa-
tion, but is one grounded in a sea of correlations. Importantly,
these correlations form a complex and dynamic system. Moreover,
the correlations are not passive statistical regularities independent
of the learner. Rather, the learner is an active creator of the cor-
relations in three senses: (1) The bodily orientation of the child’s
sensory system (e.g., where one looks) determines what will be
learned; (2) the very activity of the sensorimotor system adds cor-
relations to the mix; and (3) the child’s activity elicits and is cou-
pled to active social partners, creating even more dynamically
complex and multimodal correlations. There is no culture sepa-
rate from all these correlations in the child’s point of view.
The target article makes an important contribution by pointing
out the role of culture. But the implemented simulation may be too
simple. We suggest that when an embodied agent has real-time ex-
periences in the physical environment, rich social information in
the environment can be acquired from multisensory correlations.
These lead to coupled world-word maps between social partners.
These coupled maps, in our view, embody what is meant by the in-
ference of the internal state of another and also are absolutely cru-
cial to language learning and human cognition more generally.
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The semiotic dynamics of colour
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Abstract: The interesting and deep commentaries on our target
article reflect the continued high interest in the problem of colour
categorisation and naming. Clearly, colour remains for many cog-
nitive science related disciplines a fascinating microworld in
which some of the most fundamental issues for cognition and cul-
ture can be studied. Although our target article took the stance of
practically oriented engineers who are trying to find the best so-
lution for orchestrating the self-organisation of communication
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systems in artificial agents, most commentators focus on the im-
plications for cognitive science and we will do the same in our re-
ply.
R1. Semiotic dynamics
In our target article, we have adopted a relativistic and com-
plex systems viewpoint towards the origin and nature of
colour categories and their names. By a complex systems
viewpoint, we mean that we do not seek an explanation
through the nature or functioning of a single specific aspect
of the overall process, such as the statistical structure of the
world, the nature of the human sensory apparatus, the con-
ceptual space generated by early visual processing (imple-
mented in our simulations as the CIE L*a*b* space), the
presence of genetically predetermined categories, the na-
ture of the neural networks engaged in categorisation or
naming, or the social shaping through language. Instead, we
investigate how the dynamical interaction between all these
various aspects, operating within individuals and, most im-
portantly, across individuals in a population, can collectively
give rise to a set of colour categories and names that are suf-
ficiently shared to make successful communication possible.
Several commentators requested a clarification of what
we mean by “sufficiently shared.” We definitely do not
mean that the categories have to be absolutely identical. On
the contrary, in view of the individual variation in the data
sets available for learning, the individual variation of the
perceptual apparatus (e.g., dichromats vs. tetrachromats),
individual variation in the history of interactions with the
world, and cultural variation as reflected in language or cul-
tural habits, we cannot expect absolute similarity. Many
commentators provide further evidence that this variation
is even larger than we originally thought. We have adopted
therefore a relativistic view on colour, in the sense that in-
dividuals each generate their own ways of perceiving, cate-
gorising, and naming colours, but there is a mechanism,
based on coupling the behaviours of different individuals,
by which individual differences get resolved, even if only lo-
cally and temporarily for the purposes of a single conversa-
tion. The target article therefore advocates a shift from in-
vestigating the mechanism or mechanisms that establish
the “optimal,” “universally shared” set of colour categories
(whether it is through biology, statistical learning, or genetic
evolution) towards investigating the mechanisms through
which a group coordinates their perception, categorisation,
and naming conventions, despite individual differences and
despite the absence of a central controller or telepathy. By
“sufficiently shared” we therefore mean “sufficiently coor-
dinated” to achieve successful communication and com-
munal use, and this depends very much on the environment
and ecology in which the group operates, that is, which dis-
tinctions are relevant in their ongoing interactions.
We have proposed a single key mechanism to achieve co-
ordination, namely, that there must be a mutual coupling
between the various processes in the total chain. For ex-
ample, the low-level signal processing algorithms must get
feedback on whether successful discrimination for lan-
guage was possible so that they can be enhanced or re-
shaped if needed; the category formation process must get
feedback on whether a category was successful in the lan-
guage game so that this influence can be used to reshape
the category; and the lexicon formation process must get
feedback on whether the game succeeded so that the
strength of associations between meanings and labels can
be adjusted. In other words, there is not just an upstream
flow of information from perception to naming, but also a
downstream flow so that all processes can get coordinated
for each individual and across individuals in the population.
The target article has specifically focused on the coupling
between the category acquisition process and the naming
subsystem, showing how the activity of naming is able to
relatively quickly coordinate the categorical repertoire of
different agents so as to allow successful communication. It
also showed that the coupling can either go through genetic
evolution implementing a “memetic drive” (as pointed out
in Blackmore’s commentary) or through cultural evolution
by a direct coupling between individual category formation
and naming. The latter is argued to be the fastest and most
efficient way to reach a coordinated categorical repertoire.
It is, in principle, possible to study this semiotic dynam-
ics in human populations, and some psycholinguistic stud-
ies have indeed tried to track the rapid cognitive and lin-
guistic alignment that appears to take place when humans
engage in communication (Garrod & Anderson 1987). The
target article instead takes a theoretical stance and investi-
gates what kind of dynamical relationships among all the as-
pects of the overall process (world, perception, categorisa-
tion, naming) are necessary and sufficient for a set of agents
to arrive at a successful communication system. Our own
motivation is pragmatic, because we try to find out how we
can best build artificial agents that can self-organise their
own communication systems. Moreover, it is impossible to
integrate with total realism all relevant aspects of the real
world, human ecology, human physiology, brain science, or
human culture into theoretical models. So we are not try-
ing to explain through these simulations why a particular
human population might have adopted a particular cate-
gorisation or lexicon, or why there are specific universal
tendencies in human colour categorisation, rather, we try to
put just enough complexity into our simulations so that we
can study the overall semiotic dynamics underlying social
cognition.
Based on our concrete proposals of the dynamical inter-
action between categorisation and naming processes in in-
dividuals and among individuals, and on computer simula-
tions testing their effectiveness, we derive two types of
conclusions. The first type shows that the individual and
collective dynamics we have introduced are indeed capable
of leading to a coordinated set of colour categories and
names adequate for successful communication in a partic-
ular environment. For example, Figure 15 shows that even
a simple model of genetic evolution of colour categories
coupled with a lexicon formation process based on a bidi-
rectional associative memory and reinforcement learning
allows a population to derive a successful communication
system. Figure 12 shows a similar result for an entirely cul-
tural evolution of colour categories. 
The second type of conclusion argues that the semiotic
dynamics we advocate is not only sufficient but also neces-
sary, in other words, that relying exclusively on one source
of constraints is insufficient to explain how a group of situ-
ated grounded agents arrives at an effective communication
system that is adapted to their environment and ecology.
For example, Figure 20 shows that relying only on the sta-
tistical structure of the world does not allow agents to build
up a sufficiently shared categorical repertoire to allow suc-
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cessful communication. Figure 7 shows that a population is
able to reach a shared set of categories based on gene prop-
agation, but that this process is slow to adapt to changes in
ecology or environment, hence relying only on genetically
innate categories makes it more difficult for a population to
adapt to change.
Given this brief summary, we can now survey the differ-
ent commentaries to this argument. They fall into three
groups: (1) those that provide additional support for these
two types of conclusions, (2) those that argue that they are
not justified, and (3) those that provide suggestions for dif-
ferent experiments or enhancements of various kinds.
R2. Supportive commentaries
Commentaries that provide further justification for a rela-
tivistic, complex systems approach introduce either more
data showing actual variation in colour categorisation and
naming among human groups, or additional evidence why
a particular source of constraints cannot be the sole deter-
minant of a coordinated categorical repertoire in a popula-
tion, and hence why all constraints have to operate together.
Thus Davidoff & Luzzatti argue in favour of the cen-
tral thesis of the target article based on psychological and
anthropological investigations of colour categorisation and
naming. They take an even stronger stance than we do with
respect to the sufficiency argument, namely, they argue that
colour categorisation cannot even properly form without a
labelling process stimulating it. They provide two sorts of
empirical evidence, the first, from cross-cultural studies
that show beyond doubt how the use of language influences
categorisation, not only for language, but also for other cog-
nitive tasks like memory or sorting tasks. Even more fasci-
nating is the evidence reported on anomic aphasics, which
suggests that without the activity of labelling, colour cate-
gorisation cannot function or get off the ground. It is true
that in our simulations the discrimination game is used to
generate colour distinctions and so produces a repertoire of
categories even if language is not involved, contradicting
this evidence. However, in a more realistic setting the dis-
crimination game would only arise and be stimulated if it is
part of a larger task, such as the guessing game. We wonder
nevertheless whether other kinds of tasks (such as food se-
lection) could also not be a stimulus for the discrimination
game and in what way those patients would perform in such
a task.
In the same line, Roberson & O’Hanlon point to addi-
tional empirical studies that demonstrate how the commu-
nicative needs of a community help to shape the specific
categorical repertoires of its members, and that these dif-
ferences not only show up in communication but also in
other cognitive tasks. They paint a much more complex pic-
ture of natural colour categorisation, particularly in nonin-
dustrial cultures, with very few hue-related colour terms
and many concrete exemplars, as opposed to a few focal
points. They emphasise that the similarity of stimuli plays
an important role in shaping repertoires, for example, forc-
ing categories to be continuous in the colour domain as op-
posed to disjoint. This similarity is implicitly embedded in
the radial basis function network used in the target article,
because the network carries out a nearest neighbour com-
parison and therefore groups colour experiences by simi-
larity around a prototype.
The commentary by Bimler points out that “not all ob-
servers experience identical color distributions” and that
there are significant “variations in color distribution among
human habitats.” Both of these factors make it obviously
even more difficult to assume that the statistical structure
of the environment is enough to make all agents converge
on shared colour categories. Bimler also points out that the
sensory apparatus and low-level visual processing in hu-
mans is highly varied, particularly if colour deficiencies are
taken into account, consequently the conceptual space
would show variation as well. Again, this is further evidence
that this source of constraints cannot be the only force that
pushes agents towards a coordinated categorical repertoire.
A similar point is made by Jameson. She criticises our
simulations because we have assumed that all agents use
the same CIE standard model as conceptual space and the
same perceptual process for deriving it. She argues that this
already puts heavy constraints on the kinds of categories
that will evolve, which is of course true. We agree with
Jameson that to examine our stance more thoroughly, we
should also introduce variation on this aspect of the overall
process. The reason why no variation was used at the per-
ceptual level is because (1) we believe that the mechanisms
put in place would already allow agents to arrive at a set of
coordinated categories, even if their perception or concep-
tual space is as different as shown in the empirical evidence
pointed to by Jameson. The categorical networks employed
by each agent in the population would of course look quite
different and it would be very hard to compare them using
the measures employed, but the success rate and speed of
convergence would be comparable, unless of course, there
are basic incompatibilities so that successful communica-
tion is only possible by stepping outside the colour domain.
(2) We wanted to focus particularly on the interaction be-
tween categorisation and naming, because that is the most
controversial issue; with some researchers explicitly deny-
ing that language can have influence on category formation.
By keeping the embodiment and colour space constant, the
impact of different choices with respect to category forma-
tion and the influence of language can be clearly brought
out.
The commentaries by Bimler and Jameson suggest an-
other experiment in which we introduce variation in the
perceptual apparatus and low-level processing. Such an ex-
periment was recently carried out by Joris Bleys, who com-
pared the performance of learning colour categories and
their associated terms for a homogeneous population (as
used in the target article), as well as a heterogeneous pop-
ulation. In the heterogeneous population, each individual
had a random variation on its colour perception, imple-
mented as a normal variation (with a standard deviation of
10) on each of the L*, a*, and b* dimensions. Figure R1
shows the average communicative success for five homoge-
neous populations and five heterogeneous populations,
each population having 20 agents. The communicative suc-
cess of both kinds of agents evolves in the same way, show-
ing that perceptual variations have very little influence on
the communication of colour. The category variance is dif-
ferent, as expected: 3.18  0.41 for the homogeneous pop-
ulations, 6.45  0.51 for the heterogeneous populations,
showing that the categories of the heterogeneous popula-
tion are less similar. These experiments confirm that con-
ceptual coordination does not depend on a unique source
of constraints, but on the interaction between constraints
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and the semiotic dynamics generated in the overall system.
They confirm that agents can build a successful communi-
cation system even if their internal components are not all
identical, they just need to be coordinated. These addi-
tional simulations also illustrate that, using the methodol-
ogy adopted in the target article, it is straightforward to in-
vestigate additional questions or add additional constraints
to bring in more realism. 
Chella also discusses the issue of conceptual spaces. He
correctly points out that our framework is quite general, in
the sense that, given any kind of conceptual space, the
mechanisms presented in the article show how it can be-
come cut up into different regions. The conceptual space
could be auditory, spatial, based on body position sensors,
and so forth, as has been shown by Chella, Ikegami, and
other roboticists referenced in their commentaries. More-
over, the dimensions need not be the direct input from the
sensory channels, but could be processed in various ways,
and thus they could also include relational information, that
is, the dimensions of the space could reflect how adjacent
or opposite two samples are with respect to some directly
observed dimension (a question raised by Bimler).
But, in contrast with Chella, we do not believe that we
have actually shown how the conceptual spaces themselves
are learned. The novelty of our approach (with respect to
other work on conceptual spaces) is to show how verbal in-
teraction can help to shape the way the conceptual space is
divided up into different categorical regions. As pointed out
by Bódog, Háden, Jakab & Palatinus (Bódog et al.), we
assume the L*a*b* space as given and fixed in all the ex-
periments (because we specifically wanted to study the im-
pact of categorisation and naming). It is perfectly possible
however to make this aspect undergo either genetic or cul-
tural evolution (as suggested by these commentators). In a
recent piece of work, Nicolas Neubauer focused precisely
on this topic, showing in computer simulations how the
brightness dimension could become a separate conceptual
space (leading to categories like “light” and “dark”) in addi-
tion to the hue-based colour space, so that multi-word sen-
tence like “dark blue” could be formed. Neubauer again
showed convincingly how language can play a crucial role
in fixing the use of a new conceptual space in a population,
thus providing further computational support to the com-
plex systems view advocated in the target article (Neubauer
2003). 
Another commentator who argues that we should make
even more aspects of the overall process variable, is
Wright. He rightfully claims that we introduce a strong bias
in the very beginning of the perceptual process by assum-
ing the notion of different individual samples, whereas in
realistic circumstances even the notion of what counts as a
single object should be the subject of negotiated pragmatic
convention. We agree with Wright’s position, and in other
– more realistic – experiments we carried out on real world
robots, this was indeed a major issue (Steels & Kaplan
2002b). Even while using the same segmentation algo-
rithm, two robots quite often diverge on what the bound-
aries of objects are, simply because slightly different light
conditions or angles of view give different segmentation re-
sults. We believe that it is entirely possible to create the
same sort of coupled mutual feedback that we have now set
up between the category formation process and the naming
process, between the object identification process and
other aspects of the total cognitive chain, so that verbal in-
teraction could play a role in deciding what counts as a sin-
gular object.
Various authors make comparisons to animal categorisa-
tion and signaling, particularly with respect to birds. Chris-
tensen & Tommasi point to empirical research showing
that birds are not only capable of colour categorisation in
referential communication but also of associating sponta-
neous vocalisations with new colour distinctions. This re-
search is fascinating and it shows that the semiotic dynam-
ics discussed in our article might already be operating in
certain animal species. Given the simplicity of the mecha-
nisms we have used, this is not surprising, but we would
welcome further investigations for other species. The fact
that animals might be able to self-organise a communica-
tion system and coordinate their categorisation of reality,
strikes us as a much more significant step than the ability of
some animals to mimic an existing human-invented semi-
otic system.
Harter & Lu summarise very accurately our position
that multiple constraints act on the shaping of communica-
tion systems, and they argue for a balanced view in which
the different dynamical systems at the genetic, individual
learning, and cultural level interact. A similar position is
taken by Lehky, who suggests that the cultural influence
on colour categories through language can be stronger for
some categories and weaker for others. Lehky points out
that there might be basic categories that are so crucial to
survival that there is no time to learn them, and there are
indeed many categories relevant in human life that are not
or only sparingly lexicalised (the domain of olfaction is a
good example). In these cases, coordination would have to
be achieved through other means than verbal interaction.
It is difficult to disagree with this stance. As mentioned, the
target article develops rather extreme positions so that the
conclusions of the model are clear, but generally speaking,
we argue that multiple constraints are at work, and we show
through our models that learning without language or ge-
netic evolution without language can also lead to the for-
mation of perceptually grounded categories.
Two supportive commentaries by Ikegami and by Yu &
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Figure R1. The average communicative success of five popula-
tions consisting of identical agents versus the average success of
five populations consisting of agents having variations in their
chromatic perception.
Smith both emphasise the coupled dynamical systems
viewpoint, as advocated in the target article. Both com-
mentaries emphasise also the need for a much more active
role of the learner in shaping the environment available for
learning, which implies that the input itself would also be
influenced by the semiotic dynamics of interacting agents,
a point we entirely agree with, although it has not been re-
alised in the presented simulations.
More specifically, Ikegami reports experiments with
mobile agents whereby sharing categories means sharing
the sensory-motor coordination relevant for a joined activ-
ity (such as one agent tracking another one). In his view, the
kind of verbal interactions we use in the target article to co-
ordinate categorisation is only one example of the more
general social process in which interacting agents coordi-
nate their conceptualisations of the world: The role of ver-
bal interaction is to stimulate categorical refinement.
Yu & Smith interpret the notion of culture as just one of
the forces acting on the developing child, but it operates by
generating correlations that would not be generated other-
wise and is therefore similar to other forces, such as the
physics of the real world, which also generate correlations.
Yu & Smith believe that correlational learning (as convinc-
ingly demonstrated in their own work) can be the main
source of category formation and category coordination
(see also the commentary by Vogt & Smith on cross-situ-
ational learning), but they insist, as we do, on the frame-
work of coupled dynamical systems. We agree entirely that
it would be desirable to have much richer, active agents in
much richer environments with developmental time-lines
that are long enough to allow correlational learning to be-
come effective, but there are, at this moment, practical lim-
its to the simulation experiments that can be performed re-
alistically. As robotics further develops in the direction of
complex humanoid robots, such more complex experi-
ments will perhaps become more feasible, but they would
still require extraordinary effort.
Finally, Blackmore correctly remarks that our simula-
tions (particularly those reported in Fig. 14) show how
memetic processes can steer the genetic assimilation of
categories, something she has called memetic drive. The
“memes” in this case are words for naming certain colour
categories and they evolve in a purely cultural fashion. The
success of using a word depends on the nature of the colour
category it employs and therefore, if there is a strong cou-
pling between communicative success and fitness, that
colour category will be genetically reinforced. However, in
contrast with Blackmore, we believe that this type of ge-
netic assimilation of perceptually grounded categories is
rather exceptional, given that (1) it makes the population no
longer able to adapt quickly to change, (2) it makes it more
difficult to explain the observed variation across popula-
tions and individuals, and (3) it makes it hard to explain why
somebody born from parents foreign to a particular culture
can nevertheless perfectly well pick up the colour distinc-
tions of another culture. We believe that our work is never-
theless very relevant to memetic theory, because it shows
how certain behaviours, in this case ways of categorising re-
ality, can replicate without genetic evolution, more specifi-
cally, through the coordinating force of verbal interactions.
Often memetic theorists assume that a particular form of
behaviour can be copied (supposedly by imitation) from
one individual to another, but fail to be precise in how this
copying is carried out. It can definitely not be based on
telepathy, and imitation has turned out to be a very difficult
task for which no operational models exist today.
R3. Opposing views
The commentaries that question the complex systems view
advocated in the target article take two forms. Some argue
that the empirical data of human colour categorisation con-
tradicts the trends seen in the simulations. Others argue
that a particular source of constraints might still be suffi-
cient, if only we would have made the sensory input data,
the perceptual process, the category formation process, or
the language game itself much richer and more realistic
compared to humans. In addition, there are some com-
mentators who consider our simulations too simplistic to be
relevant for human psychology.
Counterevidence based on empirical data is provided by
Webster & Kay. They point out (as we also did in our tar-
get article) that there is strong evidence for universal ten-
dencies in colour categorisation, and that these tendencies
can be partly explained by the environmental, ecological,
physiological, and cognitive constraints operating on colour
categorisation and naming. We see similar tendencies in the
simulations, and it would indeed be extremely interesting
to follow up on Webster & Kay’s suggestion to apply the
variance metric used in the target article to the WCS data.
We have also argued that many more constraints would
have to be put in (e.g., more realistic ecologically valid in-
put) to achieve tendencies closer to human languages.
Next, Webster & Kay point out that there are, in fact,
important individual differences between speakers of the
same language, whereas our simulations show that the
group strongly converges to a similar set of categories. We
accept the findings reported by Webster & Kay. One might
think that these derive from the nature of the psychological
testing that was used during the World Color Survey (Kay
et al. 2003), which does not involve a communicative set-
ting in which speakers have to use colour terms to achieve
a communicative act (differences pointed out also by Vogt
& Smith) or that the individual differences are an artefact
of trying to shoehorn WCS colour terms into English colour
terms. However, we have done some empirical testing of
our own by asking humans from the same language family
to play guessing games of the same sort used in the target
article, and also found evidence for a similar sort of indi-
vidual variation within the population (Belpaeme 2002a).
This individual intralanguage variation is very puzzling.
If the focus for unique green for one observer may be the
focus of unique yellow or unique blue for another, then
communication becomes highly fallible. Our response to
this is that we should not just take a snapshot from a ran-
domly sampled population, but look at repeated interac-
tions in a group of individuals, for example, the members of
a family, the children in a class, a team of architects, de-
signers, and builders. We predict that then a kind of con-
verging semiotic dynamics will be seen, similar to the one
discussed in the target article. In other words, we have to
narrow down the interpretation of the simulations reported
in the article. Rather than talk about languages, we should
talk about groups of speakers who coordinate locally their
colour categorisations and names. Of course, if one is al-
ready a speaker of a given language, the focal points would
normally be already much closer and convergence would be
much faster. At this moment, empirical data is almost en-
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tirely lacking on this short-term coordination of colour cat-
egories.
Hampton argues that the conclusions of the target arti-
cle may not hold up anymore if a more realistic source of
sensory data and a more varied set of conceptual domains
are used. We agree that focusing on colour as an exclusive
dimension, and not taking into account many of the other
dimensions that make up a normal sensory experience, is
not realistic. We also agree that in other domains, such as
biological classes, the constraints imposed by the structure
of the world may be more constraining than the colour do-
main. As mentioned earlier, our position is not that one
source of constraint is not sufficient, but rather that the
combination of constraints is needed. 
Grossberg (rightfully) argues that our simulations take
a number of important shortcuts with respect to the source
of sensory data and the human perceptual process. The
samples used in the experiments do not take realistic light-
ing conditions or surface context into account. The neural
network models could be made more realistic, for example,
by using Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory (even
though we dispute that our networks are incapable of in-
cremental learning, see Fig. 4). However, it is unclear
whether making all these changes are crucial for the issues
raised in the article. None of the experiments reported by
Grossberg address the issue of sharing for communication,
because they are all based on a single individual network,
which is presented a series of samples from which it has to
generalise. They do not investigate how a population of
networks can become coordinated given different sets of
samples, a changing environment and ecology, variation in
the perceptual apparatus, and so forth. We think it is per-
fectly possible to redo all the experiments reported in the
article using ART as a categorisation engine instead of the
RBF networks, but that the semiotic dynamics reported in
our simulations would be quite similar if the same mutual
feedback relations between lexicon and category formation
are put in place.
Another neural-perceptual argument as to why culture,
ecology, or language need not influence the coordination of
colour categories comes from Wachtler. He argues that
neurons basically adapt to achieve optimal information cod-
ing of environmental stimuli. This has been demonstrated
for visual pathways, and Wachtler believes that this would
also be the case for categorisation targeting communica-
tion. As Wachtler states: “color vision is adapted to the sta-
tistics of natural chromatic signals, which implies shared
categories.”
Although we agree that the statistics of natural chromatic
signals and its information-theoretic optimal coding could
play an important role in low-level vision, there is a differ-
ence between the conceptual spaces generated by low-level
vision and the way this space is cut up for the categorisa-
tion process. We are not aware of evidence that the colour
terms found in natural languages can be explained on the
basis of information-theoretic optimality. Furthermore, as
Wachtler mentions, there is quite some interindividual
variation in the perception of colour (as explored in Fig.
R1). There are extreme variations, such as colour defi-
ciency, but also there are subtle variations in colour per-
ception in colour normals. Wachtler describes the idiosyn-
crasies in colour naming by colour deficient subjects,
which, just as colour-normal subjects, have to learn lexical
labels for their perceptual categories, but nevertheless,
Wachtler believes that lexicon acquisition “does not influ-
ence perceptual categories.” The subjects just acquire a lex-
icon with which they try to conform to the linguistic norm.
But then, what are the perceptual categories used in this
lexicon like? They cannot be identical to the categories of
colour normals, but must be framed through the filter of
colour deficiency. As Wachtler mentions: “Many color-de-
ficient individuals are not even aware about their condition
until their first color-vision test.” Does this not illustrate
that colour deficient individuals develop some sort of cate-
gorisation that is sufficiently coordinated to function in a
collective setting?
Vogt & Smith question both the category formation pro-
cess we have used and the essential mechanism by which
categories get aligned through mutual feedback. These
choices are argued to be unrealistic with respect to human
psychology, and hence our claims “may no longer hold” if a
more realistic model is used. Vogt & Smith argue that this
more realistic model is cross-situational learning without
feedback from success in communication on category for-
mation or lexicon acquisition. Against this comment, we ar-
gue as follows. 
First of all, the feedback used in the game is not linguis-
tic, but pragmatic. The agents obtain evidence of whether
or not the communicative act succeeded and have the op-
portunity to repair it by additional pointing when it failed.
Neither the speaker nor the hearer ever explicitly corrects
the words used. Evidence in the literature about the relative
absence of corrective feedback concerns the latter not the
former. No child psychologist has claimed that children or
adults never have a clue whether their communication failed
or that they never try to repair failed communication. If a
mother asks her child for a cookie and gets a doll instead, she
does not simply ignore this situation, but will try to repair it.
If we never experience success or failure in communication,
then why do we communicate in the first place?
Second, we insist that mutual feedback from language to
category formation and from category formation to lan-
guage are essential for agents to align their categorical
repertoires. 
Vogt & Smith seem to take an empiricist position, as-
suming that cross-situational learning is able to develop a
repertoire of categories that can be shared without feed-
back on communicative success. The slow rate of learning
they obtained in their experiments is taken to be a virtue,
whereas, in fact, the self-organisation of a communication
system is already so difficult in realistic circumstances (with
many sources of stochasticity and error intervening) that a
slow learning rate may mean that the shared communica-
tion system cannot get off the ground in more realistic cir-
cumstances, particularly if the categorical dimensions are
no longer simple and given. Given the observations by
Webster & Kay of individual variance within the same lan-
guage group and our argument that humans must be able
to quickly align their categorical repertoires within the con-
text and time frame of a single conversation, we cannot af-
ford a slow learning rate. Chromatic perception samples
from a continuous space and the infinite number of values
that a percept can take might hamper cross-situational
learning, especially in large populations; this closely relates
to the Sorites paradox characterised by Davidoff & Luz-
zatti (see also, Davidoff 2001). New experiments on cross-
situational learning in continuous feature spaces will be
needed to examine this argument.
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Moreover, in another study, we used real robots roaming
freely in the environment to compare cross-situational
learning (called observational learning) and discrimination-
based learning with pragmatic feedback (Steels & Kaplan
2002b). Our conclusion was that even though categories
form in cross-situational learning, they are not sufficiently
shared to be the basis of a successful communication sys-
tem. This does not mean that cross-situational learning
does not play any role at all in human learning. We believe
that any method of learning is welcome and should be used.
We do however believe that the coupling of language to cat-
egory formation based on communicative success is essen-
tial for achieving effective communication systems.
Kotchoubey rejects our simulations, and particularly
the guessing game, as being irrelevant for psychology and
that is, in principle, fine with us, because we do not claim
this relevance. However, we feel that he has not taken into
account that “verbal behavior” is only possible when there
is a categorisation of reality (a “segmentation of the face of
nature,” quoting Whorf). The studies undertaken in our
target article could be (and have been) applied to domains
like time or predicate-argument structure. One of our stu-
dents, Joachim de Beule (2004), has recently carried out ex-
periments in which agents have sufficient data about the
temporal sequencing of events derived through visual pro-
cessing and event recognition algorithms that they can gen-
erate a temporal conceptual space and start to cut it up into
tense distinctions like present–past–future, or aspect dis-
tinctions like perfective–imperfective. Just as in the colour
case, these distinctions must be coordinated among the
members of the population, which in turn impact how these
individuals structure their experiences for communication.
These experiments are further illustrations of how the cre-
ation of a shared communication system can impact con-
cept formation and thus shape the way that individuals
structure their experience. Kotchoubey confuses, in our
view, the ability to make a perceptual judgment (e.g.,
whether two hues or two sounds are similar or not) and a
categorical judgment, which assumes a division of the con-
tinuous space. To take an example mentioned by Davidoff,
an individual may be able to clearly see the difference be-
tween navy blue and royal blue but may not find it to be sig-
nificant (and thus confuse samples with these colours), be-
cause these categories are not so commonly lexicalised in
his or her language.
Maes questions the use of the guessing game, stating
that our models “stay trapped in an ‘Augustinian’ referen-
tial theory of meaning” and do not adequately reflect a cul-
turalist view, so that no conclusions can be drawn with re-
spect to human psychology. It is true that we take shared
attention for granted in our simulations. Agents are able to
play a language game, but this critically involves a shared
protocol of interaction and some form of attention influ-
ence independent of language, for example, through point-
ing or eye-gaze following. There is quite a lot of work in de-
velopmental robotics at the moment on how joined
attention might be achieved, but the problems involved are
enormous (see e.g., the review in Kaplan & Hafner 2004).
In realistic circumstances, they involve the ability to guess
the intentions of other agents and the ability to interpret re-
actions to verbal interaction. In the target article, all of
these issues are shortcut in order to focus on the semiotic
dynamics of the total game. But it is not true that the guess-
ing games concern merely sticking labels on existing cate-
gories. The experiments show, on the contrary, how the for-
mation of categories is stimulated by playing the language
game, and how category prototypes and boundaries shift to
become more aligned as a side effect of the game. More-
over, the agents are situated in a shared context in which
there is a common task (namely, identify one of the samples
in this context), so that discrimination in the specific con-
text becomes a key source of constraints over and above the
pointing. The category chosen must not simply be true for
the topic, but it must distinguish the topic with respect to
the other objects in the context.
Some other commentators question our model of genetic
evolution. For example, Vilarroya, who is generally sup-
portive of our thesis, argues that we use a totally unrealistic
and naive model of genetic evolution because phenotypical
traits are represented directly in the genome. The same
point is made by Wang & Gong who argue that using only
mutations and no crossover slows down genetic evolution.
Westbury & Hollis point out that because the population
size is small, only small areas of the total search space can
be explored, and because we let the mutation rate vary with
fitness, there is a strong bias towards convergence, and
hence towards the conclusion that genetic evolution is ca-
pable of generating a shared repertoire. We completely
agree with these commentators that our model of genetic
evolution is extremely simplistic (it is, in fact, the simplest
model one might imagine). We did not make it more com-
plex, simply because even this simplistic model serves its
purpose, namely, it derives a set of categories in the popu-
lation that is adequate for discrimination and undergoes ge-
netic assimilation when coupled to language. Making this
aspect of the overall process more complex would obscure
the overall dynamics. We note though (against Westbury &
Hollis) that there is evidence that mutation rates are influ-
enced by fitness, as shown in the SOS gene response dis-
cussed by Radman (1975) and Matic et al. (1997), so that
this assumption is not entirely devoid of biological plausi-
bility. Moreover, we need to keep at least some parents and
children interacting, because the lexicon is transmitted in a
cultural way and not genetically. If the total population is
replaced, the lexicon would be completely wiped out.
A similar comment against the simplicity of our models
is made by Satterfield, who argues that we should take the
developmental process much more seriously (this point was
also made by Vilarroya). Indeed, it is well known that
neonates and young children might not have the same
colour perception as adults have. Children also take a con-
siderable amount of time to learn the meaning of colour
terms and to correctly map colour on colour terms (see the
references in Vogt & Smith). This change could in princi-
ple be examined by having a mixed population of agents at
different “age levels.” It raises the issue of how children and
adults are able to interact with each other, even when at dif-
ferent developmental stages. We are all in favour of refin-
ing our simulations to introduce this feature. But the ques-
tion is again, whether making this aspect more realistic
would disprove our central thesis. We believe it would not.
On the contrary, we see variation caused by differences in
developmental stage as an additional argument for why the
formation of a repertoire of concepts for communication
should be seen as a coordination problem involving con-
stant alignment and adjustment, instead of the search for a
single optimal solution. In our view, there is no final state
of a language or its underlying ontology, as the group keeps
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adapting both, whenever communicative needs or conven-
tions change.
The commentary by Harnad is highly critical of our ap-
proach, perhaps because he assumes that we are trying to
explain how language (in its full richness) evolved and how
categories that are definable in terms of other categories
can be learned, but this is not what we try to do here. We
only investigate how far perceptually grounded categories
can become sufficiently coordinated in a population to be
the basis of an effective communication system. A lot of his
criticism is valid if we had this other goal in mind.
We do think however that the guessing game is repre-
sentative of one of the basic functions of language, namely,
drawing attention to some aspect of the environment using
signalling, a function that is already present in alarm calls.
Suppose two individuals are walking in a forest hunting for
mushrooms and they see a number of mushrooms. When
one of them says “don’t eat the yellow ones,” they play a
guessing game of the sort used in the article. The speaker
has discriminated the bad mushrooms from the others
based on a hue distinction and used the word “yellow” to
name that distinction. Although the same could be achieved
with pointing (indeed, bootstrapping a shared lexicon and
its associated categorical repertoire critically depends in
our model on nonverbal communication), there are signif-
icant advantages over pointing, one of them being that ges-
ture recognition is itself error-prone, another one is that
communication then becomes feasible even if the individ-
uals involved are not situated in exactly the same shared
context or see the situation from the same viewpoint.
We also disagree with Harnad about the nature of cate-
gorisation. In our view, categorisation is always relative to
some frame of reference and task. There is no absolute cor-
rect or absolutely optimal way of categorisation, and the
context always plays a role. If all mushrooms are yellow, say-
ing “yellow” does not help very much, the speaker must use
more refined colour distinctions or distinctions in another
domain, such as shape or size. So we therefore disagree, as
well, with Matthen who argues that colour perception is
not categorical. He makes a comparison with phonemes,
which is interesting and relevant (and our group has worked
extensively on how a repertoire of speech sounds can self-
organise in a population, see de Boer 2000). Phonemes are
similar to colour categories in the sense that there is a lot of
cross-linguistic variation, so that a particular distinction in
one language (like between keen and kin or lap and rap)
may be phonologically irrelevant in another (the /ee/ and /
i/ sounds are nondistinctive for Spanish and the /l/ and /r/
sounds are nondistinctive for Japanese). Speakers of these
other languages therefore have difficulty in accurately hear-
ing or reproducing those distinctions when they are speak-
ing English. Moreover, although some consonants (like bi-
labial /b/ and dental /d/) show a clear difference because
they involve different articulators, vowels and many conso-
nants form prototypes in a continuous space, and so we get
exactly the same situation as studied in the target article,
namely, agents have to coordinate their ways of categoris-
ing sounds by progressive alignment.
Matthen then argues for a more mixed approach, in
which some aspects of colour categorisation are genetically
determined (e.g., the primary hues based on the L*a*b*
space generated by the opponent channels) and then mod-
ulated by cultural processes. This approach is widely ac-
cepted and also advocated by Bódog et al. It could be in-
vestigated further with the tools we have provided in our
simulation experiments.
A final critical commentary is provided by Cowley. He
makes a philosophical argument, attributed to Wittgen-
stein, that communication relies not on shared categories
but on relations and on integration with social activity. We
believe that our simulations capture many aspects of the
Wittgensteinian approach to language, particularly if com-
pared to a logicist view (as advocated by the early Wittgen-
stein) in which meaning is supposed to be absolute and
shared independently of the social history of interactions il-
lustrated in language games.
R4. Suggestions for additional experiments
Many commentators have proposed fascinating additional
experiments and extensions. Most of these could be done
in a straightforward manner within the framework we have
developed and they would form excellent topics for a Mas-
ters or in some cases a Ph.D. thesis. We have already re-
ported on one experiment earlier in which the agents use
different low-level processing so that their conceptual
space (the L*a*b* space) is different. We briefly summarise
some of the other suggestions:
1. Bódog et al. propose an experiment in which the
agents first genetically evolve colour categories so that
there is an initial base of sharing, and then learning takes
over, further refining and adaptively shaping the categories
or a particular language. They also suggest introducing a
better model for the ecological constraints based on some
relevance measure. Both of these experiments could be
done in a straightforward way.
2. Based on the observations by Bimler and Jameson
concerning the variation in the perceptual apparatus and
the conceptual colour space among humans, we could set
up an experiment introducing such a variation. In fact, such
experiments were done by our student Joris Bleys.
3. Hampton suggests giving agents a different social
status so that some are more authoritative than others. Sev-
eral researchers have done this kind of experiment for the
naming game, and show that this has a conservative effect
on cultural evolution. This line of investigation is also in-
teresting for current research on the formation of social
networks, because language can clearly be a factor in the
formation and sustenance of a network.
4. Yu & Smith argue for an active learner. The learner
is not passively taking in perceptual and linguistic stimuli,
but actively explores the world through directing its atten-
tion, through experiencing the world through its sensori-
motor system and through eliciting interaction from social
partners. Their suggestion is welcomed, as indeed our
agents do not actively expand their knowledge, but instead
passively play language games. The interactions between
the agents will certainly benefit from an active exploration
of the environment. A concrete way to achieve this is to let
agents preferentially communicate about colour stimuli for
which they have no label yet. This would speed up the ac-
quisition of a lexicon, and in the case of cultural learning
would have repercussions on the acquisition of categories.
5. Satterfield argues that we should give different
agents different developmental time lines and introduce
profound developmental change, including to the concep-
tual spaces used by the agent depending on age. Such a fas-
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cinating experiment would be highly valuable, particularly
if it could be based on empirical data of child development.
6. Wang & Gong suggest adding stochasticity to the
feedback received by speaker and hearer (something they
have explored in their own work). Additional stochasticity
could come from errors in transmission, from cognitive er-
rors in lexicon lookup or categorisation, or from slips in per-
ception. In some other studies, we already showed that if
the stochasticity is too high, the communication system will
not get off the ground, but once the system is in place, it is
sufficiently robust to cope with these errors (see Steels &
Kaplan 1998), which is a counterargument to Harnad, who
claims that verbal communication is not relevant to achieve
more robust forms of shared attention.
Some other suggestions have already been investigated
by ourselves and other researchers. For example, Huyck &
Mitchell wonder how hierarchical categories could arise.
This was already shown in some of our earlier simulations
(see discussion of the “Talking Heads Experiment” in Steels
& Kaplan, 2002b). In these experiments, a population of
(up to 3,000) agents played the same sort of guessing game
as used in the target article. But instead of radial basis func-
tion networks, agents used discrimination trees to cut up
their conceptual space, with more abstract categories being
developed and used before more specific categories. The
Talking Heads experiment showed the same key phenom-
ena as discussed in the target article, namely coordination
of hierarchical categorical repertoires through language
games, because the same mutual feedback between cate-
gorisation and naming was implemented. We believe that
many different kinds of concept formation algorithms can
be employed as long as this mutual feedback is put into
place.
The Talking Heads experiment also addressed an issue
raised by van Brakel, namely, how far is colour a cultural
dimension? As van Brakel correctly remarks, colour is al-
ready built into the perception, naming, and categorisation
behaviour of the agents, but this was only done to focus the
experimentation. When agents are given access to more
complex sensory data and when the kind of the categories
are not predefined, the categories themselves will be sub-
ject to cultural pressures. In the Talking Heads experiment,
agents use more complex vision algorithms to generate sev-
eral sensory dimensions, based on size, shape, brightness,
spatial position, and so forth and hence multi-dimensional
conceptual spaces can be constructed that combine any of
these. In this case, there is no guarantee that the hue-based
colour space comes out as the basis for the agents’ categor-
ical repertoire, let alone that it is the only one. Indeed, in
the experiment, we saw that sometimes two agents would
use quite different conceptual spaces. For example, for one
agent “the right-most object in the scene” (a positional cat-
egory) could be the meaning of a word “babodo,” whereas
for another agent the same word might mean “a specific
area in the L*a*b* colour space corresponding to bluish
green.” This pattern could be stable for a while, leading to
successful communication, until a situation arose where the
right-most object did not have this colour, at which point
the agents had to disentangle those meanings (see Steels &
Kaplan 2002b).
These observations are also relevant to the commentary
of Wang & Gong, who argued that 
Considering heterogeneous sensorimotor systems or learning
mechanisms adopted by agents and the multiple features con-
tained in world items, it is possible for agents, through differ-
ent learning mechanisms, to create different categories for the
same world item based on its different features. Besides, if both
the categories partitioned in semantics inside one agent and the
word forms partitioned in symbols can distinguish world items,
it is possible that each agent will develop its own associative net-
work between word forms and its categories, and successful
communication is still possible even though there are no shared
categories.
Indeed, this is entirely possible and undoubtedly also oc-
curs in human language. Wang & Gong, for example, sug-
gest that lexical labels such as “friend” or “loyalty” will be
associated with concepts that differ wildly from individual
to individual, this without ever hindering communication.
We agree, and also believe that abstract concepts that rely
on a multitude of sensory information and hierarchical con-
cepts will diverge between individuals.
This brings us back to the initial point made in the be-
ginning of our reply: By sufficient sharing we do not mean
that the categories are identical, but rather that they are suf-
ficiently coordinated to allow successful communication.
R5. Conclusions
There is a lot more to say about each individual commen-
tary, and the richness and multiple views they introduce at-
test to the enormous complexity of human colour categori-
sation and naming. An important subset of commentaries
has provided additional evidence from various angles show-
ing that the environment, physiology, low-level visual pro-
cessing, developmental stage, social status, and cultural in-
fluence are highly varied among individuals, even in the
same population. This reinforces our thesis that there is not
a single source of constraints on shaping the categories used
for communication, but that individuals combine multiple
sources of constraints to coordinate their categories. It also
reinforces the idea that there is not a single optimal, uni-
versal set of categories that simply need to be labelled, but
rather that categorical repertoires are shaped and reshaped
in a relativistic fashion, even temporarily within the context
of a single conversation.
On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that certain
sources of constraints are found that are more powerful
than the ones found until now, and we therefore also see
much value in the commentaries from opponents. For 
example, the information-theoretic optimality coding sug-
gested by Wachtler needs to be explored further and com-
pared to human colour categories, and the more sophisti-
cated and realistic neural networks of Grossberg may
indeed provide constraints that push the categorical reper-
toires more towards human categories.
The many suggestions for increased complexity in the
models also show that our target article cannot be seen as
an endpoint, but rather as the starting point for investiga-
tions into the dynamical interactions between the many
constraints operating on cognition and culture. It would be
fascinating to collect much more data on how humans co-
ordinate their colour categories and to relate these data to
the kind of theoretical models of conceptual and linguistic
coordination discussed in this target article.
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